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ABSTRACT 
Institutions of higher education, the nation’s ideological filters, shape our world and our 
very being-in-the-world. Given the current anthro-cultural state of affairs around the globe, this 
investigation posits institutions of higher education’s complicity in the proliferation of societal 
dis-ease and its responsibility in assisting to recalibrate the global moral compass. Following 
these assertions this inquiry is focused on the other-than-ness of higher education, and re-
imagines both humanity and higher education to be what it is not yet, but must become. More 
specifically, through Buddhism and Ubuntu, this investigation (re)thinks institutions of higher 
education as transformational educative environments of human becoming rather than factories 
of knowledge acquisition and workforce deployment. Exploring the shift in the aim of higher 
education beginning in the latter half of the 20th and intensifying in the 21st century, this study 
theorizes the necessitation of an ontological revolution—a (re)turn to the equanimous privileging 
of ontology and epistemology—which opens up to the possibility of being differently in the 
world. Utilizing two non-Western knowledges/philosophies, the South African philosophy of 
Ubuntu and Eastern Buddhism, this inquiry de-centers Western ontological and epistemological 
positionalities. Asserting the inseparability of ontology and epistemology, this inquiry embarks 
on a re-conceptualization of the Western subject. The newly re-conceptualized Being-West sets 
the inquiry on a futural line of flight, (re)imagining an absent present-future in higher education 
bolstered by a new conception of self, and an onto-educational philosophy of higher education, 
which engenders being-becoming more human and an understanding our shared humanity.  
Finally, this conceptual inquiry offers no solutions, but provokes, encourages new lines of flight, 
which generate rhizomatic nodes of becoming, pregnant with the possibility of catalyzing a 
revolutionary human becoming.  
 x 
“Writing for me is thinking, and it’s also a way to position myself in the world, particularly when 
I don’t like what’s going on.” 
– Toni Morrison, NEA Arts Magazine, 2014
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CHAPTER ONE: 
TURNING REALITY ON ITS HEAD, (RE)IMAGINING A NEW WAY 
“Imagination is more important that knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know 
and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know 
and understand.”  
- Albert Einstein - 
All writing is situated within the world, that is, history, reality (everyday lived 
experiences), and futurity are ever present–each word, phrase, and sentence is an amalgamation 
of a space/time trinitarian onto-epistemology intricately woven into the very matter of the 
communicatory medium (Derrida, 1972/1981). This inquiry is no exception. At the time of 
writing, the world seems to be in crisis, or perhaps my awareness1 of the physical, spiritual, 
ontological, and epistemological violence has been heighted as a result of the thinking and re-
thinking inherent in becoming-PhD (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987); at any rate, it seems that we 
are besieged from all sides by anti-intellectualism, totalitarian political conservatism, partisan 
politics, and a complete disrespect for the personhood of every individual. Over the past year, 
this country has experienced what can only be described as a year of killing, which among other 
things reveals–no, necessitates a different way of being. I argue, the murders of unarmed people 
of color at the hands of American law enforcement officers—i.e. Trayvon Martin, Michael 
Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray—the recent mass shootings in 
South Carolina and closer to home in Lafayette, Louisiana; the kidnappings and religious 
massacres in Nigeria, the attacks of September 11, genocide, slavery, racism, war, colonialism, 
sexism, xenophobia, poverty, and homophobia are all symptoms of the same “dis-ease” (P. 
Hendry, personal communication, May, 7, 2015). This “dis-ease” (P. Hendry, personal 
1 Awareness, according to Kuhn (1962/2012), “is prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory” (p. 67). 
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communication, May, 7, 2015), this crisis at its core is found the symptoms of a deficit in 
understanding our shared humanity or a failure in knowing we “are not, in fact, the ‘other’” 
(Toni Morrison, 1989, p. 9). These events “have a way of imposing themselves” (Waldron, 2003, 
p. 145); as we watch the nightly news, read the daily paper, and browse various digital news sites
we are bombarded with images, “with the multiple faces of human evil and suffering” and one 
could speculate that each of us, unconsciously, fears “an inescapably inhumane reality” 
(Waldron, 2004, p. 145). Indeed, to quote Shakespeare (1611/2004), it may appear that “Hell is 
empty, /and All the devils are here” (1.2.214-215); however, understanding the universe as 
pantareic2 compels us toward radical hope (Lear, 2008), which sets in motion a new “being 
becoming” (Ramose, 2002, p. 233)–an onto-epistemological metamorphosis3, which will require 
not incremental adjustments to thinking and doing, but a serious transmutation of Western 
subjectivity, a new definition of self. The convergence of Buddhism from the East and Ubuntu 
from Africa ushers in a new way of thinking the Western subject, metamorphosing the Western 
subject into the re-conceptualized Being-West.  
William Waldron (2003) writing on the possibility of combining the Buddhist notion of 
subjectivity with evolutionary science to understand the mess we now find ourselves in, posits, 
the ills of humanity are caused by a false human understanding of self–of the ‘I’ that ‘we’ 
2 A Greek philosophy of the universe, which holds that all things are in flux, ever-flowing. It also serves 
as the basis for the African philosophic conception of the universe, which holds that “order cannot be 
established and fixed for all time” (Ramose, 2002, p. 234). This concept undergirds chaos and complexity 
theory (Capra, 1996). Ramose (2002) uses the concept as justification of the inseparability of ontology 
and epistemology, of being and becoming.  
3 Metamorphosis, derived from the Greek metamorphoun, is defined as “a change of form or nature of a 
thing or person into a completely different one, by natural or supernatural means” (Google online 
dictionary, n.d.). Following, Louw’s (2011) assertion regarding the use of the term transformation in the 
colonizing practices of Christian missionaries, metamorphosis or a derivative will be utilized in place of 
transformation where possible. Louw (2011) states, “Because nothing could be assimilated into the 
church, the buzzword was total transformation (transformation as engulfing and extinction) of indigenous 
culture without the possibility of any form of accommodation” (p. 186).	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become. In consonant with Buddhist and Ubuntu4 thought, he argues human suffering is the 
result of the “construction of and a deep-seated attachment to our sense of a permanent identity, 
what we mistakenly take to be a unitary, autonomous entity, independent of and isolated from 
the dynamically changing and contingent world around us” (Waldron, 2003, p. 146). This 
dominant view of the self, the “I” that we speak in the West runs counter to the Buddhist 
perspective, which holds we are all “ever-changing conglomerates of processes (skandha) 
formed in self-organizing patterns that are ever open, like all organic processes, to change, 
growth and decay based upon the natural functions of assimilation, interpenetration and 
dissolution” (Waldron, 2003, p. 147). Similarly, Ubuntu notions of the subjectivity knocks the 
independent and autonomous Cartesian subject off kilter by reinforcing “[t]he ‘I am’ is not a 
rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this otherness creation of relation and 
distance” (Eze, 2010, p. 191). In short, through Buddhism and Ubuntu, we come to understand 
that we are beings deeply interconnected, (re)created through and in dynamic interaction with the 
universe (and all it encompasses), and always in the process of being-becoming. Again, I argue, 
the West’s misguided understanding of self, our interconnectedness and interdependence is cause 
to the litany of inhumane effects that plague our existence.   
We have failed, I argue, in the collective memory of humanity to remember our 
interconnectedness, our shared being as human (Waghid, 2014). We–the global ‘we’–desperately 
need a dialogue on humanity; we need a dialogue on what it means to be a human being. If 
Nelson Mandela’s much quoted assertion, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you 
4 Ubuntu will be spelled in two ways througout the entirety of the document. First, Ubuntu refers to the 
philosophical understanding or practice, which encompasses Ubuntugogical theories and ideologies 
utilized by African people to make sense of their lived experience. Ubuntu encompasses the spiritual, 
secular, comtemporary, and global understanding of the philosophical construct. On the other hand, 
ubuntu refers to an ethical or cultural pratice through which a person becomes a human. In short, Ubuntu 
refers to the philosophy and ubuntu, the ethic of practice through which a particular type of human being 
is produced (Praeg, 2014).  
 4 
can use to change the world” (Nobel Peace Prize, 1993) rings with any truth, then it is within the 
hallowed halls of the academy—the training ground of future educators, politicians, lawyers, 
doctors, religious, law enforcement officers, policy makers, and leaders of the world–—that 
provides an opportune setting to dialogue on, to be, and to model our shared humanity. 
Educators, who perhaps are more powerful than armies, who by their example and sole 
utilization of the power of voice and pen, can set about building a community–a culture–that 
values individuals over machines, ideas over manufactured products, and the needs of the 
community over our own narrow self-interest (Slattery, 2013). What, then, is the role of higher 
education institutions—professors, administrators, and student affairs professionals—in 
providing a rich educative environment conducive for human being-becoming? In this context, 
being-becoming can be defined as the rhizomatic formation of self, whereby the multiplicity of 
self in communion with other selves is always perpetually caught up in lines of flight through 
and emerging from ruptures and fissures created under the influence and pressures of socio-
cultural, spiritual, and biological variables (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Tanaka, 2012).  
Education, like life, is complex and chaotic; “…the slightest perturbation has a significant 
impact on future patterns” (Slattery, 2013, p. 271). At the same time, education or rather the act 
of and reflection on being educated allows us to recognize just how unique and special we really 
are, which causes us to both bemoan that we are different only to then eventually celebrate our 
differences and those of others. “It is the disequilibrium [of schooling] itself that provides 
opportunities for creative tension and self-reflection” (Slattery, 2013, p. 271); this “creative 
tension” between the ‘what is’ and ‘what can yet be’ is the naissance of true education. What, 
then, is the goal of education in a complex, chaotic and ever-evolving world rife with competing 
interests and global strife? Dewey (1902) asserts, “[n]ot knowledge or information, but self-
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realization, is the goal. To possess all the world of knowledge and lose one’s own self is as awful 
a fate in education as in religion” (p. 9). In the postmodern viewpoint, education should bring 
humanity into the fullness of itself and in right relationship with one another through an 
interrogation of power and discourse. More importantly, education should assist in developing 
the tools through which we are thereby able to fully express our soul’s purpose (Dewey, 1902; 
Slattery, 2013). Moreover, the endeavor of education “encourages chaos, nonrationality, and 
zones of uncertainty because [of] the complex order existing here in the place where critical 
thinking, reflective intuition, and global problem solving will flourish” (Slattery, 2013, p. 272). 
Education given its permeability, flux, chaos, and complexity “can improve in the midst of 
turmoil” (Slattery, 2013, p. 273); much like the universe it is “engaged in endless motion and 
activity; in a continual cosmic dance of energy” (Capra, 1975 as citied in Slattery, 2013, p. 275). 
Education should both enhance and value the human experience, while seeking to globally 
improve the human condition.  
Background 
American institutions are experiencing an erosion of the public trust including institutions 
of higher education that have espoused egalitarian American principles and practice, in theory, 
the ideals of equity. Yet, even within the hallowed halls of the academy the juxtaposition of what 
is spoken and the "operational realities of racism, discrimination, and prejudice have trumped 
articulations of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (Harvey, 2011, p. 3). This tension 
between the promises of equality and equity for all men and our national history of exclusion and 
segregation has been at the core of this great experiment called American democracy since its 
inception. The struggle between the ideals of freedom and epistemological confinement are felt 
no greater than in American institutions of higher education, heralded as "ethically-rooted 
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laborator[ies] of inquiry where the initiates pursue truth and enlightenment, without regard to 
ideology, and with unadulterated objectivity" (Harvey, 2011, p. 5); however, in actuality are held 
captive by the ideological shackles of the “hidden curriculum” that dominates them at every turn 
(Pinar et al., 2008, p. 248). 
Historically, institutions of higher education have been complicit in de facto and de jure 
segregation and other systems of exclusion, and given the nature of the historical role of higher 
education within American society, have served as evangelist of the white and male supremacy–
institutionalized ‘othering’ (Harvey, 2011). Harvey (2011), in agreement with Dewey (1916) 
regarding the role of education and democratic citizenry, argues that universities function as 
ideological filters due to their ability to produce knowledge. In the recent history of the country, 
higher education has utilized this function and its prominent role in society to promulgate the 
assertion that people of color and women hold inferior societal status. Today, in both society and 
within every level of the educational system, we continue to experience the effects of higher 
education's past cowardice to traverse the terrain of moral injustice (Harvey, 2011); namely, a 
deficient understanding of our humanity as a mutual act of creation.   
Over the course of the nation's history and the maturation of higher education, these 
institutions emerged as the gatekeepers and authenticators of information, and “enjoyed the 
consequences of the societal maxim which proclaims that knowledge is power” (Harvey, 2011, 
p. 5). As the procurers and purveyors of knowledge, members of the academy maintained
positional authority that allowed them to intellectually justify and rationalize practices that might 
otherwise be deemed inappropriate or inhumane. “This capability to establish significant 
qualifying and sorting concepts for the larger society–determining the "natural order", creating 
hierarchy, and assigning place, for example–became comfortably lodged in the ivory tower” 
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(Harvey, 2011, p. 5). From their literal ivory tower, institutions composed solely of white 
academics utilized knowledge–biology and historical facts–to reinforce the doctrine of Western 
and white supremacy through obviously flawed scholarship. Colleges and universities, as a result 
of the “ivory tower” posture, took no responsibility and did not engage in social problems, 
especially not racial segregation but rather reinforced institutionalized racism (Harvey, 2011). 
Experiencing a shift over the last 50 years, the academy has languidly progressed from an 
overwhelming "ivory tower" ideological stance to one that recognizes an obligation for higher 
education institutions to actively engage in resolving the intellectual, financial, and technological 
problems of our time. Harvey (2011) posits that the commitment to resolving social problems is 
lacking, namely with respect to the education of minorities and the un-education of the so-called 
majority, "there exists some moral responsibility [of the academy] to see that minorities [and all 
the marginalized of the society] take their rightful places in an educated society. [The academy 
is] failing on that social objective, failing badly" (Tierney, 1991, as cited in Harvey, 2001, p. 10). 
In the long view of history, we have progressed much; however, given the current socio-political 
cultural milieu (the unabashed institutional and societal assault of black and brown bodies) it is 
clear we are feeling the tremors and lasting effects of the deeply ingrained stereotypes accepted 
and promoted by the nation’s ideological filters. Therefore, Harvey (2011) argues: 
The higher education community has an obligation to help continue the forward 
movement toward a less racially prejudiced society, and it should seize the opportunity to 
help the nation progress toward fuller implementation of some of its most cherished 
goals. The responsibility to help implement positive change is also rooted in two inherent 
dimensions that coexist within the academy: ethical responsibility and practical 
responsibility. (p. 10) 
There is an overarching ideology that institutions of higher education are bastions of ethical and 
moral fortitude (Harvey, 2011). Higher education institutions must comprehend and accept their 
responsibility to create a positive future for society. Rather than just serving as an institution that 
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sorts, certifies, and concentrates power within certain classes of the population, higher education 
must foster a diverse, racially and culturally sensitive society (Harvey, 2011). 
Recognizing our nation’s troubled past and present, the complicity of institutions of 
higher education, and the fact that the demographic composition is rapidly shifting–by 2050 no 
single racial group will be a majority of the country’s population–the importance of an onto-
epistemological recalibration within colleges and universities takes on not only a moral 
importance, but the importance of nation building and futural global socio-anthropological 
paradigm shifting (Harvey, 2011; Kuhn, 1962/2012). Higher education institutions, stress Harvey 
(2011), have a moral obligation to recalibrate the moral compass of the academy and recognize 
the need for “increased diversity within the higher education community as a means of 
generating principled, constructive…positive changes in the larger society” (p. 9). Offering 
practical solutions for higher educational institutions to transform their hollow words into solid 
action, Harvey (2011) suggests: 
First, [institutions of higher education] must identify, cultivate, enroll, support, and 
graduate substantially larger numbers of students from the underserved communities and 
prepare them to go forward to exercise leadership both within their respective groups and 
the larger society. Second, they must create meaningful academic and social 
opportunities for white students to engage and interact with their peers of color. The 
successful deracialization of American society is contingent on an informed acceptance 
by these students that in an evolving social order, their race offers them an equal, rather 
than favored, role for participation and advancement. Third, faculty members from 
underrepresented groups must be present in numbers that extend beyond mere tokenism 
so that a clear message is conveyed to all students that members of all races have the 
intellectual capability to hold such positions, and fourth, curricula must be broadened to 
debunk the myth that only people of European ancestry have been architects of and 
contributors to the development of American society, and acknowledge that there are 
antecedents to this civilization in various locations around the globe, not simply in 
Western Europe. (p.12) 
In agreement with Harvey (2011), Eric Ashby contends higher education institutions “must be 
sufficiently stable to sustain the ideal which gave it birth and sufficiently responsive to remain 
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relevant to the society which it supports” (Altback, Gumport, & Berdahl, 2001, p. 4). While 
Harvey (2011) offers curricular and policy solutions to make right historical wrongs, Ruthanne 
Kurth-Schai (1992) argues “the primary barriers on the path to equity [are] philosophical rather 
than material or technical in nature” (p. 147 as cited in Pinar et al., 2008, p. 288). In that spirit, 
we turn to the philosophical questions of human subjectivity, of humanness, and the role of 
higher education institutions in bringing to conscious awareness our shared humanity 
(Kincheloe, 2004).  
Why higher education? A university, proclaims Barnett (2011), “has being [emphasis in 
original]” (p. 13). He continues, “A university has possibilities; and they are infinite. It has 
multiple options. Each university could be other than it is” (Barnett, 2011, p. 13). It is the 
possibilities of this other-than-ness of higher education that begs to question what it might 
become. Following Harvey (2011) and Barnett’s (2011) assertions, if higher education serves an 
ideological filter that (re)produces dominant ideology through the “silenc[ing] and 
marginalization of ideas and voices,” (Pinar et al., 2008, p. 249) then it also contains the 
possibility and the ability to be differently–to resist oppressive ideology, to usher in a new order 
(Pinar et al., 2008). Further, Giroux asserts that curriculum and ideology, in particular, structures 
the unconscious of students (Pinar et al., 2008) and Apple (2013) holds that we are the result of 
ideology and even now we are under its spell. If the logic holds true, then it is on this 
battleground of American higher education, where education–the hidden curriculum–most 
deeply impacts “the unconscious…the site where social meanings and practices are negotiated 
prior to and simultaneously with any activity of the unconscious agent [emphasis my own]” 
(Pinar, et al., 2008, p. 282). It is not only within the hallowed halls of the academy, but the 
ruckus and clamoring of the student union, the exuberance of the athletic facilities, and the 
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torporific acumen of the boardroom where we can begin to resist the imprisonment of modernist, 
neo-liberal ideology that dominates the educational landscape (Apple, 2013). The impacts of 
such a resistance are best exemplified in Kuhnian discourse regarding paradigm shifts, in which 
Kuhn (1962/2012) asserts that paradigms shifts are revolutions catalyzed and maintained by 
agents of change. Redistributing Kuhn’s discourse from scientific revolutions to the context of an 
intended ontological revolution, we glean,  
when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, 
scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during 
revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar 
instruments in places they have looked before. […] we may want to say that after a 
revolution scientists are responding to a different world. (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p. 111) 
Similarly, in an ontological revolution, we may say that humans are being-becoming differently 
in the world. The resistance inherent in the perturbation of philosophical inquiry provides the 
energy necessary to initiate the paradigm shift within higher education discourse and practice. I 
argue, ideas precede action, so it is through the dialogical engagement of discourse (the idea) 
from which an ontological and epistemological metamorphosis will proceed (Kuhn, 1969/2012; 
Freire, 1970/2000). Through a collective and intentional praxis5 of  “‘a pedagogy of possibility,’ 
one which is ‘not yet but could be if we change in the simultaneous struggle to change both our 
circumstances and ourselves’” (Simon, 1987, p. 382 as cited in Pinar et al., 2008, p. 263), higher 
education institutions can begin to change the world as it itself is being changed.  
Statement of Problem 
Dewey (1938/1997) contends, “The history of educational theory is marked by opposition 
between the idea that education is development from within and that it is formation from 
5 Praxis generally implies putting theoretical knowledge in to practice through the cyclic process of 
experience, action, and reflection; however, praxis is utilized here in the Freirian conception of the term 
as awareness, reflection, and action towards transformation of oppressive structures 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxis_(process), 2015; Freire, 1970/2000).  
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without” (p. 17). Adding to Dewey’s (1938/1997) debate within educational theory, the debate 
on the nature and purpose of American higher education has raged on from the founding of 
Harvard in 1636 to the modern day founding of online colleges and universities (Thelin, 2011). 
However, the ideas espoused in this study regarding education as an endeavor of human 
edification, what some term liberal education, suffered a new attack in 1967 (Barrett, 2015). On 
February 28, 1967, then-Governor Ronald Reagan forever altered the discourse of American 
public higher education. Dan Berrett (2015) recalls: 
California still boasted a system of public higher education that was the envy of the 
world. And on February 28, 1967, a month into his term, the Republican governor 
assured people that he wouldn’t do anything to harm it. "But," he added, "we do believe 
that there are certain intellectual luxuries that perhaps we could do without," for a little 
while at least. 
"Governor," a reporter asked, "what is an intellectual luxury?" 
Reagan described a four-credit course at the University of California at Davis on 
organizing demonstrations. "I figure that carrying a picket sign is sort of like, oh, a lot of 
things you pick up naturally," he said, "like learning how to swim by falling off the end 
of a dock." 
Whole academic programs in California and across the country he found similarly 
suspect. Taxpayers, he said, shouldn’t be "subsidizing intellectual curiosity." (para. 3-5) 
Reagan’s ‘Intellectual curiosity’ comment was a direct blow to liberal education and the belief 
that education within American universities and colleges, in particular, served not a job training 
institutions, but environments for the purpose of intellectual development—the place for the 
better making of men and women, the advancement of democratic citizenship (Berrett, 2015). 
Reagan’s presidency in the 1980’s bound with a national economic crisis would see the 
obtainment of education shift from intellectual pursuit to technical mastery in pursuit of a job 
(Berrett, 2015). Berrett (2015) writes similar to our current educational discourse, “Free market 
ideas permeated higher education” (para. 17). According to the Freshman Survey conducted by 
the Higher Education Research Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles, roughly 
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72 percent of the freshmen in 1971 surveyed indicated they pursued a college degree to ‘develop 
a meaningful philosophy of life’ as compared to 44.8 percent of the freshman surveyed in 2013 
(Berrett, 2015). Conversely, in 2013, 82 percent of the freshman surveyed indicated their pursuit 
of a college degree was catalyzed by ‘being very well off financially’ (Berrett, 2015). These 
numbers alone indicate a societal shift regarding the pursuit of education, and the view of the 
university as a marketplace or a “…supermarket where students are shoppers and professors are 
merchants of learning” (AAC, 1985 as cited in Berrett, 2015, para. 41).  
Moreover, this shift demonstrates the market-driven educational discourse that shapes 
and restricts our thinking (Bacchi, 2000). Illustrating the active implementation of policy as 
discourse, Berrett (2015) writes, “Sometimes, sea changes in attitude start small, gradually 
establishing assumptions until no one remembers thinking differently. This is how that happened 
to liberal education” (para. 13).  
The Necessitation of an Ontological Turn 
Higher education is “now an epistemological regime characterized by fear” (Barnett, 
2011, p. 25). Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007), arguing ontological considerations are subordinate 
to epistemological concerns, explore the necessitation of an ontological turn within higher 
education. The assertion of the privileging of epistemology at the expense of ontology is very 
much in keeping with the arguments present by Berrett (2015) regarding the state of higher 
education post-Reagan. More specifically, Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007) reinforce the critiques 
of higher education proffered by Heidegger, “who questioned the way in which we ‘increasingly 
instrumentalize, professionalize, vocationalize, corporatize, and ultimately technologize 
education’ [emphasis in the original]” (Thomson, 2001, p. 244 as cited in Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 
2007). This critique was expressed by Harvey (2011) in his assertion that institutions of higher 
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education are merely socio-economic sorting mechanism. The conception of university as solely 
a vehicle of knowledge and skill acquisition that can be decoupled from its practical context 
exemplifies the flawed epistemological notions, which undergirds the mission of many colleges 
and universities (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Barnett, 2011). Universities with their primary 
focus on knowledge acquisition have come to treat learning as unproblematic; more explicitly, 
Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007) argue, “A focus on knowledge acquisition leaves students to the 
difficult task of integrating such knowledge into practice” (p. 680). Given these practices within 
higher education, Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007) arrive at the conclusion the issues encountered 
within higher education are ontological. Utilizing Heidegger’s position, they posit, “there is an 
essential link between education and ontology, in that our approach to the later will be reflected 
in how we treat the former: ‘When our understanding of what beings are changes historically, 
our understanding of what “education” is transforms as well’ [emphasis in original]” (Thomson, 
2001, p. 248 as cited by Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007, p. 681).  
Heidegger utilizes phenomenology or our everyday being in the world, to reveal “that our 
mode of being in the world is that of dwelling with and amongst things and others” (Dall’Alba & 
Barnacle, 2007, p. 681). These are also key insights of Ubuntu and Buddhism. In other words, 
knowing and being are interdependent. This understanding of the interdependency of knowing 
and being “requires that we are open to the possibilities of things” (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007, 
p. 681); our situatedness (Heidegger, 1978/1993) indicates that we are ‘always already’ open to
the possibilities of being (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007, p. 681). Therefore, our knowing arises 
out of or as a result of being in the world, or situated within a certain historical, socio-cultural 
context. “In other words, what is–including how things become what they are–and what we 
know are mutually dependent: ontology and epistemology are inseparable” (Dall’Alba & 
 14 
Barnacle, 2007, p. 682). To put it another way, Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007) offer: 
Our very ‘being-in-the-world’ is shaped by knowledge we pursue, uncover, and embody. 
[There is] a troubling sense in which it seems that we cannot help practicing what we 
know, since we are ‘always already’ implicitly shaped by our guiding metaphysical 
presuppositions. (Thomson, 2001, p. 250 as cited in Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007, p. 682) 
Knowing is so intertwined with our being that we cannot escape from it; however, we can be 
transformed by it (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Barnett, 2011, 1993). Knowing has the potential 
to alter our being and vice versa.  
The (re)Turn. In agreement with St. Pierre (2014), what has been referred to as the 
ontological turn in the ‘post’ analyses is really just a return to, but a return to what? Possibly a 
return to what Barnett (2011) classifies as the “the metaphysical university” (p. 11). The 
metaphysical university, the ancient Greek (and concurrently, Persian, Indian, and Chinese) 
foundation upon which the idea of the university is built upon, deemed “a full encounter with 
knowledge was felt to open up new forms of human being” (Barnett, 2011, p. 11). More cogent 
to the arguments offered in the inquiry, the metaphysical university “came to be understood as an 
institution through which individuals could come to stand in a new and surer relationship with 
the world” (Barnett, 2011, p. 11) and one another. This is not the reality of most contemporary 
universities; again, the focus is primarily on knowledge acquisition for economic benefit 
(Barrett, 2015; Barnett, 2001, 1993; Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007). So, then how can a university 
be differently?  
St. Pierre (2014) argues the conception of being inherited from Descartes, which we have 
now come to believe as natural is not so. Foucault (1984/1997) argues for a re-evaluation of the 
knowing subject. Striking a similar tone, Dall’Alba & Barnacle (2007) insist not on a rethinking 
of the ‘knowing subject’, but of knowledge as it relates to learning (Foucault, 1984/1997). In 
their rethinking, knowledge continues to hold a place of importance, but has shifted its focus 
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from transfer to creation, enactment, and embodiment (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007). “In other 
words, the question for students would be not only what they know, but also who they are 
becoming…learning becomes understood as the development of embodied ways of knowing 
or…ways of being” (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007, p. 683). Heidegger’s ontological perspective 
of being-in-the-world coupled with Dall’Alba and Barnacle’s (2007) aim of learning in the post-
secondary environment, mandates an understanding that education is not  
merely pouring knowledge into the unprepared soul [or mind] as if it were some 
container held out empty and waiting. On the contrary real education lays hold of the soul 
itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential 
being and accustoming us to it. (Heidegger, 1967/1998, p. 167 as cited in Dall’Alba & 
Barnacle, 2007, p. 684)  
It must be noted, our essential being is not the static subject of Cartesian thought, but fluid and 
ever-changing. Education, in the Heideggerian sense, should lead us to the place of our 
fundamental being, which “refers to how we are rather than what we are [emphasis added]” 
(Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007, p. 685). In the same spirit, Palmer, Zajonc, and Scribner (2010) 
advocate for a “re-ensoul[ing]” of education (p. 3), that is, the provision of an education that 
allows both students and teachers to bring all of themselves into the learning environment. It is 
no doubt that we are a multiplicity; simultaneously, teacher and learner, intellectual and 
emotional, object and subject. As a start, higher education institutions can “encourage, foster, 
and assist students, faculty and administration in finding their own authentic way to an undivided 
life where meaning and purpose are tightly interwoven with intellect and action, where 
compassion and care are infused with insight and knowledge” (Palmer, Zajonc, & Scribner, 
2010, p. 56).  
In agreement with Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2007), I call for institutions of higher 
education to provide an environment for “students to encounter the familiar in unfamiliar ways” 
 16 
(p. 685)—this creation of strangeness allows students to “engage with difference: the possibility 
that things could be otherwise” (p. 685). To clarify, problematizing taken-for-granted notions 
leads to new imaginings, new of understandings of how to be and live in the world. Barnett 
(2005) submits, “the only way, amid strangeness, to become fully human, to achieve agency and 
authenticity, is to have the capacity to go on producing strangeness by and for oneself” (p. 794). 
Amid the myriad of theorizations regarding the necessitation of an ontological turn within higher 
education, Foucault (1984) insists on the consideration of a “critical ontology of ourselves” (p. 
50), not  
as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; 
it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of 
what we are is at one and the same the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on 
us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault, 1984, p. 50) 
I theorize an institutional being-becoming, an ontological turn within higher education is 
necessary; however, it must occur in tandem with a reconceptualization of the self. Even while I 
advocate for and theorize the necessity of an ontological turn within higher education, I 
understand that at an institutional level there must remain an operational gap between 
evangelization of ideals and their realization for the university “in-itself” (Barnett, 2011, p. 19) is 
too a Being-in-the-world. Recognizing this current reality, it could be that the new being-
becoming—the ontological turn—must first occur within each human being, then as a 
community of beings, who are being-doing-thinking differently in the world, institutions of 
higher education left without a choice are obliged to make the turn–to become institutions for 
and with the world.  
The impetus of this study in part is an attempt through discourse to “as the Buddhists 
would say, ‘turn [our current] reality on its head” (Waldron, 2003, p. 146). In agreement with 
Hahn (1999) and Waldron (2003),  
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Our task then, our moral imperative, is as urgent today as it was when Albert Camus 
(1971, 11) expressed it nearly fifty years ago, just as many millions of murders ago: “One 
might think that a period which, within fifty years, uproots, enslaves, or kills seventy 
million human beings, should only, and forthwith, be condemned. But its guilt must be 
understood.” …Human beings make war and kill each other in a way that no other 
species does, that no other species could, that no other species would. Somehow, we must 
make sense of it all. (Waldron, 2003, p. 145)  
Yes, if possible, we must make sense of it all, but more importantly, we must disrupt Western 
meta-narratives, turnover and aerate the soil of the educational landscape, so that the seeds of a 
new being-becoming and new onto-epistemological understandings are provided the best 
possible conditions to take root.  
Given the magnitude of such a metamorphosis, where do we begin? Beginning at site of 
traditional knowledge production, this inquiry represents an attempt to turn our current reality on 
its head, that is, to reimage institutions of higher education mired in the muck of today’s 
inhumane reality into the fertile ground of interbeing (Hanh, 1999), interconnectedness (Eze, 
2004, Waghid, 2014), and a place where cura personalis in community (care of the whole 
person) (Ganss, 1991) flourishes and reproduces in the world. Christopher Lasch argues 
Americans have become presentistic, so self-involved in surviving the present that, for us: “To 
live for the moment is the prevailing passion–to live for yourself, not for our predecessors or 
posterity” (Lasch, 1978, p. 5 as cited in Pinar, 2012, p. 4). How can higher education institutions, 
microcosms of society, begin to shift the presentistic, individualistic paradigm that plagues our 
understanding of humanity?  In the “contested terrain” (Aguirre & Martinez, 2006, p. 55) of 
higher education, how do we begin to employ “a pedagogy of possibility” (Simon, 1987, p. 382 
as cited in Pinar et al., 2008, p. 263)—breaking open the physical, intellectual, and heart space to 
fully experience and sift through the messiness of our humanness (Pinar, 1975)? 
This inquiry refocuses our gaze toward understanding the depth of our humanity, looks 
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critically at the systems and power structures of this world, seeks to always disrupt hegemonic 
relationships through the practices of self-reflection and introspection, and actively works toward 
an education that does justice, which I argue is critical to our time (Kincheloe, 1993; Pinar et al., 
2008). For too long we have been transfixed by the Western imperialist gaze and controlled by 
knowledge production that perpetuates our oppression (Foucault, 1977; Kaplan, 1997; Said, 
1978; Apple, 2013). It is time for a new philosophical and pedagogical onto-epistemological 
perspective that advocates for justice, equity, and the liberation of the bodies and minds of the 
planet’s peoples through a focus first on human becoming. This inquiry employs pedagogies of 
hope, of the oppressed, of difference, of possibility, of interruption, and social transformation 
encompassed within the philosophical frameworks of Buddhism and Ubuntu to create a new 
understanding of humanness, humanity, and human potentiality (Pinar et al., 2008; Freire, 
1970/2007; Biesta, 2014; Kincheloe, 2008). The journey toward a new understanding or 
paradigmic shift, I argue, necessitates an ontological turn within higher education—a new way 
being and a new way of proceeding.  
Philosophical Frameworks 
In agreement with Derrida (1991), “This question of the subject and the living ‘who’ is at 
the heart of the most pressing concerns of modern societies” (p.115). I theorize that a 
reconceptualization or de-centering of the Western subject must precede an ontological turn 
within institutions of higher education. Ubuntu and Buddhism, with their generous and 
generative onto-epistemologies, offer an opportune framework through which we can (re)think 
the Western subject anew. Additionally, these once denigrated indigenous philosophical 
frameworks provide the necessary tools to disrupt current higher education discourse and serve 
as a starting point for re-imagining the American higher education milieu. We now turn to a 
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general exploration of each philosophical notion. 
Ubuntu or humanness is central to South African philosophy of life (Waghid, 2004; 
Ramose, 2002; Eze, 2008, 2010). According to Eze (2010), Ubuntu can best be explained as: 
'A person is a person through other people' [which] strikes an affirmation of one’s 
humanity through recognition of an ‘other’ in his or her uniqueness and difference. It is a 
demand for a creative intersubjective formation in which the ‘other’ becomes a mirror 
(but only a mirror) for my subjectivity. This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not 
embedded in my person solely as an individual; my humanity is co-substantively 
bestowed upon the other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other. We create 
each other and need to sustain this otherness creation. And if we belong to each other, we 
participate in our creations: we are because you are, and since you are, definitely I am. 
The ‘I am’ is not a rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this 
otherness creation of relation and distance. (p. 190-191) 
The concept and embodied practice of Ubuntu contains within its philosophical bailiwick the 
possibility to “…engender dignified and humane action, evoke the potentialities of people, and 
cultivate a community of shared face” (Waghid, 2004, p. 70). Correspondingly, Venter (2004) 
offers: 
The philosophy of Botho/ubuntu could create an awareness of purpose and meaning in 
life. It is not merely a reference to humanity or personhood, but an indication of human 
conduct in relation to others…a positive ethical/moral way of going/being in relation with 
other. (Venter, 2004, p. 152) 
With respect to schools and education, Waghid (2004) asserts that African educational 
philosophy; more specifically the ethic of ubuntu has the ability to harness a culture of humanity 
and responsibility in schools and can contribute to the nurturing of a politics of humanity.  
Buddhism provides a means through which the self, or the non-self, can become 
consciously aware (Hahn, 1999). Hahn (1999) reminds “[o]nce the door of awareness has been 
opened, you cannot close it (p. 5). Focusing on bringing forth that which is already born in all of 
humanity, the Buddha illuminates the notion of “interbeing, nonself” (Hahn, 1999, p. 125), a 
notion of (inter)subjectivity that suggests the interconnectedness of all things. The teachings of 
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the Buddha, in transformative practice, allow us to “penetrate the soil of consciousness” (Hahn, 
1999, p. 12), to awaken and re-awaken to the possibilities of peace, love, and tranquility. More 
specifically, the exploration of Buddhist philosophy opens the heart space for healing the 
ontological and epistemological violence imposed through the (un)hidden curriculum of 
traditional schooling (Pinar, 2008). Again, I argue, in a world that is increasingly technology and 
market-driven, it appears we have forgotten the essence of our humanity, the tie that binds all of 
us together; we have forgotten hope, peace, and the most powerful source of the human soul—
love (Hahn, 1999).  
Nurturing a politics of humanity and shared responsibility through dignity, respect, love, 
and harmony is central to an Ubuntu-Buddhist philosophy of education. The focus of education 
in an Ubuntu and Buddhistic view results in an onto-epistemological shift; more specifically, the 
focus is not on what one does, but one who one becomes – as an individual and as a community 
– in the world. These two notions are explored in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.
Research Questions 
Utilizing the philosophical frameworks of Ubuntu and Buddhism, this inquiry seeks to 
theorize or re-imagine what American higher education (and by extension society) might look 
like if education was engaged first as an endeavor of human being-becoming. More specifically, 
what might the world/planet become if institutions of higher education served as fertile wombs 
of (inter)subjectivity that bring all under its shadow into the fullness of their humanity and in 
deeper understanding of our shared being as human rather than schools of technical mastery 
driven by market demands. Breathing in deeply the hope of a new human and educational way of 
proceeding, the following research questions will guide this inquiry’s (re)thinking:  
• Given the socio-political milieu, how is ontology shaped in higher education
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discourse? 
• In what ways might, non-Western ways of knowing—Ubuntu from South
Africa and Buddhism from the East—inform our understanding of what it
means to be a human being and notions of humanness?
Significance of the Study 
This inquiry engages two non-Western philosophical notions, Ubuntu and Buddhism, to 
de-center Western knowledges and philosophies. More specifically, the researcher’s 
investigation yielded no similar studies, which combined these two seemingly disparate 
philosophical notions to both reconceptualize Western notions of subjectivity and utilize the 
virtues encapsulated in the philosophical perspectives to (re)think the role and purpose of 
American higher education as a space for/of human being-becoming over market-driven 
knowledge acquisition. Further, in keeping with the theme of privileging the non-Western and/or 
de-centering Western ways of knowing, the researcher rejects traditional qualitative 
epistemological methodologies and sets out on a (non)methodological path of provocation–
interrogating and problematizing toward an absent present-future.  
Concluding Thoughts 
As a postmodernist, engaged in (re)imagining the metamorphosis of what is into what 
could be, and thinking about ontology differently, I am haunted by Spivak’s (1993) statement 
that “what I cannot imagine stands guard over everything that I must/can do, think, live” (p. 22, 
as cited in St. Pierre, 2014, p. 16). Toiling toward and indeed achieving this new understanding, I 
theorize, necessitates an ontological turn in higher education. Further, privileging once 
denigrated African (Ubuntu) and Eastern (Buddhist) ways of being-knowing, I employ their 
wisdom in the creation of “intensive, futural concepts…[that] open things up, [help] us think new 
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modes of being” (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 14). Thinking with Ubuntu and Buddhism, I attempt to 
“debunk the myth that only people of European ancestry have been [and can only be] architects 
of and contributors to the development of American society" (Harvey, 2011, p. 12). Bernstein 
(1991) encourages: 
It is precisely in and through an understanding of alien cultures that we can come to a 
more sensitive and critical understanding of our cultures and of those prejudices that may 
lie hidden from us. We will see that this theme, which Gadamer relates to dialogue, 
questioning, and conversation, stands at the very center of Gadamer’s philosophic 
hermeneutic. For him this is the type of practical wisdom that is characteristic of the 
ongoing interpretation of our own tradition. (p. 36) 
Undeniably, (re)thinking subjectivity with Ubuntu and Buddhism releases the Western subject 
from the strangle of Descartes cogito and the prison of “humanist qualitative methodology” (St. 
Pierre, 2014, p. 14) grounded in the limiting epistemological desires of the Cartesian regime (St. 
Pierre, 2014; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Regarding Cartesian concepts, St. Pierre (2014) 
declares, they “slowed us down centuries ago mind/body, man/nature, and knower/known…” (p. 
14). 
At a time, when education functions as a business and every “governor ha[s] bad news” 
(Berrett, 2015, para. 1) and every headline reads: “The state budget [is] in crisis and everyone 
need[s] to tighten their belts” (Berrett, 2015, para. 1); this inquiry examines and (re)thinks for 
what purpose does education exist. Re-imagining higher education and troubling the waters of 
modern educational discourse, which promulgate the American college and university as a 
source of national economic viability via job training (Berrett, 2015), I (re)think higher education 
as institutions of being-becoming, who are more concerned with who their students become 
rather than what their students do. Moreover, I utilize the generative philosophies and philoso-
praxises of Ubuntu and Buddhism, to reconceptualize the Western subject and (re)imagine the 
higher education milieu as an intersubjective onto-epistemological-machinic assemblage–a 
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rhizomatic womb of intersubjectivity, of becoming-more human (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)6. 
Looking ahead. With the focus of the inquiry clearly stated, Chapter 2 focuses on solely 
on the great gift of Africa, Ubuntu (Biko, 1978). Given the notions centrality to the investigation, 
Chapter 2 defines ubuntu, provides an explication of the philosophical concepts of Ubuntu, 
explores the evolution of Ubuntu within written discourses, and finally, discusses the potential of 
Ubuntu beyond the geo-cultural political boundaries of the African continent.  
Chapter 3 exposes the wisdom of the Buddha as per the teachings of renowned Buddhist 
monk Thich Nhat Hanh. Reinforcing my assertion that all writing is historically situated in the 
world, I briefly discussion of the history and origins of Buddhism, and the central tenets. More 
specifically, I focus on the central teachings of Four Noble Truths, Noble Eightfold Path, and the 
Four Immeasurable Minds. I posit the seeds contained within each of these flowers can be spread 
on the field of education to blossom students who become more human through the endeavor of 
education. Finally, I discuss Hanh’s notion of Engaged Buddhism as means to utilize the 
philosophy and spirituality of Buddhism to bring about meaningful social change. The 
uniqueness of Buddhism is two fold: (1) it can be practiced along side one’s primary religion, 
and (2) it encourages engagement with and in the world (Hanh, 1999). Buddhism, I suggest, 
transcends religious practice and is thus applicable in all arenas as a catalyst for metamorphosis.  
In Chapter 4, I present an untraditional (non)methodological approach–(re)thinking as 
(non)method. Pushing qualitative methodological paradigmic boundaries and subverting 
restrictive traditional Western epistemological methodologies, I offer (re)thinking as 
6 The concepts of machinic assemblage, rhizome, and becomings are derived from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
[D&G] (1987),  A Thousand Plateaus, in which D&G offer a collection of pragmatic concepts–a 
philosophical and ethical toolkit–that can be plugged into to other understandings to yield new 
understandings, new ontological insights. The university as a multiplicitous intersubjective machanic 
assemblage reorients the university from ‘bricks and mortar ‘(which it is as well) to an intensity of Bodies 
without Organs (BwO)–beings interconnected, interdependent, and intersubjective (involved in the 
creation of one another) (Malins, 2004; St. Pierre, 2014).  
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(non)method, which is simply an engagement in thinking. More specifically, I theorize, 
(re)thinking as (non)method as the cognitive process by which we take what we know, what we 
have experienced, and the intention of the endeavor we are pursuing–what I call assemblages of 
knowing–and process them through the abstract machine called the mind (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987). (re)Thinking as (non)method, I argue, releases (as much as possible) the researcher from 
the cage of Cartesian thought and sets off on a creative cognitive journey of (re)imagining an 
absent present-future (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015).  
Ubuntu and Buddhism are pregnant with African and Eastern notions of subjectivity, 
respectfully. Chapter 5 will birth each of these onto-epistemological notions of subjectivity and 
(re)think the Western subject. This (re)thinking of Western subjectivity through Ubuntu and 
Buddhism has yielded an Ubun-hist subject-west or, what I term, the new Being-West.  
Given the birth of an equal ontologically and epistemologically privileging Being-West, I 
argue, both the method and aims for which we educate must be thought anew. Chapter 6 explores 
the philosophies of education flowing from both Ubuntu and Buddhism, and ontologically 
(re)thinks higher education. To reiterate, the Being-West’s new way of being-doing, I theorize, 
mandates a shift in higher education, which then like a river flows into society writ large. As 
Hanh (1999) reminds, this is not an either/or proposition or a temporally sequential process—
both transformations inter-are and must occur simultaneously, incrementally.  
Finally, Chapter 7 provides not conclusions, but new lines of flight, new rhizomatic knots 
of discussion. Additionally, I provide examples of possible practical and policy implications that 
can begin to set higher education on a course toward an onto-epistemological metamorphosis—
an equal focus on who their students become and not just what they do. Finally, it calls for the 
revolutionary practice of onto-courage to transform our current epistemological regime of fear.  
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CHAPTER TWO:
UBUNTU: THE GREAT GIFT OF AFRICA 
“... [Western society] seems to be very concerned with perfecting their technological know-how 
while losing out on their spiritual dimension. We believe that in the long run the special 
contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of human relationship. The great powers 
of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the 
great gift still has to come from Africa–giving the world a more human face.” 
- Steve Biko - 
Echoing the words of South African liberation fighter Steve Biko (1978), Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu proclaims Ubuntu is ‘the gift that Africa will give the world’ and, along with 
others, has called for its wider application well beyond Africa” (Bolden, 2014, p. 2). Ubuntu is 
widely translated as ‘I am because you are’; ‘a person is a person through other people’ or 
humanness (Eze, 2010, 2012; Waghid, 2014; Bolden, 2014; Forster, 2010; Louw, 2011; Gade, 
2011, 2012; LeGrange, 2011; Letseka, 2012; Shutte, 1995; Ncube, 2010; Ramose, 2002; 
Broodryk, 2006). Further, in defining Ubuntu, Tutu offers: 
A person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world fully 
formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings 
unless we have learned it from other human beings. We need other human beings in order 
to be human. (Tutu, 2004, p. 25) 
Ubuntu, a word from the Nguni7 language of Southern Africa meaning humanness, is an African 
philosophy and culture of life that places a primacy on the promotion of the common good of a 
7 The Nguni languages are spoken in the southern part of Africa. Lutz Marten explains: ‘The Nguni group 
(S40) is divided into Zunda varieties and Tekela varieties. Among the Zunda varieties are Xhosa, Zulu, 
and Zimbabwean Ndebele. Xhosa includes a number of different varieties. Zulu, with around 10.7 million 
speakers, and Xhosa, with around 7.2 million speakers, are official languages of South Africa. 
Zimbabwean Ndebele has official status in Zimbabwe. The Tekela varieties include Swati, South African 
Ndebele, and the smaller languages Phuthi and Lala (Lala-Bisa). Swati has around 1.6 million speakers 
and is an official language both in Swaziland and South Africa. The southern variety of South African 
Ndebele is an official language in South Africa, spoken by around 0.6 million speakers’ (Marten 2006: 
596 as cited in Gade, 2012, p. 486). 
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society or community over that of the individual; however, not at the expense of the individual 
(Nafukho, 2006; Eze, 2008; Venter, 2004). Eze (2008) avers, “The individual and the community 
are not radically opposed in the sense of priority but engaged in a contemporaneous formation” 
(p. 386). The two are co-creators, interdependent, and mutually sustaining. The philosophy of 
Ubuntu and praxis of ubuntu-thinking, with its strength in African communalism and humanism, 
run counter to Western ways of being and knowing (Venter, 2004; Louw, 2011; Gade, 2011; 
Bolden, 2014). 
Referring to Africa, it is important to note, that I do not assume homogeneity of 
inhabitants or cultures. Africa is a vast continent and referring to a term, philosophy, or 
worldview as African contains a multiplicity of cultures, cosmological perspectives, and 
worldviews. Letseka (2011), reminiscing on the great diversity of continent, reminds us: 
the central cultural fact of Africa’s life remains not the sameness of Africa’s cultures, but 
their enormous diversity. Appiah argues that long before Charlemagne was crowned, the 
ancestors of the San people of southern Africa were living as free of rulers, in nomadic 
family groups. But African kingship in Egypt was millennia old. When the American 
republic began, there were matrilineal kingdoms in Asante and patrilineal kingdoms in 
Yorubaland. There were female regiments in Dahomey, and high-born Hausa women 
living in enclosed Moslem households in Kano in what is now upper Nigeria; cats were 
food for the Mossi in West Africa and taboo for the Asante; and the range of clothing 
cross the continent included most of the forms of dress (and undress) that the human 
species has known. (Appiah, 1997, p. 47 as cited in Letseka, 2011, pp. 48-49) 
The point here is not to boast of Africa’s history, although it is the cradle of civilization, but to 
illuminate the heterogeneity of the continent and to dispel any notion of the Africa so often 
presented in the writings of modern colonizers. Africa is a continent steeped in history, rich with 
culture, and progressive well before it was subjected to the brutality of Western colonizers.  
In agreement with Biko (1979) and Tutu (2004), the potential of Ubuntu beyond the geo-
cultural boundaries of the African continent are immense. The potential of an ubuntu saturated 
philosophy of life and education, I argue, in the West can revolutionize our being-doing and 
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engender social harmony through “good human relationships [, an…] increase [in] human value, 
trust and dignity” (Le Roux, 2000, p. 43). This inquiry encompasses an attempt to apply the 
philosophy of Ubuntu beyond the continent of Africa and the situatedness of the African culture 
toward a reconceptualization of Western subjectivity and the creation of an ubuntu-hued 
American philosophy of education. As such this review of relevant literature will encompass a 
compilation of attempts to define ubuntu, a brief exploration of African philosophy, an historical 
analysis of the evolution of Ubuntu within written discourses, and Ubuntu as an African 
onto-epistemological cosmo-cultural philosophical notion. Finally, I will discuss the potential 
of Ubuntu beyond the geographical and cultural boundaries of the African continent.  
Ubuntu Defined 
What is Ubuntu? Ubuntu is defined as “an old philosophy of life that has for many 
centuries sustained the African communities in South Africa in particular and Africa as a whole” 
(Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005, p. 215). This ancient philosophy or worldview is deeply anchored in 
African life (Ramose, 2002; Eze, 2010; Venter, 2004) and is defined as the “art of being a human 
being” (Behengu, 1996, p. 10 as cited in Broodryk, 2006, p. 2). Blakenberg (1999) defines 
Ubuntu as a “philosophy and an ideal circulating primarily through orality and tradition and 
associated with no particular authoritative text…” (p. 43) and is therefore open to interpretation. 
Taking a philosophical approach to the term ubuntu, Ramose (2002) argues ubuntu is actually 
two words and should be utilized as a hyphenated word, "ubu-ntu" (p. 230). It consists of the 
prefix ubu- and the stem -ntu. Similarly, Forster (2010) argues:  
Linguistically, Mfenyana asserts that for one to fully understand the meaning of the word 
‘ubuntu’ it is necessary to separate the prefix ‘ubu’ from the root ‘-ntu’ (1986:2). This is 
because the word ‘ubuntu’ qualifies the noun umuntu (meaning the human person). These 
words are common in many southern African languages, for example, ‘in isiXhosa it is 
Umntu, in isiZulu it is umuntu’ (Mcunu 2004:30, original emphasis). In terms of the 
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word ‘ubuntu’, ubu refers to the abstract, whereas -ntu is a reference to the ancestor who 
spawned human society and gave human beings their way of life. (p. 8) 
Forster concludes, therefore, “[i]t is a communal way of life which deems that society must be 
run for the sake of all, requiring cooperation as well as sharing and charity...Ubuntu 
consequently, is the quality of being human [emphasis added]” (Broodryk, 2002, p. 13 as cited in 
Forster, 2010, p. 8). Ubuntu is about being (Mnyaka, 2005).  
Confounded by language and devoid of much explanation, many Africanist scholars 
define Ubuntu as the foundation of African humanism and translate its meaning through the use 
of African proverbs (Eze, 2010; Forster, 2010). The English language being what it is, the 
difficulty lies in translating what Ramose (2002) identifies as “the wellspring flowing with 
African ontology and epistemology” (p. 230). Additionally, Eze (2010) asserts definitions of 
ubuntu are “projected to us in a rather hegemonic format” (p. 93); he continues, it is “by way of 
an appeal to an unanimous past through which we may begin to understand the sociocultural 
imaginary of the ‘African’ people before the violence of colonialism…” (p. 93). Eze (2010) 
declares: “ubuntu is in fact, essentially what it means to be an African [emphasis in original]” (p. 
93). Reinforcing both Ramose’s (2002) assertion and Eze’s (2010) declaration, Saule (1996) 
states:  
Ubuntu is something that springs from within oneself or better still, within society […] 
Ubuntu could be viewed as a sum total of human behaviors inculcated in the individual 
by society through established traditional institutions over a period of time. (pp. 83-85) 
Adopting an undertone of religious essentialism, Mnyaka (2003) contends: 
Ubuntu is not merely positive human qualities, but the very essence itself, which ‘lures’ 
and enables human beings to become abantu or humanized beings, living in daily self-
expressive works of love and efforts to create harmonious relationships in the community 
and the world beyond. (p. 143) 
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In the same vein, Eze (2010) utilizing Broodyrk (2002) extends Mnyaka’s (2003) view to 
conceptualize Ubuntu as 
[a] comprehensive ancient world view based on the values of intense humanness, caring, 
sharing, respect, compassion and associated values, ensuring a happy and qualitative 
human community life in a spirit of family. Ubuntu determines and influences everything 
a person thinks, says and does. (Broodryk, 2002, pp. 13-14 as cited in Eze, 2010, pp. 91-
92) 
Moving away from and in an attempt to overcome his essentialist definition (Eze, 2010), Saule 
(1996) admits: 
It stands to reason therefore that a synthetic definition of ubuntu would always be 
inadequate. In their definitions scholars address those characteristics of the concept of 
Ubuntu that mostly appeal to them… (Saule, 1996, p. 85 as cited in Eze, 2010, p. 93)  
Forster (2010) argues that any translation involves a loss of culture specific meaning. Echoing 
Saule (1996) and Forster (2010), Sebidi (1988) offers: 
Defining an idea like “ubuntu” is akin to trying to give a definition of “time.” Everybody 
seems to know what “time” is until they are asked to define it or detail its essential 
characteristics without which “time” could not be “time.” This is based on the notion that 
ubuntu is something abstract, [a] non-perceptible quality or attribute of human acts the 
presence or absence of which can only be intuited by the human mind. (Mnyaka, 2005, p. 
217) 
Ubuntu is comparative to Black Americans recognizing ‘soul’ in other Black Americans, it is 
deeply felt, marginally describable, and imperceptible to those in which it is not contained. 
Ubuntu is at once a philosophy and an embodied knowing. With these assertions in mind, I will 
provide a landscape of the definitions of ubuntu circulating in the written discourses on the topic. 
The following section will provide a historical analysis of the term in written text from 1846 to 
present day.  
Common definitions. Ubuntu is most commonly understood as a Zulu/Xhosa word 
meaning humanness, personhood, or morality (Broodryk, 2006; Forster, 2010; Waghid, 2014; 
Letseka, 2011).  Given Ubuntu’s lack of a true definition, Mbiti’s (1971) phrase: “I am because 
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we are; and since we are, therefore I am” (Letseka, 2011, p. 48) is often utilized as the closest 
English translation of the Afro-cultural significance of the term.  To reiterate, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu describes ubuntu as:  
A person is a person through other persons. None of use comes into the world fully 
formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings 
unless we learned it from other human beings. We need other human beings in order to 
be human. (Tutu, 2004, p. 25) 
In resonance with Tutu (2004), Eze (2010) asserts, Ubuntu can best be explained as: 
‘A person is a person through other people’ strikes an affirmation of one’s humanity 
through recognition of an ‘other’ in his or her uniqueness and difference. It is a demand 
for a creative intersubjective formation in which the ‘other’ becomes a mirror (but only a 
mirror) for my subjectivity. This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not embedded 
in my person solely as an individual; my humanity is co-substantively bestowed upon the 
other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other. We create each other and need 
to sustain this otherness creation. And if we belong to each other, we participate in our 
creations: we are because you are, and since you are, definitely I am. The ‘I am’ is not a 
rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this otherness creation of 
relation and distance. (Eze, 2010, p. 190-191) 
As evidenced by Tutu (2004) and Eze (2010), ubuntu is “best conveyed by the Nguni expression 
‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’, which means ‘a person is a person through other people’” 
(Bolden, 2014, p. 1). 
Again, as Broodyrk (2006) asserts it is difficult to define ubuntu or pinpoint one 
definition of ubuntu because it flows from the (South) African approach to life; however, for the 
purposes of this study Eze’s (2010) conception of Ubuntu will be utilized as the primary 
understanding of the term/philosophy/ethic. 
Ubuntu Across the Continent(s). Finding its conceptual origins in the Bantu people of 
eastern Africa as omundu/muntu, ubuntu or a closely related iteration meaning humanity or 
humanness is shared across much of the African continent (Letseka, 2000, Mbiti, 1991; Nafukho, 
2006). Roederer and Mollendorf (2004) trace the roots of ubuntu to small communities and pre-
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colonial Africa, and argue its notion of communalism and human interdependence are the very 
foundation of every indigenous culture in Africa. For example, the information in Figure 1 below 
provides the word equivalents of Ubuntu throughout southern Africa.  
Table 1: Conception of Ubuntu across the continent of Africa8 
Language/Ethic Group Equivalent Word/Conception 
Zulu Ubuntu 
Sesotho Botho 





Xhosa (Transkei) Umuntu 
Shona (Zimbabwe) Nunhu 
Swahili (Kenya) Utu 
Kiswahili (Tanzania) Ujamaa 
Ugandan Abantu 
Cape Afrikaans Manslikgeit 
In fact, Teffo (1998) affirms that the philosophy of Ubuntu encompasses universal attributes 
(Eze, 2010). More specifically, Teffo (1998) suggests: 
This philosophy is encapsulated in all the philosophies of the world, though it might be 
articulated and actualized differently. Effectively, therefore, it would be ethnocentric and, 
indeed, silly to suggest that the [Ubuntu/]Botho ethics is uniquely African. The mere fact 
8 Source: Broodryk (2006, pp. 3-4) 
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that the tenets that underpin this philosophy are intensely expressed by Africans, do not 
make those exclusively African. (p. 4)  
Maintaining Ubuntu as the root of African philosophy, Bolden (2014) concurs similar concepts 
exist in other societies. For example, “the Chinese philosophy of Jên (pronounced ren), the 
Filipino philosophy of Loob and the Russian concept of Obschina” (p. 1) are similar conceptions. 
The Confucian concept of Jên is a direct Eastern parallel to the southern African notion of 
Ubuntu (Bell & Metz, 2011). More specifically, similar to Ubuntu in southern Africa, Chan 
(1955) argues Jên is “one of the most important in Chinese thought” (p. 295). Jên is Ubuntu of 
the East and is translated as “benevolence, love, altruism, kindness, charity, compassion, 
magnanimity perfect virtue, goodness, true manhood, manhood at its best, human-heartedness, 
humanness, humanity, ‘hominity,’[and] man-to-manness” (Chan, 1955, p. 295). In a striking 
parallel to Ubuntu, Chinese Confucianist understands the concept to explain the manner in which 
we are made human in relationship with others (Bell & Metz, 2011; Chan, 1955). Given the 
humanistic nature of Ubuntu philosophy, there is no doubt that the essence of ubuntu is also 
illustrated in the writings of European philosophers Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricouer 
(Bolden, 2014). However, the primary concern of this study is the South African understanding 
of the philosophy.  
South African understanding of Ubuntu.  Motivated by the fact that South Africa is the 
only country to utilize Ubuntu as the foundation of its modern constitution, Gade (2012) 
conducted a study to understand the South African conception of Ubuntu. Analyzing a collection 
of written documents and oral testimonies of South African leaders and common citizens, Gade 
(2012) in true Western reductionist fashion, attempts to elucidate the essence of Ubuntu. Gade’s 
(2012) research yielded two common understandings of Ubuntu: first, a moral quality or 
attributes of personhood (ubuntu); and second, as a phenomenon through which humans are 
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interconnected–“…a philosophy, an ethic, African humanism, or a worldview” (p. 484). It is 
these two clusters of the South African understanding of Ubuntu that will be discussed in detail. 
Gade (2012) elaborates on the understanding of ubuntu as a moral quality by utilizing the 
words of Mfunisewela John Bhengu, an author on ubuntu and former Inkatha Freedom Party 
member of parliament, who “describes ubuntu as a kind of ‘soul force’” (p. 489). To clarify, 
Bhengu continues: 
Gandhi gave India the spiritual concept of ‘soul force’ (satyagraha), a capacity to sustain 
and transcend physical discomfort in a triumph of concentration and restraint. Why 
should we Africans not give South Africa that soul force (ubuntu). (Bhengu, 1996, p. 19 
as cited in Gade, 2012, p. 489) 
In a later interview with Gade (2012), Bhengu conceptualizes ubuntu as a crystallization of the 
divine; he states, “There is God in a human being. […] That is ubuntu” (interview on 17 
December 2009 as cited in Gade, 2012, p. 489). Equally, Bangura (2005) articulates ubuntu as 
the spiritual foundation of African societies. The moral quality of ubuntu is often expressed as 
behavior or a practice. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, a former member of the Human Rights 
Violations Committee of South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), provides a 
poignant example of the soul practice of ubuntu: 
Its essence is about the capacity for empathy with another person. You see, that is the 
essence of ubuntu: that capacity which I think is something we ought to have as human 
beings, and which is present in all of us, that capacity to connect with another human 
being, to be touched, to be moved by another human being. That is ubuntu. If I walk 
down the street, and I see someone…I can see something in his face that says that this 
person is going through a difficult moment. I do not have time but I turn to him and say: 
‘How are you today?’ That is ubuntu because I am connecting to how he seems to be 
feeling at the moment, and I am reaching out, and I am acknowledging that I see his pain 
and want to leave him with some kindness as I walk past him (interview on 27 August 
2008). (Gade, 2012, pp. 489-490) 
A person who is said to have ubuntu is highly praised. Tutu explains that a person with ubuntu is 
“generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate” (Tutu, 1999, p. 34 as cited in Gade, 
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2012, p. 490). Gobodo-Madikizela’s explanation requires one to be both present in the 
ordinariness of everyday life and attentive in the recognition of another’s humanness.  
Ubuntu as a philosophy, worldview, African humanism, or as an ethic is best reinforced 
in illustrative quotes. For example, Makgoba (1999) describes ubuntu as “a social ethic, a 
unifying vision enshrined in the Zulu maxim ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabyne’ (‘one is a person 
through others’)” (p. 153 as cited in Gade, 2012, p. 492). Others describe ubuntu as an 
atmosphere from which African humanism emanates (Buthelezi, 2004), and Ngcoya (2009) 
expresses ubuntu as “worldview [which] advocates a profound sense of interdependence and 
emphasizes that our true human potential can only be realized in partnership with others” (p. 1 as 
cited in Gade, 2012, p. 492). As a philosophy, ethic, and worldview ubuntu provides a firm 
foundation upon which African humanism or the philosophy of Ubuntu is built and its tenets 
practiced.  
Gade’s (2012) two definitional clusters ground the South African understanding of 
ubuntu as both a moral quality and philosophy or ethic. As both and deeply engrained in the 
culture of South Africans, ubuntu permeates one’s very being; however, how did a notion so 
complex come to be reduced to two complimentary clusters of thought? Now, turning to a 
historical analysis of ubuntu in written discourse, the dichotomous reduction is explained.  
The Evolution of Ubuntu: A Historical Analysis of Written Discourses 
Ubuntu is an ancient African philosophy that spans “…from the Nubian dessert to the 
Cape of Good Hope and from Senegal to Zanzibar” (De Tejada, 1979, p. 304 as cited in Ramose, 
2002, p. 230). Given its historicity as both a “philosophy and an ideal circulating primarily 
through orality and tradition and associated with no particular authoritative text, ubuntu is open 
to interpretation, especially in view of its application to contemporary South African society” 
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(Blakenberg, 1999, p. 43 as cited in Venter, 2004, p. 149). Gade (2011) provides an historical 
analysis of ubuntu in written discourses; namely, in the social transformation movements of 
postcolonial Africa. Finding the first textual mention of the word in 1846, Gade (2011) traces the 
evolution of the meaning of ubuntu through the 2000s. Ubuntu, in written discourses, has been 
defined as a human quality, a philosophy, ethic, African humanism, and a worldview, and is 
associated with the proverb “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (people are people through other 
people)” (Gade, 2011, p. 318). It is important to note that the authors of the written discourses 
were white colonizers and it was not until 1956 that African priest and philosopher Alexis 
Kagame published a text containing the word (Gade, 2012). Finally, Gade (2011) explores the 
use of Ubuntu in postcolonial Africa’s narratives of return, and within the transitory periods of 
migration toward Black rule in Zimbabwe and post-apartheid South Africa. As Ramose (2002) 
and Venter (2004) contend, Ubuntu is the basis of African philosophy and the very core of an 
African philosophy of life; therefore, a genealogical analysis of the notion is imperative in 
understanding the historical and socio-political situatedness of this important African 
foundational philosophical notion.  
Ubuntu: 1846-1980. Gade (2011) contends that no evidence exists of the term ‘ubuntu’ 
appearing in writing before the second half of the 20th century; however, he has “discovered as 
many as 31 texts from before 1950, which contain the term ‘ubuntu’, the oldest of which is from 
1846” (p. 306), which refers to the qualities of ubuntu, but never mentions the term specifically.  
In 1956, “Alexis Kagame, a Rwandese historian, philosopher, and Catholic priest from the Tutsi 
group, was the first African to publish a text containing the term ‘ubuntu’” (Gade, 2012, p. 488). 
Prior to 1956, ubuntu lay prey to interpretation of the Western colonizer and academic discourse, 
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which was dominated by an Eurocentric interpretation of an African socio-cultural embodied 
term. During this period, Gade (2011, p. 307) found ubuntu was described as:  
• ‘Human nature’ (Appleyard 1850: 106; Perrin 1855: 120; Colenso 1855: 7; Colenso
1861: 354; Roberts 1880: 107; Grout 1893: 290; Roberts 1895: 133; McLaren 1955:
25; Bryant 1963: 232; Callaway 1969: 22).
• ‘Humanity’ (Callaway 1926: 395; Wilson 1936: 555; Doke 1945: 60; Walker 1948:
220; Van Sembeek 1955: 42; McLaren 1955: 25; Malcolm 1960: 163; Doke et al.
1967: 54; Rodegem 1967: 129; Callaway 1969: 22; Thompson 1969: 129; Epstein
1967: 379; Pauw 1973: 89; Thompson & Butler 1975: 158 & 160; Clarke & Ngobese
1975: 34; Livingston 1979: 128).
• ‘Humanness’ (Egenbrecht 1962: 22; De Vries 1966: 121; Thompson & Butler 1975:
158; Samkange 1975: 96; Lissner 1976: 92; Ziervogel et al. 1976: 58; Krige et al.
1978: 152; Du Plessis 1978: 48; Biko 1979: 214).
Additionally, Gade’s (2011, pp. 307-308) research revealed that prior to 1980, ubuntu is 
described as:  
• ‘Manhood’ (Colenso 1861: 354; Wilson 1936: 555; Callaway 1969: 22).
• ‘Goodness of nature’ (Colenso 1861: 354).
• ‘Good moral disposition’ (Colenso 1861: 354).
• ‘Virtue’ (McLaren 1918: 332).
• ‘The sense of common humanity’ (Barnes 1935: 46).
• ‘True humanity’ (Callaway et al. 1945: 11).
• ‘True good fellowship and sympathy in joy and in sorrow’ (Callaway et
al. 1945: 11).
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• ‘Reverence for human nature’ (Callaway et al. 1945: 29).
• ‘Essential humanity’ (Shepherd & Paver 1947: 41).
• ‘The kindly simple feeling for persons as persons’ (Brookes 1953: 20).
• ‘Manliness’ (Van Sembeek 1955: 42; Callaway 1969: 22).
• ‘Liberality’ (Kagame 1956: 53).
• ‘A person’s own human nature’ (Read 1959: 149; Read 1968: 80).
• ‘Generosity’ (Kimenyi 1979: 75).
• ‘Human feeling’ (Jabavu 1960: 4).
• ‘Humaneness’ (Prideaux 1925: 269; Vilakazi 1962: 60; Nyembezi
1963: 47; Nyembezi 1970: 16).
• ‘Good disposition’ (Nyembezi 1963: 47).
• ‘Good moral nature’ (Nyembezi 1963: 47).
• ‘Personhood’ (Reader 1966: 175).
• ‘Politeness’ (Rodegem 1967: 129).
• ‘Kindness’ (Rodegem 1967: 129; Callaway 1969: 22).
• ‘Real humanity’ (Sabra Study Group of Fort Hare 1971: 121).
• ‘Humanity (benevolence)’ (South African Department of Bantu
Education 1972a: 129).
• ‘Personality’ (South African Department of Bantu Education 1972b:
153). 
• ‘Human kindness’ (Jordan 1973: 228).
• ‘The characteristic of being truly human’ (Pauw 1975: 117).
• ‘Greatness of soul’ (Thompson & Butler 1975: 213).
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• ‘A feeling of human wellbeing’ (Clarke & Ngobese 1975: 61).
• ‘Capacity of social self-sacrifice on behalf of others’ (Hetherington
1978: 68).
Prior to 1980, as is evidenced from the list above, ubuntu in written discourse is identified as a 
positive attribute or quality that one possesses. Further, some authors have identified ubuntu as a 
quality only possessed by a specific group–African people (Gade, 2011; Gade, 2012). The author 
writes “ubuntu is described as an ‘excellent African quality’ (Davis et al. 1936: 142), a quality 
among ‘the admirable qualities of the Bantu’ (Smith 1950: 18), and ‘an essentially Native 
quality’ (Southern Rhodesian Department of Native Affairs 1950: 34)” (Gade, 2011, p. 308).  
Going a step further, Gade (2011) argues that some Africans believe “ubuntu is a quality that 
blacks possess and whites lack” (Jabavu 1960: 4; Thompson & Butler 1975: 158 as cited in 
Gade, 2011, p. 308). Additionally, another author explains, “Initiation is a ladder to humanity 
(ubuntu) and respect” (Pauw 1973: 89 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 308) of which whites have not 
partaken. Citing the atrocities of apartheid committed at the hands of whites, some Africans 
believed that whites did not possess ubuntu; therefore, were not abantu (human) (Gade, 2011, 
2012). Given the later conception of ubuntu as humanness, Gade (2012) later explores the 
concept of personhood in relation to South Africans’ understanding of ubuntu and inquires: who 
counts as a person? This question is interrogated in detail in the (re)thinking of the Western 
subject in Chapter 5.  
Elevation to philosophy. During this same period, in the 1970s, Ubuntu begins to emerge 
in the text as “African humanism” (Africa Institute of South Africa 1975: 177; Breytenbach 
1975: 177; Ngubane 1979: 261 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 308); while the term is not directly 
defined it is interpreted as a distinction to ubuntu as a quality. The elevation of ubuntu from a 
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quality to a philosophy or ethic is reinforced in the works of Ngubane (1963, 1979): An African 
Explains Apartheid and In Conflicts of Minds, respectively. Ngubane (1963) writes: 
Supreme virtue lay in being humane, in accepting the human being as a part of yourself, 
with a right to be denied nothing that you possessed. It was inhuman to drive the hungry 
stranger from your door, for your neighbour’s sorrow was yours. This code constituted a 
philosophy of life, and the great Sutu-nguni family (Bantu has political connotations that 
the Africans resent) called it, significantly, ubuntu or botho – pronounced butu – the 
practice of being humane. (p. 76) 
Further, he defines Ubuntu as “the philosophy, which the African experience translates into 
action” (Ngubane, 1979, p. 113 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 309). Newell Snow Booth (1977) in 
his book, In African Religions: A Symposium, explicates: “The concept of ubuntu, the 
recognition of a person as a person, is basic to the ethics of all the southern Bantu” (p. 15 as cited 
in Gade, 2011, p. 309). Further evidence of the elevation of ubuntu to philosophy or ethic is 
found in the Philip Mayer ‘s (1980), Black Villagers in an Industrial Society; Mayer (1980) 
relays: 
the occurrence of the same ideas through the whole spectrum of Blacks from the least 
educated, leaves no doubt that the main source was in African philosophy, in the concept 
of ubuntu which is associated with kindness, gentleness, humility, respect and love. 
(Mayer, 1980, p. 70 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 309) 
As evidenced by Gade’s (2011) historical analysis, it was during the 1846-1980 period that 
Ubuntu moved from cultural oral transmission to a quality one possesses, and finally to the 
elevation of a philosophical concept in the Western categorization–as written discourse.  
The search for African dignity: 1950-1960. Chris Vervliet avers, “ubuntu is rooted in a 
search towards African dignity” (Vervliet, 2009, p. 20). Gade (2011), in agreement, contends the 
literary evidence of this search for African dignity appeared well before Zimbabwe and South 
Africa’s transition to Black rule. According to his research, the search for African dignity is 
reflected in the calls for Africanization, and the attempt “to formulate a foundation of politics 
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that consists of traditional African humanis[m] or socialis[m]” (Gade, 2011, p. 304) reflected in 
the political thinking of prominent postcolonial African leaders, such as: Kwame Nkrumah, 
Léopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Obafemi Awolowo, Kenneth Kaunda, and Ahmed Sékou 
Toure (Gade, 2011)9. During the years of decolonization, following the gaining of their 
independence in the second half of the 1950s through the 1960s, these leaders utilized narrative 
or stories to restore African dignity in their respective colonies (Gade, 2011). These stories “can 
be characterized as narratives of return, since they contain the idea that a return to something 
African (for instance traditional African socialism or humanism) is necessary in order for society 
to prosper [emphasis in original]” (Gade, 2011, p. 304). It is this utilization of the philosophy of 
Ubuntu within narratives of returns that situates the notion as catalyst for social transformation 
that I will explore further.  
Narratives of return, rooted in the idea of social transformation, called for the 
identification of native values—i.e. those values not introduced or forced upon the indigenous 
population by the oppressive colonizers—that can serve as a guiding force in both life and 
politics in the future of the society (Gade, 2011). Utilizing the work of Julius Nyerere, who in 
1962 was the “president of the newly independent Republic of Tangaykia” (now the United 
Republic of Tanzania) (Gade, 2011, p. 305), Gade (2011) provides a fitting example of  
narratives of return in praxis. Nyerere (1966), in his book Freedom and Unity, evangelized 
Africanization following independence through “a return to ujamaa, which he described as a 
1  Gade (2011, p. 304) reminds in a paper about social philosophy in postcolonial Africa, Kwasi Wiredu 
explains that: ‘The leaders in question [Kwame Nkrumah, Léopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Obafemi 
Awolowo, Kenneth Kaunda, and Ahmed Sékou Touré] had an equally strong sense of the importance of 
cultural self-identity. Colonialism had in varying degrees scored African culture. Now after independence 
they needed to reassert their own culture, and not just cosmetically. National reconstruction is a cultural 
enterprise of the highest kind. At independence the easy option was to stick by the systems in which the 
colonial powers left us. These were copies, imperfect copies, to be sure, of what were in place in the 
colonialist countries. These leaders did not go for that easy option. They understood that the colonial 
systems needed to be reviewed from an African standpoint’ (Wiredu 2008: 332).  
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traditional African form of socialism” (Gade, 2011, p. 305). The push for Africanization, later 
known as the Pan-African movement, served to counter what Nyerere (1966) contends are: 
Years of Arab slave raiding, and later years of European domination, [which] had caused 
our people to have grave doubt about their own abilities. This was no accident; any 
dominating group seeks to destroy the confidence of those they dominate because this 
helps them to maintain their position, and the oppressors in Tanganyika were no 
exception (p. 3).  
The years following his election as president of Tanganyika (later the United Republic of 
Tanzania), Nyerere (1966) described the Africanization movement as revolution: “…a revolution 
with a purpose, and that purpose is the extension to all African citizens the requirements on 
human dignity” (p. 22). The revolution could fulfill its purpose only “if society returned to its 
traditional socialism” (Gade, 2011, p. 305), which he identified as ujamaa. Nyerere (1966) 
contended ujamaa differed greatly from the European socialism. He writes: 
European socialism was born of the Agrarian Revolution and the Industrial Revolution[,] 
which followed it. The former created the “landed” and the “landless” classes in society; 
the later produced the modern capitalist and the industrial proletariat. These two 
revolutions planted the seeds of conflict within society, and not only was European 
socialism born of that conflict, but its apostles sanctified the conflict itself into a 
philosophy. Civil war was no longer looked upon as something evil, or something 
unfortunate, but as something good and necessary. As prayer is to Christianity or to 
Islam, so civil war (which they called “class war”) is to the European version of socialism 
– a means inseparable from the end. (Nyerere 1966, p. 169)
On the other hand, Nyerere’s ujamaa, “the true African social[ism] does not consider one class 
of men as his brethren and another as his enemies…but rather regards all human beings as 
members of an extended family” (Gade, 2011, p. 305). The end result is societal harmony.   
Nyerere’s conception of a return to ujamaa and thus a return to recognizing the 
interconnectedness of all human beings resonates deeply with the universal conception of 
ubuntu. Throwing off the shackles of colonization and Western domination, Nyerere (1966) 
further explains:  
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“Ujamaa”, then, or “familyhood”, describes our socialism [“ujamaa” is a Swahili word 
meaning “familyhood”]. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society 
on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire 
socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict 
between man and man. We, in Africa, have no more need of being “converted” to 
socialism than we have of being “taught” democracy. Both are rooted in our own past – 
in the traditional society which produced us. (Nyerere, 1966, p. 170) 
Similarly, in the political arena, Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah promulgated “the 
philosophy of consciencism, which he believed was congruent with the original humanist 
principle of Africa (Gade, 2011). Lastly, Senegalese President Léopold Senghor (1962) argued 
that socialism in Senegal should “be inspired by négritude, which he identified as the totality of 
traditional civilizing values of the Negro world” (Gade, 2011, p. 306). 
Ubuntuism: A Political Philosophy. Gade (2011) maintains the first book written solely 
about Ubuntu is Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous Political Philosophy 
(Samkange & Samkange, 1980). “‘Hunhu’ is a term from the Shona languages, which according 
to the Samkanges has the same meaning of the term ‘ubuntu’ from the Nguni languages” (Gade, 
2011, p. 309). More explicitly, hunhu is defined as: “the attention one human being gives to 
another: the kindness, courtesy, consideration and friendliness in the relationship between 
people; a code of behaviour, an attitude to other people and to life, is embodied in hunhu or 
ubuntu” (Samkange & Samkange, 1980, p. 39). Linking Hunhuism or Ubuntuism to political 
philosophy, the Samkanges utilized it as an indigenous political philosophy during the 
Zimbabwean transition from minority to majority rule (Gade, 2011) and declared, “It is our 
business to distill this philosophy and set it out for the whole world to see” (Samkange & 
Samkange, 1980, p. 9).  
Summing up the book, Gade (2011) points to the Samkanges (1980) political and policy 
implications of a new Zimbabwe government constructed through the lens of Hunhusim or 
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Ubuntuism. The implications, while theorized were never realized; there exist no evidence that 
Zimbabwe utilized Hunhusim or Ubuntuism as political philosophy. However, in 2009, 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe utilized the term ubuntu in a national celebratory article, 
thus continuing the discourse. 
Ubuntu and Mandela Uniting a Broken South Africa: 1980-2011. February 11, 1990, 
was a historic day for South Africa, President Willem de Klerk, after months of secret meetings 
declared Nelson Mandela would be released from prison after decades of imprisonment. This 
announcement amid the growing concern of the international community to end South African 
apartheid ushered in “the ratification of the Interim Constitution on 18 November 1993 and to 
South Africa’s first democratic election on 27 April 1994” (Gade, 2011, p. 311). The interim 
constitution, was a transitional document that sought to provide 
a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, 
conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human 
rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex’ (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, Epilogue after Section 251).  
Further, Gade (2011) posits: 
The last quotation is from the Epilogue of the Interim Constitution, which defined the 
nature of the chosen ‘bridge’ away from apartheid by stating that in addressing the 
divisions and strife of the past, ‘there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a 
need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization’ 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993: Epilogue after Section 
251). (p. 311) 
The appearance of ubuntu in the Interim Constitution is no mistake and permeates the whole of 
the Constitution (S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995: § 237 as cited in Gade, 2011). Utilizing 
post-apartheid court rulings as evidentiary data, Gade (2011) surmises, “Historically it [Ubuntu] 
was foundation to the spirit of reconciliation and bridge-building that enabled our deeply 
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traumatized society to overcome and transcend the divisions of the past” (Dikoko v Mokhatla, 
2006: § 113 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 312). 
Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. While the interim Constitution uses the term and ubuntu 
is permeated throughout, it fails to define ubuntu.  Gade (2011) avers between 1993 and 1995 the 
term became associated with and/or defined by the proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ and in 
1997 Ubuntu was being defined as “…a person becomes a person through other person” (Lötter 
1997: 46 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 313). The 2000s brought about similar iterations: 
Ubuntu is the short-form of a widespread isiXhosa proverb in Southern Africa: Umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu, which means “A human being is a human being only through its 
relationships to other human beings”’ (Marx 2002: 52); ‘The last term, the African 
traditional notion of ubuntu, means roughly “a person is a person through other persons”’ 
(Holkeboer, 2004: 155); ‘Ubuntu is an African word that, literally translated, means 
“people are people through other people”’ (Ronaldson 2005: 153); ‘Ubuntu literally 
translated means “I am because we are; I can only be a person through others”’ (Van den 
Heuvel et al. 2006: 45 as cited in Gade, 2011, p. 313).  
A key text in proselytizing this particular definition of ubuntu is August Shutte’s (1995), 
Philosophy for Africa. The foreword states: 
South Africa is world-famous for apartheid – that unique racist philosophy and system 
constructed over the last fifty years. Because of apartheid (which means “separateness”) 
another feature of South African life has been hidden from the world for all that time. But 
now the apartheid era has ended and our recent treasure has been revealed to the world by 
our president, Nelson Mandela, by public figures like Bishop Tutu and by events like the 
recent elections, the inauguration of the president, and the World Cup of Rugby. It is 
called ubuntu (which means “humanity”). We feel it is something of great value we can 
offer to the rest of the world. This is what this book is about. (Shutte, 1995, p. v) 
Connecting Ubuntu with the proverb, Shutte (1995) explains: 
Central to my book is the conception of humanity embodied in the traditional African 
proverb umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through persons). This 
understanding of human nature has its counterpart in the moral sphere in the idea of 
ubuntu. In English this is equivalent to humanity, understood as a moral notion referring 
to a general quality of character, or attitude or behaviour or way of life. (Shutte, 1995, p. 
vi)
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This genealogical analysis of Ubuntu from an orally transmitted cultural virtue to a written 
philosophical and political discourse provides a glimpse of the causal effects of space/time with 
respect to language. More directly, the social and political milieu greatly effects the meaning, 
usage, and linkages of a particular term over time. Gade (2011, 2012) conveys the evolution of 
meaning given the space/time in which the discourse was constructed. Further, it stands to reason 
that the current conception of Ubuntu as human interconnectedness or that a ‘person is a person 
through other people’ is a political mechanism arising in resistance to segregationist ideology of 
the apartheid regime (Gade, 2012; Praeg, 2014). It must also be noted that the English language 
is limiting in its ability to aptly translate non-Western words into comprehendible Western 
definitions. The translation of Ubuntu, upon which the “be-ing of an African in the universe is 
inseparably anchored” (Ramose, 2002, p. 230) is only comprehensible through an embodied 
knowing–no translation, no interpretation can truly grasp the fullness of its meaning.  
In accord with Eze (2010), Shutte (1995) provides the working definition of ubuntu that I 
employ throughout the study to problematize and re-conceptualize Western subjectivity. The 
conception of ubuntu as philosophy or ethic will be further examined when utilized as the 
foundation for the re-conceptualization of a philosophy of education. 
The Philosophy of Ubuntu 
Defining the individual in the context of relationship to others, Ubuntu is both a 
philosophical and religious conception with the potential to engender harmony, respect, and 
compassion not only for other human beings but all sentient beings (Louw, 2011).  Yes, Ubuntu 
is identified as African humanism (Gade, 2011); however, African humanism is distinctly 
different than the Western conception of humanism. Humanism in the African context is 
cosmological and encapsulates the “…traditional way of living in Africa, which was peaceful 
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and harmonious. Respect was shown not only to other human beings, but also to the communal 
environment, animals, nature and the supernatural” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 4). Ubuntu as a 
philosophy of African humanism does not necessarily center the human, but recognizes the 
human as one component in the larger order of the Cosmos. As Broodryk (2006) so aptly states, 
“philosophy is about the love of wisdom and to be wise, is to possess the skill to make mature 
statements, judgments about the use of human knowledge in the context of daily life” (Presbey, 
1997, p. 3 as cited in Broodryk, 2006, p. 5). More generally, Venter (2004) asserts, “philosophy 
is a conceptual response to basic human problems and an analysis of human experience” (p. 
152). Philosophy encourages and requires new ways of (re)thinking and being in response to 
issues and problems (Venter, 2004; Letseka, 2011; Louw, 2011). Ubuntu, according to Ramose 
(2002), is understood to be “the root of African philosophy” (p. 203); so much so, he exclaims, 
“the being of an African in the universe is inseparably anchored upon ubuntu” (p. 230). In 
agreement, Makuhudu (1993) affirms:  
Every facet of African life is shaped to embrace Ubuntu as a process and philosophy[,] 
which reflects the African heritage, traditions, culture, customs, beliefs, value system and 
the extended family structures. (Makuhudu, 1993, p. 40 as cited in Forster, 2010, p. 7) 
Ubuntu is both the abstract and concrete manifestation of human interdependence and 
interconnectedness that defines the culture and lives of southern Africans.  
The inseparability of Ubu- and –ntu: Ubuntu as onto-epistemology. Ramose (2002) 
maintains Ubuntu as an African onto-epistemology upon which an African’s be-ing is anchored. 
Ubuntu “is the indivisible one-ness and wholeness of ontology and epistemology” (Ramose, 
2002, p. 230). The word ubuntu is composed of a prefix  (ubu-) and a suffix (-ntu), which are 
inseparable (Ramose, 2002). “Ubu- evokes the idea of be-ing in general. It is enfolded be-ing 
before it manifests itself in the concrete form or mode of ex-istence of a particular entity” 
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(Ramose, 2002, p. 230). This enfolded be-ing, “Ubu- is always oriented towards unfoldment, that 
is, incessant continual concrete manifestation through particular forms and modes of being” 
(Ramose, 2002, p. 230). Ubu-, the ontological, is always oriented toward –ntu, the 
epistemological (Ramose, 2002; Eze, 2008). –Ntu, writes Ramose (2002), is the “nodal point at 
which be-ing assumes concrete form or a mode of being in the process of continual unfoldment” 
(p. 231). Asserting that ubuntu is a gerund10, “ubu- may be regarded as be-ing becoming and this 
evidently implies the idea of motion” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231)—perpetual motion, which cannot 
be halted unless motion itself ceases to exist. This motion is verbal always moving toward the 
noun,  –ntu, the temporary place where one has become. The indivisibility of being-becoming 
toward the very temporary location where one has become situates ubuntu as a gerund, “a –ness 
and not an –ism” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231). This ‘-ism’, Ramose (2002) warns, falsely gives the 
impression of entities existing as fixed, independent, and separate. Returning to the inability of 
language to truly speak what we mean, the fragmentation of verb and noun constitutes false 
thinking, which finds it roots in “the subject-verb-object understanding of the structure of 
language – which posits a fundamental irreconcilable opposition in being becoming. On the basis 
of this imputed opposition be-ing becoming is fragmented into pieces of reality with an 
independent existence of their own” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231). Language, Western language, has 
falsely fragmented being in both the real and linguistic sense.  
To fully grasp the inseparability of ubu– from –ntu, one must first understand the concept 
of umuntu, which is defined as “the emergence of homo–loquens11 who is simultaneously homo 
sapiens” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231). The prefix umu– is ontologically identical to ubu–; however 
10 Gerund: A noun made from a verb by adding “-ing”; “a verbal noun in Latin that expresses generalized 
or uncompleted action” (Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary, n.d.).  
11 Homo loquens or “talking man” refers to man as the only animal capable of language. (see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names_for_the_human_species, n.d.).  
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the former tends toward the more specific where the latter is general. More specifically, umuntu 
“is the specific entity which continues to conduct an inquiry into being, experience, knowledge, 
and truth” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231). Umuntu is an integral component of ubuntu as it gives voice 
to and “relevates…directs and focuses the entire epistemological domain towards the ontology of 
ubu–” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231). The onto-epistemological philosophy of Ubuntu maintains, “be-
ing human is not enough. One is enjoined, yes, commanded as it were, to actually become a 
human being” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231).  
Ubuntu as philosophy is one such attempt to (re)think and (re)imagine the very real 
socio-politico cultural issues of the world and propels us toward the creation of a new 
“awareness of purpose and meaning in life…a positive ethical/moral way of going/being in 
relation to others” (Venter, 2004, p. 152). Ubuntu is not only a way of being-in-the-world, but 
also a “recognition of be-ing becoming” (Ramose, 2002, p. 231). The following will discuss 
briefly the unique conception of African philosophy, the central tenets and corresponding values 
of a philosophy of Ubuntu, and the applicability of Ubuntu beyond the geo-socio-cultural 
boundaries of the continent of Africa.  
Ubuntu as counter-Western, counter-hegemonic philosophy. Generally, two debates 
rage within the context of African philosophy and philosophizing: 1) the legitimacy of a 
philosophy that does not stand up to the rigor of the Eurocentric philosophical tradition; 2) and 
the privileging of indigenous knowledge/ways of knowing as a means to liberate the heart and 
minds of the African people from the imprisonment of Eurocentric, Western hegemonic 
thought—onto-cognitive imperialism (Eze, 2010; Waghid, 2014; Venter, 2004; Ramose, 2002; 
Deacon, 2002; Battiste, 2002). Deacon (2002) reflects, “African philosophy can be identified as 
constitutive of a post-colonial quest for a uniquely African identity, which has become lost amid 
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the brutality of the European rape of the African continent” (p. 97). To emphasize the necessity 
of a uniquely African philosophy, Van Hook writes: 
Questions concerning the existence of African philosophy are…perceived as reflecting 
Western colonial bias that there is no such thing as, and has never been (and some would 
even say, cannot be) an African philosophy, because Africans are not rational or not as 
rational as Westerners, or do not have the temperament needed to produce philosophy. 
(Van Hook, 1993, p. 30 as cited in Deacon, 2002, p. 97) 
While LeGrange (2011) articulates a false dichotomization between the West and Africa, it is no 
doubt a reality, but not one that cannot be overcome. Oruka (1990, 2002) in an attempt to 
overcome this debased view and recognizing the necessity for discourse on African philosophy, 
has classified African philosophy into four strands: ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity, 
national-ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy (LeGrange, 2011; Waghid, 2014; 
Deacon, 2002). Using Oruka’s (2002) four strands as a heuristic map, I will discuss each of them 
briefly. 
Ethno-philosophy is best exemplified in the work on Bantu ontology produced by Father 
Placide Temples, who is recognized as “...the first person to use the term ‘philosophy’ with 
regard to the thoughts of African people” (LeGrange, 2011, p. 69). Essentially, ethno-philosophy 
is a folk philosophy that “reproduces both the latent and explicit philosophical doctrines in the 
hope of providing future philosophers with an intellectual matrix to indigenous Africa” 
(LeGrange, 2011, p. 69). Ethno-philosophy, the strand in which Ubuntu finds its home, is not 
without critics. LeGrange (2011) contends ethno-philosophy because it is geared toward Western 
audiences only reifies “African thought as being pseudo-philosophy or pre-scientific” (p. 70). 
However, in contrast to the rational, logical, and rigorous investigation of Western philosophy, 
ethno- or folk philosophy recognizes “the customs, traditions, and religions of a specific people” 
(Oruka, 1990, p. 15). More importantly, Oruka (1991) writes:  
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African philosophy is an existential experience common and obvious to all members of 
the stock. Basic logical principles in the West such as the principle of contradictions and 
of excluded middle have no room in African thought. The basic principle is that of a 
poetic self-involvement that defies any Western logical formulation [emphasis added]. 
(Oruka, 1991, p. 21)  
Ethno-philosophy, thus is a holistic philosophy of collective knowledge, customs, and traditions 
that seeks to accurately represent the lived experiences of African people.  
Philosophic sagacity or sagacity philosophy, based on Oruka’s research of Kenyan sages, 
is a reflective system of thought founded on the wisdom and traditions of people. Oruka (1990) 
defines philosophic sagacity as the “thoughts of wise men and women in any given community 
and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates between popular wisdom and 
didactic wisdom” (p. 28). Discussing Oruka’s (1990) philosophic sagacity, Broodryk (2006) 
confirms: 
In Africa, life lessons and life coping advice are taught by so-called sages (wise people). 
The Kenyan philosopher H. Odera Oruka recorded the wisdom of various sages, which 
merits more study to researchers of wisdom. The sages, when asked to explain [what] 
their special roles were in society, and their general roles in life, they reported that their 
lives were devoted to the betterment of their communities, as well as their service to 
individuals in their communities. (p. 25) 
In addition to the men and women entrusted with the transmission of wisdom from generation to 
generation, Gyekye (1987) reveals a wealth of “philosophical material…embedded in proverbs, 
myths and folktales, folksongs, rituals, beliefs, customs, and traditions of the people” (p. 13 as 
cited in Nafukho, 2006, p. 412). Sagacity philosophers are acknowledged as both sages and 
thinkers, although one does not need to be a ‘thinker’ in the Western sense to be a sage. Distinct 
from ethno-philosophy, sages are well versed in the wisdom and traditions of his or her people 
and are armed with the ability to critically evaluate, through both cognitive and embodied 
processes, notions categorically accepted by members of their respective communities. Raising 
critique, LeGrange (2011) argues like ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity “comes perilously 
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close to non-philosophy, because it is based on the views of everyday people” (Bodunrin, 1984 
as cited in LeGrange, 2011, p. 70). While LeGrange (2011) raises protest over the classification 
of ethno-philosophy and sagacity philosophy as actual philosophical constructs due to their 
insistent focus on the everyday lives of people, I argue, it is the very focus that confirms their 
place as philosophic constructs. Philosophy is simply a conceptual response, a extraordinary 
(re)thinking of the ordinary problems human beings encounter in the lived experience of their 
daily lives.  
The third strand or trend in African philosophy is nationalist-ideological philosophy. 
Discussed earlier, this philosophical trend developed and was produced through the work of the 
first post-colonial leaders; namely, Senghor, Nyerere, and Nkrumah (LeGrange, 2011; Gade, 
2011). With an aim towards decolonizing their newly freed nations and the minds of their 
people, these leaders promoted Pan-Africanism and were deeply influenced by Marxism. More 
pointedly, the nationalist-ideological philosophical perspective is characterized by a thought 
system based on traditional African socialism and communalism (Gade, 2011; Waghid, 2014; 
LeGrange, 2011). It is a socio-political ethno-philosophy aimed at, as Bodunrin (1984) criticizes, 
“…glorify[ing] an African past in order to forecast an almost utopian non-colonial future” (p. 2); 
however, it lacked the rigor and logic to be classified a philosophy.  
Finally, the fourth strand of African philosophy is professional philosophy. Professional 
philosophy is the analysis and interpretation of reality undertaken by trained philosophers (read: 
Western educated). Philosophy, asserts professional philosophers, is a universal discipline that 
maintains homogeneity of meaning across cultures (Waghid, 2014, LeGrange, 2011; Eze, 2010; 
Deacon, 2002). The argument, then, is that “African philosophy is philosophy done by African 
philosophers whether it be in the area of logic, metaphysics, ethics, or history of philosophy” 
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(LeGrange, 2011, p. 70). Conversely, Waghid (2014), in essence argues that an ethno-centric 
philosophy is just as reasonable as any other tradition of inquiry. An African philosophy of 
education is obtained not through methodological means but through the practice, the active 
engagement in “conscious rationality or reasonableness” (Waghid, 2014, p. 7), which is 
operationalized as one’s ability to clearly articulate and defend their arguments, and a 
willingness to listen with care to the other (Wiredu, 2004). Rationality, contends Hountondji 
(2002), is not something that is given to humankind in advance, but must be developed “in a 
spirit of solidarity and sharing…so that the germs of ignorance and poverty will be eliminated 
forever from planet earth” (Waghid, 2014, p. 7). Waghid (2014) asserts an African tradition of 
inquiry, like all traditions of inquiry, is nothing more than “a matter of how knowledge is 
constructed and enacted within an African tradition” (p. 4). Further, he defends African 
philosophy by cogently arguing “philosophic activity is not a thing or body of knowledge that is 
neutral and objective, but rather a mode of intellectual inquiry–reasonable, deliberative, and 
moral” (Waghid, 2014, p. 6). To this end, an African philosophy of education or a Buddhist 
philosophy of education is a valid means through which to analyze, interpret, and make sense of 
one’s reality.  
Clearly, the professional philosophical strand is distinctly universalist in its strong 
identification with the traditional Western philosophical traditions. However, for particularists, 
like Waghid (2014) and Eze (2010), philosophy and culture are indistinguishably entangled. 
“[S]o much so that cultural values/expressions are perceived as commensurate with philosophy” 
(LeGrange, 2011, p. 71). In contrast to Western, Eurocentric philosophic models, the philosophy 
of Ubuntu serves as “an obvious and potent means to rescue people from their loss of identity; to 
let them regain their cultural and societal values, and to let them experience themselves as human 
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beings with dignity” (Sebedi, 1989, 1995 as cited in Venter, 2004, p. 152). Distinct even from 
Eastern philosophies, Ubuntu is classified as ethno- and sagacity philosophy, which as a 
distinctly African philosophy moves society collectively toward harmony and happiness in 
relationship with others (LeGrange, 2011; Eze, 2010; Waghid, 2014; Louw, 2011; Nafukho, 
2005). Ubuntu is not merely a cultural value or moral quality, but a philosophy with the 
wherewithal to transcend the Western philosophical qualifications of rigor, systemization, and 
factory line uniformity.  
Central Tenets of Ubuntu. The importance of Ubuntu in African society cannot be over 
stated. In fact, “Every facet of African life is shaped to embrace Ubuntu as a process and 
philosophy, which reflects the African heritage, traditions, culture, customs, beliefs, value 
system and the extended family structures” (Makhudu, 1993, p. 40 as cited in Forster, 2010, p. 
7).  Forming the core of most African traditional cultures, Ubuntu through and in relationship 
with others encourages recognition of our shared humanity through communal dialogue and the 
practice of respect, compassion, and harmony (Eze, 2010; Ncube, 2010; Venter, 2004; Waghid, 
2014; Louw, 2011; Ramose, 2002).   
Ubuntism, what Nafuhko (2006) defines as the philosophy of Ubuntu, contains three 
central tenets: spirituality or religiosity, consensus building or democracy, and dialogue 
(Bangura, 2005; Nafukho, 2006; Waghid, 2014; Louw, 2011). “Ubuntu was decidedly religious” 
(Nafukho, 2006); however, as Forster (2010) attests there is no narrow or single view of God in 
relation to the Universe; rather, “there is a predominant understanding that all that exists comes 
from a Supreme Being. Moreover, it is God who sustains and provides for the created order 
through elements of sunshine, rain fertility, good health and so on” (Kudadjie & Osei, 2004, p. 
35 as cited in Forster, 2010, p. 7). On the other hand, spirituality serves as the unifying force 
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between the living and living-dead (Louw, 2011). In the spirit of communalism characteristic of 
Ubuntu, the living and the dead are responsible for the care of one another (Forster, 2010). The 
African worldview places a primacy on the “wholeness of being” (Setiloane, 1998, p. 75, as cited 
in Forster, 2010, p. 7) and harmony; wholeness begins with God and ends with all of creation. 
Acquiescing Ubuntu with Buddhism, Venter (2004) holds, “The African community…shares 
some features with Buddhist ideals of the human community as being a vast, ever-expanding net 
of spiritual, psychological, biological and emotional relations” (Higgs and Smith, 2000, p. 55 as 
cited in Venter, 2004, p. 151). Venter (2004) drawing further comparison with Buddhism and the 
African community states, “The African community, like the Buddhist community, shares the 
earth with the unborn, the living spirits of the dead, the earth, mountain and sky” (Higgs and 
Smith, 2000, p. 55 as cited in Venter, 2004, p. 151). Forster (2010) interprets this relationship as 
vertical and horizontal. The vertical element representing the wholeness and harmony of all 
reality, which encompasses the living dead (spirits), human beings, sentient beings, and all the 
earth. Within the African worldview, it is deeply felt that: 
The universe itself – comprising both seen and unseen reality (spirit beings, human 
beings, plants, animals, mountains, waters, stellar bodies, and all) is a whole, a 
community with symbolic influences and relationships. It is also commonly believed that, 
through the laws of nature and various spiritual forces, as well as human customs and 
institutions, God sustains and upholds the world. Thus, he maintains an orderly and 
harmonious world so that all can perform their own duties in it. (Kudadjie & Osei, 2004, 
p. 36) 
Thus, in a southern African cosmology human beings are just one part of a much larger 
community of living beings. This is African humanism. The horizontal element, which according 
to Forster (2010) represents the enactment, the daily, lived praxis of compassion through Ubuntu. 
Louw (2011) defines praxis as more than practice, but as “the intention of actions as related to 
meaning and destiny. It refers to intentionality: the question regarding significance/telos and 
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truth/aletheia (p. 173). With the aim of maintaining the all-important equilibrium of the cosmos, 
Ubuntu is utilized as the noetic12 vehicle through which human beings participate in the dance of 
the universe and engage in actions that co-create our humanity and lead to dignity (Louw, 2011; 
Forster, 2010).  
Again, with its aim being social harmony and cohesion, the second tenet of consensus 
building is of extreme importance in maintaining communal harmony. Nafukho (2006) 
referencing the work of Bangura (2005) asserts African democracy operates through discussion 
toward the pursuit of reconciliation and agreement. Born out of mutual respect, consensus 
building is an authentic recognition of the personhood of each individual, the communalist 
notions central to Ubuntu, and the necessity of maintaining harmony. Democracy or consensus 
building, according to Broodryk (2006), is synonymous with gathering underneath the shade of a 
tree and engaging in conversation until an agreement is reached. Consensus building and 
communal harmony are maintained utilizing the third of Nafukho’s (2006) central tenets of 
Ubuntu—dialogue. Dialogue or narrative, as we come to understand it in the West, serves as the 
primary tool for sense-making and wisdom transmission in traditional African society (Nafukho, 
2006; Hendry, 2010). Ubuntu, as Bangura (2005) reinforces, “with its particularity, individuality 
and historicality, […] inspires us to expose ourselves to others, to encounter [the] differences of 
their humanness in order to inform and enrich our own” (p. 32). The gifts of dialogue and 
encounter reside in the genuine recognition of the humanness of the Other through which we 
come into the fullness of our own humanity.  
12 Noetics, associated with Husserl’s phenomenology, is a way in which we make sense of the world. 
According to Louw (2011), “noetics refers to the hermeneutical realm of significance of life and human 
actions as determined by patterns of thinking (paradigms) and the network of rational conceptualization. 
It is connected to the relevance and appropriateness of philosophies of life, belief systems and religious 
convictions that function as intentional driving forces (motivational impulses) in human decision making, 
existential discernments and a sense of purposefulness in life” (p. 174). 
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Characterizing Ubuntu as an interactive moral ethic, Letseka (2011) posits our humanity 
is shaped and re-shaped through interaction with and in relation to other interdependent beings. 
In fact, the spirit of Ubuntu—human dignity and respect—is made manifest in these daily 
interactions and establishes the moral norms and values of the African community. These moral 
or normative implications include: altruism, kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, 
courtesy, and respect and concern for others. In strong resonance with Buddhistic philosophy and 
reflecting Nafukho’s (2006) identified three central tenets, Broodryk (2006) offers an in-depth 
explanation of the beliefs encompassed in an Ubuntu ethic. These beliefs formulate the value 
system that produces the personality traits of a person with ubuntu. We will discuss each of the 
tenets below followed by a brief explanation of the values and personality traits.  
“My neighbour and I have the same origins, same life experience and a common 
destiny” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 5). Sameness or “umoja (togetherness)” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 5) is 
strongly emphasized within an Ubuntu philosophy/ethic. The idea here is that we are in this life 
together–good, bad, or indifferent–and as a community we reach a common end.  
“We are the obverse and reverse sides of one entity” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 6). 
Expressed through the expression unumtu ngubuntu ngabuntu (or a person is a person through 
other persons), an Ubuntu philosophy or ethic holds central the notion of brotherhood, 
interdependence. In African proverbial wisdom, it is illustrated through the Ghanaian expression 
“a tree cannot survive a storm on its own” (Oduru, 2006, p. 3 in Broodryk, 2006, p. 6) and in 
Zulu the word “simunye” (translated as unity or solidarity) (Broodryk, 2006, p. 6; Eze, 2008). 
The strength in an Ubuntu ethic lies in community, the collective—the fist as opposed to the 
fingers. Broodryk (2006) offers Mgibi’s (1995) African Collective Fingers Theory as an 
example, which  
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[a]ccording to this theory the thumb, in order to work efficiently, will need the collective 
co-operation of the other fingers. In practice it means that one needs to open collective 
forums, which are inclusive in nature, and must, as much as possible, include everyone in 
a group. (Mgibi, 1995, p. 111 as cited in Broodryk, 2006, p. 7) 
A spirit of brotherhood–esprit de fraternite–and a sense of belonging are necessary for cohesion 
and integral for communal success. 
“We are unchanging equals” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 7). Broodryk (2006) asserts that all 
African people are equal, which may have been true in traditional Africa, but is no longer so 
following colonization. Apartheid, which literally means separateness, ushered in an era of 
erroneous Western thought. However, this belief is best or most clearly expressed in the principle 
of treating all people with dignity and respect. In line with this belief, the Ubuntu infused post-
apartheid constitution of South Africa both protects and demands that all people, irrespective of 
race, gender, income, or cultural heritage be treated with dignity and respect (Gade, 2011; 
Broodryk, 2006). This belief reinforces the African cosmological view of the holonistic nature of 
the universe (Forster, 2010), that is “[m]ankind is an integrated whole consisting of different 
material environments, sexes, racial groups and cultures: all racial and cultural groups are 
appreciated as equals” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 8). Furthermore, asserts Broodryk (2006), “Equals 
do not oppress each other” (p. 16).  
“We are mutually fulfilling complements” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 8). Again, the 
communalism that inculcates an Ubuntu ethic is lived out through the value of sharing. In an 
African worldview or an Ubuntu ethic, one has an obligation to share their gifts, abilities, talents, 
and resources with others for the betterment of the whole. Sharing, for the benefit of the 




“My neighbour’s sorrow is my sorrow” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 9). Sorrow is inevitable 
in this life. As human beings materialized in the physical world, there is an unwelcome knowing 
that loved ones will pass on, sickness will take hold, and disaster will strike; however, all these 
things are temporary–joy will come in the morning. An Ubuntu ethic prompts the practice of 
sympathy (Broodryk, 2006). Through compassionate listening, a sister can assist a sister in 
dealing with the pain of sorrow. Broodryk (2006) reminds, “sorrow shared is half sorrow” (p. 
10).  
“My neighbour’s joy is my joy” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 10). If shared sorrow is half 
sorrow, then shared joy is doubly joyful (Broodryk, 2006). This double joy is what Broodryk 
(2006) defines as happiness of which the pursuit is an inalienable right. He states: 
First, happiness is a process, a pursuit, and a way of life. Happiness is a habit, and when 
practised constantly, is so powerful it can dominate all other attitudes of a person. 
Secondly, others will interfere with one’s happiness only if one allows them to. If one’s 
right to be happy is controlled from within, one remains in charge of one’s own 
happiness. (Broodryk, 2006, p. 10) 
 
Persons practicing an Ubuntu ethic are joyful, happy people motivated by a mutual appreciation 
of personhood.  
“He [/She] and I are mutually fulfilled when we stand by each other in moments of 
need” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 12). In keeping with brotherhood/sisterhood inherent within an 
Ubuntu ethic, empathy or the ability to put one’s self in the proverbial shoes of another is a key 
value. Broodryk (2006) observes that it is only by putting one’s self in the situation of another do 
we really come to expand our understanding of the other’s suffering. 
“His survival is a precondition of my survival” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 14). The 
philosophy of Ubuntu is pregnant with “motho ke motho ka botho (the essence of caring for 
others)” (Ramose, 1999, p. 150). The deep recognition of man’s interdependence permeates all 
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ubuntu-thinking. In a communal culture, interdependence necessitates “an interpersonal bond of 
care and love” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 14). The expression of this care is realized through 
compassion—a genuine interest in the well-being and survival of others.  
“No community has any right to prescribe destiny for other communities and never 
prescribe destiny for any person” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 15).  Born out of the lived experience 
of Western colonial oppression and coercive Christian conversion, this belief reinforces the 
importance of dignity and respect for all people. More importantly, it dismantles the Western 
colonial insistence of dominant cultural assimilation (Louw, 2011).  
“My neighbor is myself in a different guise” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 15).  The 
consciousness of shared face radically alters the manner in which we interact as human beings 
(Waghid, 2014; Broodyrk, 2006). To comprehend that ‘I am you’ and ‘you are me’ mandates a 
level of tolerance with one another that seeks only to strengthen the ties of brother/sisterhood and 
galvanizes the community.  
“To be inhumane is to be like an animal” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 18). Humanness is the 
essence and aim of Ubuntu philosophy. The inhumane treatment of any human being at the hand 
of another human being reduces the perpetrator to sub-human status. Like Biko (1978), Broodryk 
(2006) establishes the world can learn much from the African appreciation of the significance of 
humanness. Broodryk (2006) hypothesizes:  
It is due to this affinity with humanness that apartheid South Africa never experienced a 
bloody revolution. This is the humanness, which saw a political convicted but civilized 
Nelson Mandela leaving prison after 27 years not being embittered, but propagating for 
understanding and reconciliation between the races of South Africa. (Broodryk, 2006, p. 
18) 
Disagreeing with Broodryk (2006), Tutu (2004) recalls the brutality, murder, and death that 
Black South Africans suffered at the hands of the colonizers. This is an example of the very 
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different perception of colonizer and colonized. At any rate, the principle is the ability to forgive 
for the sake of communal harmony, which is the soul of Ubuntu in praxis.  
“All the one lives for is to be the best that one can be” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 19). 
Reminiscent of the axiom “Whatever you are be a good one” attributed to Abraham Lincoln and 
popularized by Martin Luther King in the 1960s, this tenet encourages one to be satisfied and at 
peace with where and who one is in this life. Embracing the harmony of ubuntu-thinking, one 
realizes comparison is most assuredly the thief of joy and the culprit of sorrow. “It does not 
matter whether one is a shepherd, academic, businessman, labourer, or chief; one only has to do 
one’s best, as an equal to all other human beings” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 19).  
“Wealth must be shared and your neighbors’ poverty is your poverty” (Broodryk, 
2006, p. 22). Counter to Western capitalist discourse, Ubuntu philosophy supports the sharing of 
wealth or socialism. Broodryk (2006) reverberates Nyerere’s post-colonial discourse represented 
as the narratives of return, which promoted a return to the traditional African value of ujamaa or 
African socialism. Unlike Western capitalism, African socialism “is not founded on class 
struggle, but on the harmony of the extended family” (Gade, 2011, p. 306). The redistribution of 
wealth ascribed to the practice of socialism extends beyond material assets to the non-material–
i.e. spiritual guidance, ethics, wisdom, and knowledge (Broodryk, 2006).  
“Knowledge is the challenge of being human so as to discover the promise of being 
human” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 24). Finally, the attainment of wisdom is demonstrated through 
the embrace of Ubuntu and the art of being human. In the tradition of philosophic sagacity, a 
wise person is one who can “make mature statements [and] judgments about the use of human 
knowledge in the context of daily life” (Presbey, 1997, p. 3). It is through knowledge, theoretical 
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and experiential, that we come to know better, do better, and be better human beings with and for 
one another. 
Human formation through the philosophy of Ubuntu is complex and no one outcome can 
be attributed to any Ubuntu ethic or value without taking a plethora of factors into account; 
however, Broodryk (2006) theorizes the skills and outcomes associated with the values 
demonstrated by a person with ubuntu. In an attempt to streamline his conjecture, Figure 2 
exhibits Ubuntu personality values in relation to the life skills flowing from the values, which 
corresponds with applications and intended outcomes. For example, a person who possesses the 
value of equality or “ukalingana” supports equality in the world through the practice of 
acceptance and non-discrimination (Broodryk, 2006, pp. 26-27). To reiterate, this Figure 2 serves 
as an example of the values, possible skills and outcomes associated with a person pregnant with 
ubuntu; it is not meant to be prescriptive. 
Whether defined as the moral quality of a person, an ethic, or a philosophy, Ubuntu is the 
life’s blood of African life. It is an intense lived understanding of the interdependence and 
interconnectedness of all living beings indispensable to the process of being-becoming more 
human, which compels us toward a code of ethics that reinforces communal harmony, 
compassion, empathy, tolerance, kindness, and love. 
The notion of interconnectedness or inseparability is so pervasive that when speaking of 
the phenomenon of Ubuntu, Archbishop Desmond Tutu declares:  
[T]he humanity of the perpetrator of apartheid’s atrocities was caught up in that of his  
victim: Ubuntu means that in a real sense even the supporters of apartheid were victims 
of the vicious system which they implemented and which they supported so 
enthusiastically. Our humanity was intertwined. The humanity of the perpetrator of 
apartheid’s atrocities was caught up and bound up in that of his victim whether he liked it 
or not. In the process of dehumanizing another, in inflicting untold harm and suffering, 
the perpetrator was inexorably being dehumanized as well. (Tutu, 1999, p. 35 as cited in 
Gade, 2012, p. 493) 
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Table 2: Values, life skills, and intended outcomes of a person with ubuntu13 
Values Life Skills Outcomes 
Togetherness (umoya)  Facilitating togetherness Improved teamwork, family 
atmosphere, moral support 
Brotherhood (ubuzalwane) Implementing brotherhood Experienced unity, simunye 
(we are one), solidarity, 
commitment 
Equality (ukulingana) Support equality Practised non-
discrimination, acceptance 
by all 
Sharing (isabelo) Endorsing sharing Created different 
responsibilities, happiness 
and sorrow-participation 
Sympathy (isisa) Expressing sympathy Showing sympathy: applied 
listening, problem analysis, 
consolation 
Empathy (uzwela) Practicing empathy Established open-
mindedness, understanding 
Compassion (umunyu) Honoring compassion Valued peace, cohesion, 
warmth 
Respect (ukuhlonipha) Maintaining respect Structured order, discipline, 
dignity 
Tolerance (yeka) Allowing tolerance Self-controlled calmness, 
coolness, forgiveness 
Humanness (ubuntu) Saluting humanness Lived softness, bliss-ness, 
helpfulness 
Harmony (ubungane) Propagating harmony Resulted steadiness, non-
chaos [peace], clarity of 
vision 





Obedience (ukulalela) Applying obedience  Justified relationship, 
convention, custom, values, 
norms 
Happiness (singcolile) Living happiness Enjoyed spontaneity, long 
life, friendliness 
Wisdom (ubudoda) Loving wisdom Executed resolution, 
decision, evaluation, 
happiness 
13 Source: Broodryk (2006, pp. 3-28) 
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The shared humanity, the enmeshing of being-doing deduced from Tutu’s statement establishes 
the inseparability of perpetrator and victim. Through Ubuntu, human beings are made aware that 
we belong to one another and are intimately involved in the creation of one another; this 
intersubjective realization is just one of the great transferable gifts of Ubuntu to the world writ 
large. 
The Great Gift 
The central premise of Ubuntu as philosophy is connection—a “connection where 
different beings are united as beings” (Venter, 2004, p. 153). Mandela (2005) adds, “The spirit of 
Ubuntu – that profound African sense that we are human only through the humanity of other 
human beings – is not a parochial phenomenon, but has added globally to our common search for 
a better world” (Mandela, 2005, p. 82 as cited in Louw, 2011, p. 183). The great gift of Ubuntu 
as a philosophy of life and education, if embraced, resides in its ability to transform social 
relations producing a society that is “more egalitarian, transparent, and democratic” (Ncube, 
2010, p. 81). As a moral theory, in our deeply bruised world, Ubuntu “has the potential to foster 
a shared moral discourse which is characteristic of a cohesive society” (Morrow, 2007, p. 6 as 
cited in Letseka, 2001, p. 55). More specifically, “the struggle for ubuntu serves as a philosophy 
of the struggle for people trying to heal the brutality and desperateness of a deeply ruptured 
society [emphasis added]” (Swanson, 2005, p. 4 as cited in Letseka, 2011, p. 55). Given the 
litany of social horrors recited in Chapter 1, we are those people yearning to heal.  
Limitations. While a gift to the world, Ubuntu also contains limitations, especially the 
limitation of untranslatability into a Western context. Southern African society saturated in 
philosophy of Ubuntu, as we know, is not without its own problems of corruption, death, 
violence, and exploitation. These are obviously antithetical to an ubuntu ethic. Praeg (2014) 
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draws our attention to a great limitation of Ubuntu in southern Africa—the use of benevolent 
coercion as an exercise of power in an ubuntu-centric political system and culture. Regarding 
this political coercion, Praeg (2014) writes: “At work here is a form of benevolent coercion, 
indoctrination, inculcation or perhaps simply cultural strategies of discipline, aimed at the 
production of certain modes of being and belonging we have come to associate with Ubuntu” (p. 
65). Of course, the goodness contained within Ubuntu could be utilized in a manner contrary to 
its original intention; however, this is the risk we face with any philosophical conception that 
molds the being of beings-human. To this end, Bangura (2005) writes:  
Whatever is good, by very nature of its goodness, harbors a grain of evil. This is a 
guarantee against any exaggerated sense of moral superiority which goodness by itself 
may entail. The notion of perfection, therefore, is alien to African thought. Perfection in 
itself constitutes a temptation to danger, an invitation to arrogance and self-glorification. 
The principle of balance defines the relationship between good and evil. As life operates 
in a dialectics of struggle so also does good balance evil and vice versa.  
 
As with life in community, we must engage with the pleasant and the unpleasant, taste the bitter 
with the sweet; so too with Ubuntu. We must recognize that every gift has its poison, but the 
poison does not negate the intention of the gift or goodness contained within. The poison for 
Ubuntu serves a humbling agent and is a reminder that we are still with the certain uncertainty of 
humanness.  
 Public policy created through the lens of Ubuntu contains the potential to transcend a 
politics based on narrow, socially constructed identities toward inclusive caring and respect 
(Letseka, 2011; Waghid, 2014; Eze, 2008). Nkondo (2007) suggests an “ubuntu-based political 
ideal founded on the idea that we live in a moral space mapped by strong values, that one’s 
social world provides a framework which defines the shape of a life worth living” (p. 95 as cited 
in Letseka, 2011, p. 56). Within the philosophical framework of Ubuntu, hermeneutic and/or 
narrative interrogation of shared human experience dominates political thinking, and politics 
 65 
becomes a “process of acting with others, in social practice” (Nkondo, 2007, p. 96 as cited in 
Letseka, 2011, p. 56). An Ubuntist political process becomes concerned with building generative 
coalitions of consensus focused on progress for the whole rather than divisive cliques seeking 
gains for the few. 
Within the realm of education, ubuntugogy, which transcends pedagogy, promotes 
dialogue and consensus building within the learning environment (Bangura, 2005; Nafukho, 
2006). “For any meaningful learning to take place…the learners must interact and engage in 
dialogue. Consensus building, a key function of learning, requires that both teacher and student 
must show humanity toward each other” (Nafukho, 2006, p. 415). Consensus building and 
dialogue are also key components in the engagement of democratic citizenship (Letseka, 2011). 
The hope and indeed the promise of an Ubuntu-hued philosophy of education both in African 
and around the globe is its contribution “towards imagination, deliberation and responsibility–
actions that can help towards enhancing justice in educative relations” (Waghid, 2014, p. 1). 
Waghid (2014) asserts: 
By provoking students to work cooperatively through sharing, engagement, and 
remaining open to the new and unexpected they contribute towards cultivating learning 
communities; and by learning to show outrage at injustices and human violations, 
students learn to attend to those on the margins (women, children and those who suffer 
from dictatorships and displacements on the African continent, and elsewhere). (Waghid, 
2014, p. 2) 
Imagine a world where education and learning were approached from an ubuntugogical 
perspective (Bangura, 2005). How different might this world, our human relationships, our 
planet be differently? These are precisely the questions this futural inquiry interrogates and 
(re)thinks to imagine a world not yet conceived in the physical. In spite of Western opposition, 
Ubuntu as philosophical notion, a moral theory, and an ethic provides a powerful tool for global 
transformation. Ubuntu, as Tutu (2004) reminds, reorients Western thinking: “Ubuntu does not 
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say, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong. I participate. I share’” 
(Tutu, 2004, p. 27).  
Privileging once denigrated indigenous ways of knowing, Biko’s (1978) prophetic 
declaration that “the great gift has to come from Africa–giving the world a more human face” (p. 
46) is discovered hidden in plain sight. Ubuntu, the philosophy of love, human being-becoming, 
and interdependence is Africa’s great gift to the world for the benefit of all humanity (Nashon, 




















BUDDHISM: AN ENGAGEMENT WITH AND IN THE WORLD 
“Individual consciousness is made of collective consciousness, and the collective consciousness 
is made of individual consciousnesses. They cannot be separated. Looking deeply into our 
individual consciousness, we touch the collective consciousness. Our ideas of beauty, goodness, 
happiness, for example, are also the ideas of our society.” 
- Thich Nhat Hanh - 
Buddhism provides a unique vehicle for transformation; it allows for the practice of one’s 
own faith tradition alongside the teachings and practice of Buddha. Indeed, according to Hahn 
(1999), Buddhism insists in the preservation of one’s “Jewish, Christian, or Muslim roots. That is 
the best way to realize the Buddha’s spirit. If you are cut off from your roots, you cannot be 
happy” (p. 169). In this view, one can both attain Buddhist enlightenment and Christian 
salvation. Buddhism pertains to the present, the now—the metamorphosis of society through 
transformative onto-epistemological praxis. Nirvana can be attained in the here and now; it is not 
some destination to be reached as one passes from life to new life. Present transformation or 
metamorphosis is the benefit of Buddhist teaching and philosophy, and provides along with 
Ubuntu, a vehicle by which we can transform consciousness and catalyze an educational and 
societal metamorphosis. The central insight of Buddhism and the crux of this inquiry are found 
in the Buddha’s teaching on Interdependent Co-Arising (Emmanuel, 2013; Hanh, 1999). 
Interdependent Co-Arising is best exemplified in the teaching of impermanence, which states, 
“all phenomena are conditioned, transitory, and devoid of any essence or “self” that remains 
unchanged over time. All phenomena arise within a complex network of mutually conditioning 
causes and effects” (Emmanuel, 2013, p. 6). Nothing is said to exist outside of an unconditioned 
reality. Buddhistic philosophy asserts we are all products, the very creation of our consciousness 
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(Ortwein, 2013). The teachings of the Buddha provide a way to liberation or a transformation of 
the mind consciousness through awakening and compassion (Hanh, 1999). The goal is to 
transform ignorance (avidya) into understanding (vidya) (Hanh, 1999). Therefore, “our practice 
is to identify ignorance when it is present” (Hanh, 1999, p. 236). Cultivating awareness through 
the sapta-bodhyanga or the “Seven Factors of Awakening,” we are able to transcend suffering or 
wrong thinking. The Seven Factors of Awakening (sapta-bodhyanga) are “mindfulness14, 
investigation of phenomena, diligence, joy, ease, concentration, and letting go” (Hanh, 1999, p. 
214). Hanh (1999) asserts, “Clarity, the absence of ignorance, gives rise to the desire to act with 
love and compassion. This is called the Great Aspiration (mahapranidhana) or mind of 
awakening (bodhichitta) in Mahayana15 Buddhism” (p. 238). Buddhism teaches us to utilize our 
consciousness as a tool of transformation and service (Hanh, 1999). Much like education, 
Buddhism is concerned with the conditioning of the mind and perception through the 
understanding and practice of Buddhistic virtues (Ortwein, 2013; Emmanuel, 2013). This view is 
best exemplified by Hanh (1999) at the end of his writings on “The Twelve Links on 
Interdependent Co-Arising”. Hanh (1999) writes: 
There is co-arising conditioned by deluded mind and co-arising conditioned by true mind. 
The world, society, and the individual have been formed by a cycle of conditions based 
on deluded mind. Naturally, in a world based on deluded mind, there is suffering and 
affliction. But when conditions are based on true mind, they reflect the wondrous nature 
of reality. Everything depends on our mind. Imagine one thousand people whose minds 
are full of misperceptions, wrong views, envy, jealousy, and anger. If they come together, 
they will create a hell on Earth. The surroundings they live in, their daily lives, and their 
relationships will all be hellish, if two people full of misunderstanding live together, they 
create a hell realm for each other. How much greater the hell of one thousand people!  
To make hell into paradise, we only need to change the mind on which it is based. To 
change the minds of one thousand people, it may be necessary to bring in some element 
14 The Sanskrit word for mindfulness is smriti, which means “remember.” Mindfulness is remembering to 
come back to the present moment (Hanh, 1999, p. 64).  
15 Mahayana or “great vehicle” refers to the northern school of Buddhism, which emphasizes the 
compassionate action of bodhisattva (enlightment-being; or one on the path to enlightment who assists 
other beings in the attainment of enlightenment) (Hanh, 2007, p. 213).  
 69 
from the outside, like a Dharma teacher or a group of people practicing the Dharma. 
Imagine one thousand people who do not have wrong perceptions, anger, or jealousy, but 
who have love, understanding, and happiness. If these people come together and form a 
community, it will be paradise. The mind of the people is the basis of paradise. With your 
deluded mind, you make hell for yourself. With your true mind, you make paradise. 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 249) 
In this view, education takes on a wholly different significance. Conditioning the mind not solely 
for knowing, but also for being with one another in community—mindful living—becomes not a 
by-product of education but is an aim of the educative process. Buddhism provides a way to 
transform minds, to fling open the doors of awareness. Indeed, Hanh (1999) reminds, “Once the 
door of awareness has opened, you cannot close it” (p. 5).  
In tandem with transforming mind consciousness, I argue, a reconceptualization of the 
Western subject too must occur if we are to ever “make paradise” (Hanh, 1999, p. 248). In 
concert with the wisdom of Ubuntu, the teaching of impermanence or non-self, which I posit is 
the Buddhist notion of subjectivity, provides cessation from suffering or wrong perception. The 
Buddhist and Ubuntu conceptions of personhood and subjectivity will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. This review of relevant literature will provide a brief discussion of the history and 
origins of Buddhism, and the central tenets of Buddhist teachings utilizing the writings and 
teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh16 encompassed in The Heart of Buddha’s Teachings: 
Transforming Suffering into Peace, Joy, and Liberation (1999). Finally, I will discuss Hanh’s 
notion of Engaged Buddhism as means to utilize the philosophy and spirituality of Buddhism to 
initiate a meaningful social metamorphosis.  
16 Thich Nhat Hanh is a Vietnamese Buddhist monk, author, poet, and peace activist. He is the founder of 
the Engaged Buddhism movement. Hanh’s approach to Buddhism combines traditional Zen teachings 
with Mahayanna Buddhist traditions, methods from Theravada Buddhism to offer a modern approach to 
this ancient spiritual tradition. (See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Th%C3%ADch_Nhất_Hạnh)   
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History and Origins 
Hanh (1999) explicitly states, “Buddha was not a god. He was a human being like you 
and me, and he suffered just as we do” (p. 3). Tracing its origins and teachings to the historic 
Buddha, Siddartha Guatama, 17 who is said to have lived in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. 
(Hesse, 1951; Emmanuel, 2013; Hanh, 2007), the origins of Buddhism are revolutionary and 
democratic, and are akin to the nature of the Protestant Reformation in Christianity; Buddhism 
turned fifth century India on its head (Hanh, 1999; Safran 2013). Buddhism developed in current 
day northeast India in response to a growing merchant class, emerging cultural diversity, and the 
challenging of traditional axioms and religious beliefs. The society of the day was largely 
agrarian and was divided into four castes: priest, warriors, farmers, and servants; these castes 
were rigidly adhered to, believed to have their origins in the cosmos, and transferred hereditarily 
from generation to generation. There was no escape; these castes determined one’s position in 
life and ethical conduct (Safran, 2003). At the time, Buddhism liberated the people of India from 
the control of the Brahmins or priest and located the site of salvation or enlightenment at the 
locus of the individual; one could achieve enlightenment in the ordinariness of life without the 
assistance of the magic and rituals of the Brahmin or the priestly caste (Safran, 2003). But, who 
is this Buddha?  
According to some legends, Siddhartha was the son of a king, while others insist that the 
he was the son of a Brahmin; at any rate, Siddhartha lived a life of luxury. Following Hesse’s 
(1951) account, Siddhartha was loved by everyone he met; however, began experiencing 
“dreams and restlessness of the soul…arising from the smoke of the sacrifices, emanating from 
the verses of the Rig-Veda, trickling through from the teachings of the old Brahmins” (p. 3). 
Hesse (1951) translating the legend of Siddhartha, continues:  
17 Also spelled Siddhattha Gotama (Emmanuel, 2013).   
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Siddhartha had begun to feel the seeds of discontent within him. He had begun to feel the 
love of his father and mother, and also the love of his friend Govinda, would not always 
make him happy, give him peace, satisfy and suffice him. He had begun to suspect that 
his worthy father and his other teachers, the wise Brahmins, had already passed on to him 
the bulk of their wisdom, that they had already poured the sum total of their knowledge 
into his waiting vessel; and the vessel was not full, his intellect was not satisfied, his soul 
was not at peace, his heart was not still. (Hesse, 1951, p. 3) 
Therefore, Siddhartha, in the Hindu ascetic tradition of self-denial and meditation to achieve 
enlightenment, set out to fulfill his one goal: 
[T]o become empty, to become empty of thirst, desire, dreams, pleasure and sorrow—to 
let the Self die. No longer to be Self, to experience the peace of an emptied heart, to 
experience pure thought—that was his goal. When all the Self was conquered and dead, 
when all passions and desires were silent, then the last must awaken, the innermost Being 
that is no longer Self—the great secret! (Hesse, 1951, p. 11) 
However, enlightenment through asceticism was never reached. 
Alternate accounts of the legend of Siddhartha, recall the son of a Hindu King shielded 
from the realities of sufferings within the walls of his father’s palace. Encountering suffering for 
the first time in his twenties, Siddhartha comes to realize that suffering is pervasive and is 
launched into despair (Buddhism, n.d.). One day Siddhartha, encounters a Hindu ascetic, who 
through self-denial and meditation is attempting to free himself from the cycle of reincarnation. 
This encounter led Siddhartha to believe that suffering and death could be avoided through 
asceticism and meditation. Determined to find the way, he left his family in search of an 
enlightenment that never came through ascetic practice (Buddhism, n.d.; Hesse, 1951; 
Emmanuel, 2013). However, sitting under the bodhi tree, Buddha’s devotion to finding a 
solution to the sufferings of birth, sickness, old age, and death were brought to fruition through 
teaching of the Four Noble Truths (Hanh, 1999). Hanh (1999) writes: 
Siddhartha Guatama was twenty-nine years old when he left his family to search for a 
way to end his and other’ suffering. He studied meditation with many teachers, and after 
six years of practice, he sat under the bodhi tree and vowed not to stand up until he was 
enlightened. He sat all night, and as the morning star rose, he has a profound 
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breakthrough and became a Buddha, filled with understanding and love. The Buddha 
spent the next forty-nine days enjoying the peace of his realization. (p. 6) 
Over the next forty-five years of the Buddha’s life, he spread his message of enlightenment and 
alleviation of suffering through the practice of meditation (Ortwein, 2013). The Buddha’s great 
revelation transformed Hinduism through the emphasis of ethics, rejection of the caste system, 
and declaration of the Hindu gods as useless in the quest for enlightenment (Buddhism, n. d.). 
The first teaching of Buddha, the Four Noble Truths, were and continue to be revolutionary in 
their ability to restore well-being and liberate one from suffering. It should be noted that Buddha 
did not commit his teachings to writing, so much of what we know and read today are 
interpretations of interpretations; however, the seeds of truth continue to proliferate. Today, 
roughly “386 million” people in the world continue on the path with between 1-2 million 
practicing Buddhist in the United States. We now turn to a discussion of the Buddha’s teachings 
via the writings and teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh (1999).  
Buddha’s Teachings  
Hahn (1999) provides an extensive interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings in his book, 
The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching; however, I will provide a summary of the major points of the 
work and teachings contained within The Four Noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path, and the 
Four Immeasurable Minds.   
The Four Noble Truths. The first of Buddha’s teachings is found in the Four Noble 
Truths. After Buddha’s revelation and transformation under the bodhi tree, Buddha said, “Dear 
Friends, I have seen deeply that nothing can be itself alone, that everything has to inter-be with 
everything else. I have seen that all beings are endowed with the nature of awakening” (Hanh, 
1999, p. 6). This is the first Dharma18 talk from which Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths—
18 Dharma (Skt): the way of understanding and love taught by the Buddha (Hanh, 2007, p. 212) 
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“the existence of suffering, the making of suffering, the possibility of restoring well-being, and 
the Noble Eightfold Path that leads to well-being” (Hanh, 1999, p. 6)—and declared his total 
liberation from suffering. Following Buddha’s realization,  
At that moment the Earth shook, and the voices of the gods, humans, and other living 
beings throughout the cosmos said that on planet Earth, an enlightened person had been 
born and had put into motion the wheel of the Dharma, the Way of Understanding and 
Love. (Hanh, 1999, p. 6) 
This teaching is recorded as the Dhamma Cakka Pavattana Sutra or Discourse on the Turning 
Wheel of the Dharma (Hanh, 1999). This sutra is characterized by three points: the teaching of 
the Middle Way, which teaches moderation in all things; the Four Noble Truths; and 
“engagement in the world. The teachings of the Buddha were not to escape from life, but to help 
us relate to ourselves and the world as thoroughly as possibly” (Hanh, 1999, p. 8). The ultimate 
goal of this first Dharma talk, according to Hanh (1999), was the recognition and transformation 
of suffering into “mindfulness, compassion, peace, and liberation” (p. 8).  
The First Noble Truth is dukkha or suffering (Hanh, 1999). The Second Noble Truth is 
samudaya or “the origin, roots, nature, creation, or arising of suffering” (Hanh, 1999, p. 9). More 
specifically, the Second Noble Truth supposes a causal linkage between dukkha and our 
interaction with the world and those within it (Ortwein, 2013). The Third Noble Truth is nirodha 
or “the cessation of creating suffering by refraining from doing the things that make us suffer” 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 11). Within this truth, the Buddha taught that healing, joy, and happiness are all 
possible (Hanh, 1999). The Fourth Noble Truth is marga or “the path that leads to refraining 
from doing the things that cause us to suffer” (Hanh, 1999, p. 11). This path, unfolds into the 
Noble Eightfold Path—Right View, Right Thinking, Right Speech, Right Action, Right 
Livelihood, Right Diligence, Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration (Hanh, 1999). It is 
important to note, that “right” does not denote a moral judgment; however, Hanh (1999) 
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reminds, “through our own awareness, we discover what is beneficial (“right”) and what is 
unbeneficial (“wrong”)” (p. 11).  
The twelve turnings of the wheel. Hahn (1999) argues, to understand the Four Noble 
Truths beyond intellect, one must practice the twelve turnings of the wheel, which include 
recognition, encouragement, and realization within each of the Four Noble Truths. To clarify, 
Hanh (1999) defines the first turning of the wheel—recognition—as an awareness that something 
is awry, but one is unable to say exactly what is wrong. It is an awareness that “our suffering is 
us, and we need to treat it with kindness and nonviolence” (Hanh, 1999, p. 29). “With all our 
courage and tenderness, we recognize, acknowledge, and identify it” (Hanh, 1999, p. 29). 
Encouragement, the second turning of the wheel, looks deeply into the suffering to understand its 
cause (Hanh, 1999). In the third turning of the wheel, realization, the suffering has been 
understood and one is able to call it by name. Figure 3 contains the Twelve Turnings the Wheel. 
The key insights gained in this teaching are the “four kinds of nutrients that can lead to our 
happiness or our suffering — edible food, sense impressions, intention, and consciousness” 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 31).  
Edible food, according to Hanh (1999), can cause mental and physical suffering. The 
second nutrient is sense impressions; our six senses—“eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and 
mind—are in constant contact (sparsha) with sense objects, and these contacts become food for 
our consciousness” (Hanh, 1999, p. 32).We see this today with our ingestion of the media, which 
conveys every horrible thing and, in turn, we begin to think that the world is a horrible place. In 
agreement, Hanh (1999) writes:  
When you feel despair, fear, or depression, it may because you have ingested too many 
toxins through your sense impressions. Not only children need to be protected from 
violent and unwholesome films, TV programs books, magazines, and games. We, too, 
can be destroyed by these media. (Hanh, 1999, p. 33) 
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Table 3. The Four Noble Truths and the Twelve Turnings of the Wheel19 
Four Noble Truths Twelve Turnings 
Suffering Recognition: This is suffering.  
Encouragement: Suffering should be 
understood.  
Realization: Suffering is understood. 
Arising of suffering Recognition: There is an ignoble way that 
has lead to suffering.  
Encouragement: That ignoble way should 
be understood.  
Realization: That ignoble way is 
understood.  
Cessation of Suffering (well-being) Recognition: Well-being is possible. 
Encouragement: Well-being should be 
obtained.  
Realization: Well-being is obtained.  
How well-being arises Recognition: There is a noble path that 
leads to well-being.  
Encouragement: This noble path as to be 
lived.  
Realization: This noble path is being lived. 
Mindfulness, offers Hanh (1999), is the practice of discernment and a means to protect oneself 
from ingesting toxins. In fact, Hanh (1999) declares, “to get out of the dangerous situation we are 
in, the practice of mindfulness has to be collective” (p. 34). The third nutrient, volition (intention 
or will), is defined as “the desire in us to obtain whatever it is that we want. Volition is the 
ground of all our actions” (Hanh, 1999, p. 34). Consciousness, the fourth nutrient, is eating all of 
the time and “what it consumes becomes the substance of our li[ves]” (Hanh, 1999, p. 36). 
Consciousness is composed of the past actions of our own and society. In the footnote, he adds:  
In the year 255, Vietnamese Meditation Master Tang Hôi taught that our consciousness is 
like the ocean with the six rivers of our senses flowing into it. Our mind and our body 
come from consciousness. They are formed by ourselves and our environment. Our life 
19 Source: see (Hanh, 1999, pp. 29-47) 
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can be said to be a manifestation of our consciousness. Because of the food that our 
consciousness consumes, we are the person we are and our environment is what it is. In 
fact, the edible foods we take into our body and the foods of our sense-impressions and 
intention all end up in our consciousness. Our ignorance, hatred, and sadness all flow 
back to the sea of consciousness. We should know the kind of food we feed our 
consciousness every day. When vijñana (consciousness) ripens, it brings forth a new 
form of life, nama rupa (mind/body). (Hanh, 1999, p. 36) 
The importance of all four nutrients, but most especially consciousness, cannot be overstated. 
Through the practice of mindfulness and the “Four Immeasurable Minds of love, compassion, 
joy, and equanimity” (Hanh, 1999, p. 36), we can nourish our consciousness and set about on a 
new way of being.  
The Noble Eightfold Path: The Middle Way. Finding that extreme asceticism failed to 
live up the promise of enlightenment and transcendence, and extreme hedonism failed to fulfill 
his desire for peace and lasting joy, the Buddha discovered the Middle Way. The Middle Way, 
the passage between asceticism and hedonism, “gives rise to vision, which gives rise to 
knowledge, to enlightenment…” (Laumakis, 2008, p. 47 as cited in Ortwein, 2013, p. 119). 
Ortwein (2013) suggests the metaphysical implications of the Middle Way are that human souls 
lack a fixed self. Epistemologically, the Middle Way necessitates a cautionary path between 
blind certainty and total disbelief (Ortwein, 2013). The Middle Way unfolds as the Noble 
Eightfold Path (Hanh, 1999; Buddhism, n. d.; Ortwein, 2013). Hahn (1999), recalling a question 
asked to the Buddha from one of the canonical works, writes: 
The Buddha replied, ‘Subhadda, it is not important whether they are fully enlightened. 
The question is whether you want to liberate yourself. If you do, practice the Noble 
Eightfold Path. Wherever the Noble Eightfold Path is practiced, joy, peace, and insight 
are there.’ (p. 49)  
The Noble Eightfold Path–Right View, Right Thinking, Right Speech, Right Action, Right 
Livelihood, Right Diligence, Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration–inter-are, that is, there 
exists no linear order rather “each limb contains all seven” (Hanh, 1999, p. 50). The Eightfold 
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Path is divisible into three main qualities: wisdom, moral action, and meditation (Buddhism, n. 
d.; Ortwein, 2013). 
Wisdom. Wisdom, the first of the three qualities, indicates that one holds deeply the Four 
Noble Truths and understands their implications in life (Hanh, 1999; Ortwein, 2013). The 
wisdom quality of categorization contains Right View (samyag drishti) and Right Thinking 
(samyak samkalpa). Right View encompasses a deep comprehension of the Four Noble Truths—
“our suffering, the making of our suffering, the fact that our suffering can be transformed, and 
the path of transformation” (Hanh, 1999, p. 51). To put it another way, Right View is the ability 
to discern which of the four nutrients (discussed earlier) have been ingested and what has been 
produced as a result of the ingestion (Hanh, 1999). Right View is best exemplified in the 
following parable: 
Sharipura described Right View as the ability to distinguish wholesome roots (kushala 
mula) from unwholesome roots (akushala mula). In each of us, there are wholesome and 
unwholesome roots — or seeds — in the depths of our consciousness. If you are a loyal 
person, it is because the seed of loyalty is in you. If you live in an environment where 
your seed of loyalty is watered, you will be a loyal person. But if your seed of betrayal is 
watered, you may betray even those you love. You’ll feel guilty about it, but if the seed 
of betrayal in you becomes strong, you may do it. (Hanh, 1999, p. 51) 
Reminiscent of the Parable of the Sower in Christian teachings, Right View has the ability to 
transform “so you sow, shall you reap” into watering and reaping only the wholesome seeds of 
our store conscious20 that you water through the practice of mindfulness (Hanh, 1999, 2007). The 
seeds of Buddhahood lie dormant in each of us. Hanh (1999) maintains that the cause of a great 
deal of our suffering is wrong perception. “The Buddha advised us not to be fooled by what we 
perceive. He told Subuti, ‘Where there is perception, there is deception’” (Hahn, 1999, p. 53). In 
20 Buddhist psychology asserts our consciousness is divided into eight parts, which include mind 
consciousness (manovijañana) and store consciousness (alayavijñana). Store consciousness, according to 
Buddhist psychologist, is described as a field in which every kind of seed can be planted–seed of 
suffering, sorrow, fear, and anger, and seeds of happiness and hope. (Hanh, 1999, p. 12) 
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addition to practicing mindfulness, we can liberate ourselves from deceptive perception by 
simply asking if we are perceiving a thing correctly.  
Taking Right View a step further, Hahn (1999) asserts that our happiness and the 
happiness of those around us depend on Right View, our perception of happiness. Hanh (1999) 
writes:  
We have an idea of happiness. We believe that only certain conditions will make us 
happy. But is often our very idea of happiness that prevents us from being happy. We 
have to look deeply into our perceptions in order to become free of them. Then, what has 
been a perception becomes an insight, a realization of the path. This is neither perception 
nor non-perceptions. It is a clear vision, seeing things as they are. (Hanh, 1999, p. 54) 
Understanding the internal and the external life, connects us to reality and liberates us from the 
suffering of wrong perception. Right View, then, “is the insight we have into the reality of life, a 
living insight that fills us with understanding, peace, and love” (Hanh, 1999, p. 54). It is not an 
ideology. Right View cannot be described, but must be practiced and experienced in the 
miraculous ordinariness of our daily lives (Hanh, 1999). Hanh (1999) does suggests watering the 
seeds of Right View through “mindful living–mindful breathing, mindful walking, living each 
moment of our day in mindfulness” (p. 55). To reiterate, Right View must be practiced; Hanh 
(1999) declares, “We have to put our view into practice. In the process of learning, reflecting, 
and practicing, our view becomes increasingly wise, based on our real experience” (p. 56). Right 
View is the foundation for Right Thinking (Hanh, 1999).  
Right Thinking, Hanh (1999) asserts, leads us to Right Action. “Thinking is speech in our 
mind” (Hanh, 1999, p. 59) and reflects reality, where wrong thinking causes our view to be 
skewed. De-centering Cartesian thought and affirming the connection of mind and body, Hanh 
(1999) writes:  
When Descartes said, ‘I think, therefore I am,’ he meant that we can prove our existence 
by the fact that our thinking exists. He concluded that because we are thinking, we are 
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really there, existing. I would conclude the opposite: ‘I think, therefore I am not.’ As long 
as mind and body are not together, we get lost and we cannot really say that we are here.’ 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 59)  
Right Thinking connects the functions of the mind to the actions of the body, through conscious 
breathing the two become one again.  
According to Hanh (1999), Right Thinking has two parts: “initial thoughts (vitarka) and 
developing thought (vichara)” (p. 60). While much of our thinking is unnecessary, both parts of 
thought are necessary to develop Right Thinking. Again, Buddhism is focused on learning 
through action and reflection; therefore, Hanh (1999) lays out four practices that assist us in 
developing Right Thinking. First, remembering that wrong perception causes wrong thinking, we 
must ask ourselves, “Are you sure?” (Hanh, 1999, p. 60). Second, to ensure that we are present, 
in the moment, we must ask, “What am I doing?” (Hanh, 1999, p. 60). Hanh (1999) writes, 
“Sometimes I ask one of my students, ‘What are you doing?’ to help him release his thinking 
about the past or the future and return to the present moment. I ask the question to help him be 
— right here, right now” (p. 61). Mindfulness is a state of being. Third, keeping in mind that 
Right Thinking leads to Right Action and vice versa, we must say, “Hello, habit energy” (Hanh, 
1999, pp. 61-62). “Our way of acting depends on our way of thinking, and our way of thinking 
depends on our habit energies” (Hanh, 1999, p. 62). Saying hello or embracing the habit energy 
renders it powerless. Fourth, Hanh (1999) reminds that Right Thinking gives way to Right 
Diligence. The “Bodhichitta”  or “mind of love,” (Hahn, 1999, p. 62) is cultivated when we seek 
to understand ourselves for the aim of showering others with happiness. Each of these Right 
Thinking practices reinforce Right View and leads to one of the other gateways on the Noble 
Eightfold Path. Dwelling in the present, we are able to transform and liberate ourselves from 
suffering (Hanh, 1999).  
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Moral Action. Moving now into the second categorization, moral action, involves 
conduct in speech, behavior, and livelihood (Ortwein, 2013). This categorization contains Right 
Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood, and holds that we can reduce suffering or dukkha 
by resisting participation in the acts that cause suffering. To put it differently, Ortwein (2013) 
offers, “when we resist repaying an evil with another evil we stop the chain reaction that 
promulgates further suffering. This…category brings us closer to a Buddhist theory of virtue” (p. 
120). Right Speech is “knowing the words that created happiness or suffering” (Hanh, 1999, p. 
84). More explicitly, Right Speech is classically explained as: “ (1) Speaking truthfully. […] (2) 
Not speaking with a forked tongue. […] (3) Not speaking cruelly. […] (4) Not exaggerating or 
embellishing” (Hanh, 1999, pp. 84-85). It is important to note that Right Speech finds its basis in 
Right Thinking. Speech is the verbal expression of our thinking, so it is important to guard your 
thoughts which controls your tongue. At the core of Right Speech, asserts Hanh (1999), is deep 
listening, which he describes as listening with compassion. According to Hanh (1999), 
“compassionate listening brings about healing. When someone listens to us this way, we feel 
some relief right away” (p. 86). In agreement with Hanh (1999) regarding our current state as a 
society, he states:  
You must also use loving speech. We have lost our capacity to say things calmly. We get 
irritated to easily. Every time we open our mouths, our speech becomes sour or bitter. We 
know it’s true. We have lost our capacity for speaking with kindness. (Hanh, 1999, p. 87) 
In keeping with a central tenet of Ubuntu, the dialogical becomes ever more important in 
reducing suffering, increasing understanding, and producing a harmonious environment. 
Compassion—compassionate listening, speech, and writing—“is the only energy that can help us 
connect with another person. The person who has no compassion in him can never be happy” 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 91). Finally, Hanh (1999) declares “to practice social justice and non-
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exploitation, we have to use Right Speech” (p. 93). In other words, Right Speech leads us to 
Right Action. 
Right Action is very much so needed in our society in today. Right Action, encourages 
Hanh (1999) is “right action of the body. It is the practice of touching love and preventing harm, 
the practice of nonviolence toward ourselves and others” (p. 94). The opening chapter–Chapter 
1–begins with a litany of violence, of wrong action toward other human beings. Can we imagine 
a different absent present-past and absent present-future where the seeds of the teaching of Right 
Action have been watered within the hearts and minds of our students (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 
2015)? As a reminder that Right Action is achieved through mindfulness, Hanh (1999) 
developed the Mindful Trainings as the practice of Right Action. The Mindful Trainings include: 
“reverence for life…generosity…sexual responsibility…[and] mindful, eating, drinking, and 
consuming” (pp. 94-96). Due to their centrality of the Right Action and the means through which 
we can course correct the current behavior exhibited in society, I will provide full excerpts on 
each from Hanh’s (1999) writings.  
Reverence for life, Hanh’s first mindfulness training, points us toward the awareness that we are 
guilty of killing. This awareness can bring out a cessation of the killing that we are all complicit 
in committing. Hanh (1999) writes:  
‘Aware of the suffering caused by the destruction of life, I am committed to cultivating 
compassion and learning ways to protect the lives of people, animals, plants, and 
minerals. I am determined not to kill, not to let others kill, and not to support any act of 
killing in the world, in my thinking, and in my way of life.’ We may be killing every day 
by the way we eat, drink, and use the land, air, and water. We think that we don’t kill, but 
we do. (Hanh, 1999, p. 94) 
We are complicit in the violence, in the killing of this world; however, we are able to stop it with 
mindful awareness.  
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In resonance with Ubuntu, Hanh’s (1999) second Mindfulness Training, generosity, 
encourages us to live simply and to share. More importantly, counter to Western culture “this 
training tells us not just to refrain from taking what is not ours or exploiting others. It also 
exhorts us to live in a way that brings about justice and well-being in society” (Hanh, 1999, p. 
95). Regarding the Mindfulness Training on generosity, Hanh (1999) reflects: 
‘Aware of the suffering caused by exploitation, social justice, stealing, and  
oppression, I am committed to cultivating loving kindness and learning ways to work for 
the well-being of people, animals, plants, and minerals. I will practice generosity by 
sharing my time, energy, and material resources with those who are in real need. I am 
determined not to steal and not to possess anything that should belong to others. I will 
respect the property of others, but I will prevent others from profiting from human 
suffering or the suffering of other species on Earth.’ (Hanh, 1999, p. 95) 
Right Action concerns the promotion of social justice and liberation of the minds, bodies, and 
souls in a Sisyphean cycle of bondage. 
Traversing ever deeper into the moral terrain of society, Hanh’s (1999) third Mindfulness 
Training is sexual responsibility. The encouragement of responsible sexual behavior through 
mindfulness, asserts Hanh (1999), assists in protecting the integrity of families and individuals. 
Hanh (1999) maintains, “practicing this training, we not only protect ourselves and those dear to 
us, but we protect the whole human species, including children” (p. 95). 
Linked to the entirety of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, the fifth 
Mindfulness Training “encourages mindful eating, drinking, and consuming” (Hanh, 1999, p. 
96). The key idea is the necessity of a good diet to transform both the self and society (Hanh, 
1999). To this point, Hanh writes: 
‘Aware of the suffering caused by mindful consumption, I am committed to  
cultivating good health, both physical and mental, for myself, my family, and my society 
by practicing mindful eating, drinking, and consuming. I will ingest only items that 
preserve peace, well-being, and joy in my body, in my consciousness, and in the 
collective body and consciousness of my family and society. I am determined not to use 
alcohol or any other intoxicant or to ingest foods or other items that contain toxins, such 
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as certain TV programs, magazines, books, films, and conversations. I am aware that 
damage to my body or my consciousness with these poisons is to betray my ancestors, 
my parents, my society, and future generations. I will work to transform violence, fear, 
anger, and confusion in myself and in society by practicing a diet for myself and for 
society. I understand that a proper diet is crucial for self-transformation and for the 
transformation of society.’ (Hanh, 1999, p. 96) 
Without mindful consumption, we cannot transform the situation that we find ourselves in 
society—our current reality. In fact, it may be the only way out, “the only way to stop the course 
of destruction for our body, our consciousness, and the collective body and consciousness of 
society” (Hanh, 1999, p. 97). The practice of mindfulness is one key to liberation. 
The last of the moral action category on the Noble Eightfold Path is Right Livelihood, 
which Hanh (1999) defines as a means of earning a living that does not work against your ethical 
code or that does not transgress “your ideals of love and compassion” (p. 113). Cogent to the aim 
of this inquiry, “the way you support yourself can be an expression of your deepest self, or it can 
be a source of suffering for you and others” (Hanh, 1999, p. 113). As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
higher education moved from the pursuit of knowledge and the vocational discernment to 
education for the sole purpose of supplying market demand and economic prosperity (Berrett, 
2015). Particularly relevant to this point, Hahn asserts we must: 
[b]ring awareness to every moment, we try to have a vocation that is beneficial to  
humans, animals, plants, and the earth, or at least minimally harmful. We live in a society 
in which jobs are sometimes hard to find, but if it happens that our work involves 
harming life, we should try to find another job. Our vocation can nourish our 
understanding and compassion, or erode them. We should be awake to the consequences, 
far and near, of the way we earn our living. (Hanh, 1999, p. 113) 
The impact that one person has on the world cannot be understated nor underestimated. 
Discovering one’s vocation, living one’s purpose in alignment with one’s values is Right 
Livelihood. Hanh (1999) emphasizes, “Right Livelihood is not just a personal matter. It is our 
collective karma” (p. 155). Providing the following example, he elaborates: 
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Suppose I am a schoolteacher and I believe that nurturing love and understanding in 
children is a beautiful occupation. I would object if someone were to ask me to stop 
teaching and become, for example, a butcher. But when I meditate on the interrelatedness 
of things, I see that the butcher is not the only person responsible for killing animals. We 
may think the butcher’s livelihood is wrong and ours is right, but if we didn’t eat meat, he 
would not have to kill. Right Livelihood is a collective matter. The livelihood of each 
person affects everyone else. (Hanh, 1999, p. 115) 
Not only does Hanh’s (1999) example highlight the necessity of Right Livelihood, but in a very 
real way reminds of us of our interconnectedness and interdependence as human beings. Indeed, 
our human and cosmological interconnectedness holds that the actions of one very much so 
impacts the whole. Even more directly, Hanh (1999) states, “If someone has a profession that 
causes living beings to suffer and oppresses others, it will infect their own consciousness, just as 
when we pollute the air that we ourselves have to breathe” (p. 117). Right Livelihood, Right 
Thinking, and Right Action encourage us to live, work, and be in a manner that releases the 
fragrance of love and compassion in society. 
Meditation. The last of the three qualities or categorizations of the Noble Eightfold Path 
is meditation or the ability to control the mind and cultivate the will to resist the urges of the 
mind (Ortwein, 2013). Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration are the two teachings of the 
Noble Eightfold Path that comprise this categorization, and are perhaps the most important of all 
the tenets of the Path (Hanh, 1999). Hanh (1999) expresses mindfulness or “smriti…is 
remembering to come back to the present moment” (p. 64).  
Right Mindfulness as the heart of the Buddha’s teaching from which all others radiate. 
“To cultivate mindfulness in ourselves is to cultivate the Buddha within, to cultivate the Holy 
Spirit” (Hanh, 1999, p. 64). Incorporating Buddhist psychology, Hanh avows,  
(abhidharma, “super Dharma”), the trait “attention” (manaskaraI) is “universal,”  
which means we are always giving our attention to something. Our attention may be 
“appropriate” (yoniso manaskara), as when we dwell fully in the present moment, or 
inappropriate (ayoniso manaskara), as when we are attentive to something that takes us 
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away from being here and now. A good gardener knows the way to grow flowers from 
composts. Right Mindfulness accepts everything without judging or reacting. It is 
inclusive and loving. The practice is to find ways to sustain appropriate attention 
throughout the day. (Hanh, 1999, p. 64) 
Mindfulness in and of itself is a transformative way of being-in-the-world and with one another. 
Sustaining mindfulness in a world wrought with distraction is the great difficulty of the practice. 
Hanh (1999) offers the pedagogical tool of the seven Miracles of Mindfulness.  
The miracles of mindfulness. The Miracles of Mindfulness offer suggestions for the 
practice of mindfulness in our everyday lives. The first Miracle of Mindfulness is “to be present 
and able to touch deeply the blue sky, the flower, and the smile of our child” (Hanh, 1999, p. 
65)–to be in the now. The second Miracle of Mindfulness is to extend the awareness from 
ourselves to those around us (Hanh, 1999). This is an opportunity for you and your beloved to 
see, to deeply see one another. The third Miracle of Mindfulness “is to nourish the object of your 
attention” (Hanh, 1999, p. 65). Hanh (1999) asserts that love is most deeply felt and shown in the 
practice of appropriate attention. The fourth Miracle of Mindfulness is the relief of another’s 
suffering through deep listening and mindful presence (Hanh, 1999). For example, “when 
someone is about to die, if you sit with him stably and solidly, that alone may be enough to help 
him leave this life with ease. Your presence is like a mantra, sacred speech that has a 
transforming effect” (Hanh, 1999, p. 66). Tying these four Miracles of Mindfulness back to 
meditation, they compose the “first aspect of meditation — shamatha — stopping, calming, 
resting, and healing” (Hanh, 1999, p. 66).  
Looking deeply (vipashyana), tied to the second aspect of meditation, is a the fifth 
Miracle of Mindfulness (Hanh, 1999). Understanding, the sixth Miracle of Mindfulness, is 
defined as looking deeply and seeing what could not be seen before (Hanh, 1999). About 
understanding, Hanh (1999) expands:  
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Seeing and understanding come from within us. When we are mindful, touching  
deeply the present moment, we can see and listen deeply, and the fruits are always 
understanding, acceptance, love, and the desire to relieve suffering and bring joy. (Hanh, 
1999, pp. 66-67) 
Understanding, proclaims Hanh (1999), “is the very foundation of love. When you understand 
someone, you cannot help but love him or her” (p. 67). Elsewhere, Hanh (2014) declares, 
“understanding is love’s other name. If you don’t understand you can’t love” (p. 10). The pursuit 
of understanding is love-in-action. Finally, the seventh Miracle of Mindfulness is transformation. 
Through the practice of Right Mindfulness, “we touch the healing and refreshing elements of life 
and begin to transform our own suffering and the suffering of the world” (Hanh, 1999, p. 67). In 
the practice of mindfulness, community or Sangha21 takes on an important aspect in modeling 
the behavior and holding us accountable (Hanh, 1999). Transformation takes time and patience is 
necessary, but once transformed “we stop the wheel of samsara, the vicious cycle of suffering 
and confusion that has gone on for so many lifetimes” (Hanh, 1999, p. 67). The practice of the 
seven Miracles of Mindfulness leads us to the path of happiness, health, and liberation from 
suffering toward transformation (Hanh, 1999).  
Finally, the last of the Noble Eightfold Path is Right Concentration. The goal of Right 
Concentration is “to cultivate a mind that is one-pointed” (Hanh, 1999, p. 105). Active 
concentration and selective concentration compose this tenet of the Noble Eightfold Path (Hanh, 
1999). Utilizing following poem by a Buddhist monk, Hanh (1999) sets out to explain active 
concentration. The poem reads: 
The wind whistles in the bamboo 
and the bamboo dances. 
When the wind stops,  
the bamboo grows still.  
A silver bird 
21 Sangha (Skt.) is the Buddhist community of practice comprised of monks, nuns, and laypersons (Hanh, 
2007, p. 216). 
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Flies over the autumn lake.  
When it has passed,  
the lake’s surface does not try  
to hold on to the image of the bird. (Hanh, 1999, p. 105) 
Active concentration, like the bamboo in the wind and the reflection of the silver bird over the 
lake, dwells intensely in the present moment, welcome what comes, releasing and returning to its 
new present when it passes. Selective concentration, on the other hand, is focusing intently on 
one object and holding onto the object in the mind (Hanh, 1999). For example, “If the object of 
our concentration is a math problem, we don’t watch TV or talk on the phone. We abandon 
everything else and focus on the object” (Hanh, 1999, p. 106). Concentration, then, becomes not 
an escape but a deep presence. Hanh (1999) maintains “living each moment deeply, sustained 
concentration comes naturally…and gives rise to insight” (p. 106). Degree of concentration and 
quality of life enjoy a positive correlation, according to Hanh (1999), and Right concentration is 
a path to happiness and Right Action. There are nine levels of concentration (Hanh, 1999).  
The nine levels of concentration. We will briefly summarize the nine levels of 
concentration, beginning with the “Four Dhyanas…[or] concentrations on the form realm. The 
next five levels belong to the formless realm” (Hanh, 1999, p. 107). Unlike worldly 
concentration, Buddhist concentration seeks to liberate (Hanh, 1999). When practicing 
“samadhi” (Hanh, 1999, p. 107) or concentration you live deeply in the moment, “you are 
absorbed in the moment. You become the moment [emphasis in original]” (Hanh, 1999, p. 107). 
Together, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration assist us in transcending the carnal desires 
of the world, “and we find ourselves lighter and happier. Our world is no longer gross and heavy, 
the real of desires (karma dhatu)” (Hanh, 1999, p. 107). The first Four Dhyanas, in the form 
realm, are the means by which the growth of mindfulness, concentration, happiness, peace, 
equanimity, and joy are catalyzed (Hanh, 1999). Moving through the fourth Dhyana into the 
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formless dyhanas, one enters into a deeper experience, concentration, and reality (Hanh, 1999). It 
is in this deeper realm, where one begins “to see the impermanent, nonself, and interbeing nature 
of the phenomenal world. Earth, water, air, fire, space, time, nothingness, and perceptions inter-
are. Nothing can be by itself alone” (Hanh, 1999, p. 107). This understanding of interbeing is 
central to Buddhistic philosophy and resonates deeply with Ubuntu philosophy and notions of 
personhood (Eze, 2010). We are beings holonic, communal, and enmeshed in a web of 
interconnectedness.  
Limitless space is the fifth level of concentration, which holds that everything becomes 
space once we begin to practice deep concentration (Hanh, 1999). Looking and concentrating 
deeply, one can ascertain that space is composed of “non-space elements”—air, earth, water, etc. 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 108). More succinctly, Hanh (1999) writes, “According to the teachings of the 
Buddha, nothing has a separate self. So space and everything else inter-are. Space inter-is with 
the other five elements” (p. 108). The kernels of Buddhist subjectivity are beginning to blossom, 
which again finds agreement with Ubuntu and is deeply counter to Western notions of 
subjectivity. Limitless consciousness, following the same logic as limitless space, is the sixth 
level of concentration (Hanh, 1999). Almost in direct congruence to the definition of Ubuntu, 
nothingness is seventh level of concentration. Hanh (1999) defines nothingness in the following 
manner:  
We go beyond outward appearances or signs and come to “signlessness.” At first, we 
think that members of our family are separate from one another, but afterwards we see 
that they contain each other. You are the way you are because I am the way I am. (Hanh, 
1999, p. 108) 
This is Ubuntu. It is the understanding of the “intimate connection between people…” and the 
shedding of the thinking “that the universe contains millions of separate entities. Now we 
understand ‘the nonexistence of signs’” (Hanh, 1999, p. 108).  
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“The eighth level of concentration is that of neither perception nor non-perception” 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 108). It is a recognition that all of the products of our perception are false. In 
agreement with DeleuzoGuattarian philosophy (1987), Hanh (1999) avers:  
Therefore, we see that we cannot rely on our old way of perceiving, and we want to be in 
direct touch with reality. We cannot stop perceiving altogether, but at least now we know 
that perception is a perception of a sign. Since we no longer believe in the reality of 
signs, our perception becomes wisdom. We go beyond signs (“no perception”), but we do 
not become perceptionless (“non-perception”). (pp. 108-109) 
The regime of the sign has been defeated and replaced by the indwelling regime of intuition, 
embodied knowing, or deep looking. Cessation, that is, “the cessation of ignorance in our 
feelings and perceptions, not the cessation of feelings and perceptions” (Hanh, 1999, p. 109) is 
the ninth level of concentration. Within this level, insight is born; through concentration, we 
begin to search for a place of non-suffering (Hanh, 1999).  
Deeply understanding the implications of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold 
Path “…is the greatest wisdom that one can achieve in this life. These are skillful, useful, and 
beneficial views. If you attain this wisdom, you are liberated from the cycle of pain and sorrow” 
(Olson, 2005, p. 55 as cited in Ortwein, 2013, p. 119). However, Hanh provides an ominous 
warning:  
But if our path is not noble, if there is craving, hatred, ignorance, and fear in the way we 
live our daily life, if we practice the ignoble eightfold path, suffering will naturally be the 
outcome. The practice is to face our suffering and transform it in order to bring about 
well-being. We need to study the Noble Eightfold Path and learn ways to put it into 
practice in our daily lives. (Hanh, 1999, p. 46) 
Having explored the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, we turn to the Four 
Immeasurable Minds or the Brahmaviharas, which represent the most hopeful aspects of human 
nature.  
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The Four Immeasurable Minds (Brahmaviharas). The Brahmavirharas or the Four 
Immeasurable Minds are the dwelling places of love; they include: love, compassion, joy, and 
equanimity (Hanh, 1999). Hanh (1999) avers the four Brahmaviharas are considered to be 
immeasurable, “because if you practice them, they will grow in you every day until they embrace 
the whole world. You will become happier, and everyone around you will become happier, also” 
(p. 169). The emergence of the Brahmaviharas is best explained in Hanh’s recalling of the story 
handed down through Buddhist teaching. The story follows: 
During Buddha’s lifetime, those of the Brahmanic faith prayed that after death  
they would go to Heaven to dwell eternally with Brahma, the universal God. One day a 
Brahman man asked the Buddha, “What can I do to be sure that I will be with Brahma 
after I die?” and the Buddha replied, “As Brahma is the source of Love, to dwell with 
him you must practice the ‘Brahma Abodes,’ (Brahmaviharas) or Four Immeasurable 
Minds — love, compassion, joy, and equanimity.” […] The Four Brahmaviharas are the 
abodes of true love. This address is much greater than a four-star hotel. It is a 1,000-star 
dwelling. (Hanh, 1999, p. 169) 
To reiterate, Buddhism is about practice; therefore, to practice the Brahmaviharas is to heal 
oneself from the emotional conditions that plague us all from time to time. We now turn to a 
discussion on each of the four Brahmaviharas.  
Love. Love or loving kindness (maitri in Sanskrit or metta in Pali) is the first of the 
abodes of true love, and births in us “the intention and capacity to offer joy and happiness” 
(Hanh, 1999, p. 170). The capacity of love—joy and happiness—is developed through the 
practice of deep listening and looking, which enables one to discern what will bring others 
happiness (Hanh, 1999). Hanh (1999) suggests offering someone what we think they need versus 
seeing what they actually need is not maitri and exemplifies a lack of understanding. Recall that 
understanding, in the perspective of Hanh (2014, 1999), is simply love’s (maitri) other name. 
More explicitly, he states, “Without understanding, your love is not true love. You must look 
deeply in order to see and understand the needs, aspirations, and suffering of the one you love” 
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(Hanh, 1999, p. 171). In a nod to poststructuralism, Hanh (1999) reminds us of the importance of 
language. Maitri can be and is often translated not as love but loving kindness, which some 
Buddhist teachers prefer “as they find the word ‘love’ too dangerous” (p. 171). Hanh (1999), 
however, prefers the word love and asserts “Words sometimes get sick and we have to heal 
them” (p. 172). Using the word ‘love’ not as desire, but going back to maitri’s primary meaning 
of friendship. “In Buddhism, the primary mean of love is friendship” (Hanh, 1999, p. 172). 
Underscoring the centrality of love as integral to our very being, Hanh (1999) does well to 
remind us all that  
We all have the seeds of love in us. We can develop this wonderful source of energy, 
nurturing the unconditional love that does not expect anything in return. When we 
understand someone deeply, even someone who has done us harm, we cannot resist 
loving him or her. (p. 172) 
In agreement with Ubuntu, maitri or love comprises a revolutionary act. Love necessitates 
understanding, tolerance, happiness and each of the other three Brahmaviharas (Hanh, 1999, 
Broodryk, 2006). Imagine a world, an educational system with love as its foundation, where 
understanding in human relations held an equally privileged position to academic understanding. 
Compassion. Compassion (karuna in both Sanskrit and Pali) comprises the intentionality 
to transform suffering and lighten burdens (Hanh, 1999). Paying attention to and in an effort to 
heal language, Hahn (1999) maintains the translation of karuna is understood to be compassion, 
but it does not necessarily convey the whole meaning. Hanh (1999) writes, “‘Compassion’ is 
composed of com (“together with”) and passion (“to suffer”). But we do not need to suffer to 
remove suffering from another person. […] Still, until we find a better word, let us use 
“compassion” to translate karuna” (p. 172).  
In parallel to the Ubuntu value of umunyu or compassion, karuna is practiced with deep 
looking and listening, and by being mindful of breathing (Broodyrk, 2006; Hanh, 1999). The 
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practice of compassion has the ability to reduce another’s suffering and activate joy (Hanh, 
1999). With profound implications for education and human relations, Hanh (1999) movingly 
conveys the impact of compassion. He explains:  
One compassionate word, action, or thought can reduce another person’s suffering and 
bring him joy. One word can give comfort and confidence, destroy doubt, help someone 
avoid a mistake, reconcile a conflict, or open the door to liberation. One action can save a 
person’s life or help him take advantage of a rare opportunity. (Hanh, 1999, p. 173) 
Imagine the teaching and modeling of compassion in the field of education. Think on the 
generative, multiplicative effects that the practice of compassion in the education realm can have 
on being-doing of this nation, of this world. Particularly, germane to the inquiry at hand is 
Hanh’s (1999) inclusion of ideas in the practice of karuna; Hanh (1999) proclaims, “One thought 
can do the same, because thoughts always lead to words and actions. With compassion in our 
heart, every thought, word, and deed can bring about a miracle” (p. 173). Every action is 
preceded by an idea.  
Joy. The third abode of love is joy (mudita), which is a fruit of love. “If our love does not 
bring joy to both of us, it is not true love” (Hanh, 1999, p. 173). Deciphering between joy and 
happiness, Hanh (1999) discerns joy relates directly to the mind and happiness to both the mind 
and body. Joy and happiness inter-are (Hanh, 1999). Joy is practiced through mindfulness, 
believing joy to be a natural by-product of the mind one can increase their joy by being mindful. 
Ever the poststructuralist, Hanh (1999) disputes some scholars’ definition of mudita as 
“‘sympathetic joy’ or ‘altruistic joy,’ the happiness we feel when others are happy” (p. 174) as 
being too limited. Furthermore, these disputed meanings promulgate the false dichotomy 
between the self and others (Hanh, 1999). Rather, joy or mudita “is filled with peace and 
contentment” (Hanh, 1999, p. 174); it is discovered in our happiness and the happiness of others. 
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Joy must first be deeply felt for ourselves before it can felt for others. In short, joy is for 
everyone or as Broodryk (2006) avers shared joy is doubly joyful (Hanh, 1999). 
Equanimity. The fourth and final abode of love is equanimity (upeksha in Sanskrit and 
upekkha in Pali), which “is the ability to see everyone as equal, not discriminating between 
ourselves and others” (Hanh, 1999, p. 174). Upeksha is translated to mean “equanimity, 
nonattachment, nondiscrimination, evenmindedness, or letting go” (Hanh, 1999, p. 174). Hahn 
illustrates the final abode of love as follows: 
Upa means “over,” and iksh means “to look.” You climb the mountain to be able  
to look over the whole situation, not bound by one side or the other. If your love has 
attachment, discrimination, prejudice, or clinging in it, it is not true love. People who do 
not understand Buddhism sometimes think upeksha means indifference, but true 
equanimity is neither cold nor indifferent. If you have more than one child, they are all 
your children. (Hanh, 1999, p. 174) 
Utilizing Hanh’s (1999) multiple children illustration, practicing equanimity is not indifference 
to love, but is the communication of a deep expression of love to all of your children–equally 
(Hanh, 1999). 
Equanimity parallels Broodryk’s (2006) Ubuntuist understanding that we are at once 
“unchanging equals” (p. 7) and that “equals do not oppress each other” (p. 16). “True love allows 
you to preserve your freedom and the freedom of your beloved” (Hanh, 1999, p. 175). The 
implications of the practice of equanimity in everyday relations are particularly salient in a 
society that, in practice, has proclaimed Black and Brown bodies guilty until proven innocent; 
Hanh (1999) writes: “In a conflict, even though we are deeply concerned, we remain impartial, 
able to love and understand both sides. We shed all discrimination and prejudice, and remove all 
boundaries between ourselves and others” (p. 174). Regarding subjectivity and this inquiry’s 
aim, Hanh (1999) continues:  
As long as we see ourselves as the one who loves and the other as the one who is 
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loved, as long as we value ourselves more than others and see ourselves as different from 
others, we do not have true equanimity. We have to put ourselves ‘into the other person’s 
skin’ and become one with him if we want to understand and truly love him. When that 
happens, there is no ‘self’ and no ‘other.’ (p. 175) 
Through the Four Noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path, the Four Immeasurable Minds 
together with the Seven Factors of Awakening, and in consistent practice we can arrive at 
enlightenment (Hanh, 1999). The enlightened person radiates the Four Immeasurable Minds—
love, compassion, joy, and equanimity (Hanh, 1999). “They are the four aspects of true love 
within ourselves and within everyone and everything” (Hahn, 1999, p. 170). 
Buddhist Philosophy  
Safran (2003), in conjunction with Adams (2012), assert central to the Buddhist and 
Updanishadic philosophy is 
the concept of atman, which is equivalent in some respects to our concept of soul. The 
atman is the essence of the person, which transcends phenomenal experience. It is thus 
the real self in contrast to the experienced self. This atman is conceptualized as identical 
with the single unified essence behind appearances. The individual experience of self, 
and all phenomena in the world, are thus illusions, behind which lies as a transcendental 
reality in which all phenomena are one. The failure to see behind this veil of illusion 
keeps people trapped in the pain of individuation and the suffering of life and death. 
Those who fail to recognize their true nature as part of the universal essence experience 
the pain and sorrow of life, and at death are reborn once again into endless rounds of life 
and death. The goal is to reorganize the illusory nature of the self and to unify the true 
self or atman with the underlying universal essence. (Safran, 2003, p. 11) 
This doctrine, not found in the Four Noble Truths, is of ancient and persistent Buddhist thought 
and along with Duhka (Suffering) and Anitya (Impermanence) composes the triad of the 
trilaksana, or the Three Marks of Existence (Adams, 2012). In short, what has been termed in 
Western thought as the doctrine of no-self or spelled differently than above “the doctrine of 
anãtman” (Adams, 2012, p. 275) is widely considered the Buddhist theory of subjectivity and 
makes the ontological claim “of a kind of groundless ground of being” (O’Sullivan, 2014, 258). 
In other words, being just is. 
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Buddhist Ontology 
Asakura (2011) writing to understand Mou’s Buddhistic ontology in an attempt to 
overcome the imprisonment of Kantian metaphysics, first distinguishes between the noumenal22 
and phenomenal23 forms of ontology. Noumenal and phenomenal refer to the Kantian postulation 
that two worlds exist; the noumenal, the world outside of ourselves as things really exists which 
is incomprehensible and the phenomenal, the world as perceived or conceptualized within the 
mind of the individual(s) (Kant, 1929).  Asakura (2011) argues “phenomenal ontology must be 
fully grounded in the noumenal version, the ultimate ground must be morality: it is essentially a 
moral vision of the world” (p. 654). Conversely, Buddhistic ontology, is amoral and “only on 
this amoral ground, or on the lack of any ground, can we see the possibility of posing a question 
of being” (p. 654). Moreover, Asakura (2011) defines Buddhistic ontology as “a question of 
being, asking amorally the meaning of what it is be” (pp. 654-655). Buddhistic ontology is non-
metaphysical, which in the Heideggerian sense, the question of being can be posed without the 
shackles of morality (Asakura, 2011). Buddhist ontology, therefore, transgresses the necessity of 
Kantian morality and the distinction of the noumena and phenomena (Asakura, 2011). In doing 
so, the “essence of Buddhism is discovered in its non-metaphysical and precisely ontological 
investigation of the being of entities” (Asakura, 2011, p. 672). While Hanh (1999) and Waldron 
(2003) would contend that there is no essence of Buddhism, they would find agreement that 
Buddhist ontology “attempts to comprehend and affirm the whole reality, including its most 
22 Noumenal refers to an object that can be intuited only by direct knowledge (intuition) and not perceived 
by the senses; an object independent of intellectual intuition of it or of sensuous perception of it. Also 
called a thing-in-itself. In Kantian philosophy, for example, the noumenal refers to an object such as the 
soul, which cannot be known through perception, although its existence can be demonstrated (Hanh, 
2007, p. 214).  
23 Phenomenal refers to an occurrence, circumstance, or fact that is perceptible by the senses. In Kantian 
philosophy and physics, the phenomenal is an observable event or the appearance of an object to the mind 
(Hanh, 2007, p. 215).  
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troubling aspects, immediately and without reservation, by casting its gaze of the being of all 
things or entities” (Asakura, 2011, p. 669). In other words, nothing is beyond the gaze of 
understanding or can be separated from the whole.  
Buddhist ontology is free of value or moralistic judgment and recognizes the 
interconnected nature of all things–that all things inter-are (Hanh, 1999). However, in our 
humanness, inability to live in the contradictions, and our Western need for all ruptures to be 
mended, Buddhist ontology poses a challenge. Asakura (2011) solidifies and illuminates 
Buddhism’s dissolution of the Western categorization of human inquiry when he states, “For its 
members, ontology is not a theoretical problem; it is a ‘metanoetic’ practice against the tendency 
to convert contradictions into reconciliation” (p. 670). In short, the ontological and 
epistemological are one; there is no division. (Hanh, 1999; Asakura, 2011). Buddhism onto-
praxis allows one to sit comfortably in the uncomfortableness of the in-between.  
Asakura (2011) aptly sums up the Buddhist ontology in his description of both Mou’s and 
the Kyoto School’s Buddhistic ontology, he states:   
…Buddhistic ontology, which is a practical and radically ontological type of philosophy.
It is radically amoral and impersonal in the sense that it transcends the personal 
standpoint. It is a question of being in its univocal horizon, which can only be described 
in paradoxical or non-metaphysical ways. Reality self-realizes in this affirmation of 
being, which pays concentrated attention to the being of all things, which is also an 
affirmation of the controversial and even disturbing aspects of our world. This question 
of being constitutes an ontological awareness in its purely subjective and practical sense. 
It is realizable in its awareness and in its all-embracing and no longer personal 
compassion. (Asakura, 2011, pp. 673-674)  
When reduced to philosophy, Buddhist ontology can be described as a “groundless ground of 
being” (O’Sullivan, 2014, p. 258) or more commonly understood as interbeing or non-self, 
which proffers the impermanence, instability, and interconnectedness of self (Hanh, 1999). 
Given the Buddhist notion of self as non-self, one can deduce that there is no separation in the 
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Buddhist perspective between being and knowing (Hanh, 1999; Mack, 2010). The Buddhist 
perspective is onto-epistemological, the self is ever-changing and knowledge connotes a 
permanence; therefore, for the learner, the nature of being and the nature of knowledge—what is 
known, and/or what can be known—is also ever changing. In this view, truth, then, is not 
universal but situational, positional, and subjective. 
Engaged Buddhism 
Buddhism in praxis is naturally an engagement in the world; however, in the midst of the 
Vietnam War Thich Nhat Hanh “broke with the 2500-year tradition of Buddhist apoliticism” 
(Knabb, 2002, p. 50) to found an order that employed Buddhism as a ethical and meditational 
practice to transform contemporary social issues (Hanh, 2008; Seiber, 2015). Arising not only in 
the midst of physical war, but also in the midst of ideological warfare of 1954 Vietnam 
dominated in the North by Marxist-Leninist ideology and in the South by Catholic personalism24, 
Engaged Buddhism began as a series of articles in Vietnam with the sole aim of looking at 
Buddhism with fresh eyes (Hanh, 2008). In light of the tumultuous context of Hanh’s early years 
(1949-1964), he imagined a Buddhism that enters “into life, social life” (Hanh, 2008, p. 31)—
Engaged Buddhism. Engaged Buddhism is present in every moment of life, and Hahn maintains 
is the kind of wisdom that responds to anything that happens in the here and  
now—global warming, climate change, the destruction of the ecosystem, lack of 
communication, war, conflict, suicide, divorce. (Hanh, 2008, p. 31) 
Quelling our natural tendency to run away from suffering, Engaged Buddhism walks right into 
the pain of suffering to transform it.  
24 According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, personalists believe that the human person 
should be the ontological and epistemological starting point of philosophical reflection. They are 
concerned to investigate the experience, the status, and the dignity of the human being as person, and 
regard this as the starting-point for all subsequent philosophical analysis. 
Personalists regard personhood (or “personality”) as the fundamental notion, as that which gives meaning 
to all of reality and constitutes its supreme value. Personhood carries with it an inviolable dignity that 
merits unconditional respect. (Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism/#WhaPer)  
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A Renewed Four Noble Truths. Looking at the Four Noble Truths in light of the 
situation we know find ourselves in, that is, in light of the current global socio-cultural milieu, 
we come to see that transformation and well-being are possible (Waldron, 2003; Hanh, 2008; 
Hanh, 1999). In Engaged Buddhism’s (re)thinking of the first Noble Truth, dukkha, through 
mindfulness we can identify today’s “true face of ill-being,” (Hanh, 2008, p. 32) which Hanh 
defines as “tensions, stress, anxiety, fear, violence, broken families, suicide, war, conflict, 
terrorism, destruction of the ecosystem,[and] global warming” (Hanh, 2008, p. 32). Refusing to 
hide our heads under a bushel and looking deeply into the suffering, we are able to see the path 
to transformation (Hanh, 2008). Hahn (2008) writes: “If we know how to live like a Buddha, 
dwelling in the present moment, allowing the refreshing and healing elements to penetrate, then 
we will not become victims of stress, tensions, and many kinds of disease” (p. 32). “Dis-ease” 
(P. Hendry, personal communication, May 7, 2015) is caused by our inability to live our lives 
fully, deeply in every moment (Hanh, 2008, 1999). Speaking of schooling and Engaged 
Buddhism, Hanh (2008) observes “…even school teachers don’t know how to help their students 
recognize and hold their emotions tenderly. We people cannot communicate[;] they don’t 
understand each other…there is no love, no happiness” (p. 32). Engaged Buddhism as a practice 
within schools encourages communication, deep listening, and emotional mindfulness (Hanh, 
1999). Even more importantly, it encourages the striving to understand on the part of both the 
teacher and student.  
Again, Buddhism is an engagement in and with the world; with respect to contemporary 
social issues that deeply wound humanity, Hanh argues:  
Fear, misunderstanding, and wrong perceptions are the foundation of all these  
violent acts. The war in Iraq, which is called anti-terrorist, has not helped to  
reduce the number of terrorists. In fact the number of terrorists is increasing all the time 
because of the war. In order to remove terrorism you have to remove wrong perceptions. 
 99 
We know very well that airplanes, guns, and bombs cannot remove wrong perceptions. 
(Hanh, 2008, p. 32) 
The same can be said for America’s so-called War on Crime, which has only served to 
exacerbate crime. Through Buddhism and Engaged Buddhism, we are brought to the awareness 
that “only loving speech and compassionate listening can help correct wrong perceptions. But 
our leaders are not trained in that discipline and they rely on the armed forces to remove 
terrorism” (Hanh, 2008, pp. 32-33). An education that trains and encourages loving speech and 
deep listening are necessary components to recognize and transform the suffering of ill-being 
(Hanh, 1999, 2008). 
The Third Noble Truth, “the cessation of ill-being, which means the presence of well-
being—just as the absence of darkness means the presence of light” (Hanh, 2008, p. 33) is 
possible through the shedding of ignorance, which is the root of all of our problems. The Fourth 
Noble Truth is achieved through practice, which sets us on a path of well-being. 
The Noble Eightfold Path and Hanh’s (1999) Mindfulness Trainings teach non-
attachment to views. The goal of the teachings are insight not attachments. More to the point, 
The Buddha said, ‘My teaching is like the finger pointing to the moon. You should be 
skillfull. You look in the direction of my finger, and you can see the moon. If you take 
my finger to be the moon, you will never see the moon.’ (Hanh, 1999, p. 17) 
Attachment to views can be equated to fanaticism, which can be attributed as the root cause of all 
wars (Hanh, 2008). Where there is an attachment to views, there is no peace. Discussing 
Buddhist refusal of the Vietnam War, Hanh (2008) composed a poem to express the Engaged 
Buddhist perspective. The last line of this poem can and should be recited over and over again in 
classrooms, boardrooms, and government war rooms. The poem reads: 
Whoever is listening, be my witness: 
I do not accept this war;  
let me say this one more time before I die. 
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Our enemies are not men. (Hanh, 2008, p. 35) 
In fact, our enemies are not men, but ideas. “Our enemies are hate, fanaticism, violence. Our 
enemies are not men. If we kill men, with whom shall we live?” (Hanh, 2008, p. 35). Not only 
with whom shall we live, but with what idea will be forced to live with. An idea can outlive man 
by millennia. In fact, we see that physical violence is akin to throwing a match on a drought 
stricken forest floor, we know that eventually the rain will come and the fire will be no more. 
Ideological violence–wrong ontological and epistemological viewpoints–on the other hand, do 
not disintegrate but proliferate, replicate, and transmute like a virus. The ability to contain it is 
just within reach, but always escapes our grasp.  
Engaged Buddhism teaches that transformation, awakening to suffering begins with self 
first (Sivaraksa, 2002). The inward practice of awareness produces the outward results of 
personal and societal transformation. Each of us are change agents with the ability to enact 
changes within our communities–micro and macro (Hanh, 1999, 2008). To reiterate, Sivaraksa 
(2002) writes: “While the Buddha’s intention was certainly to change individuals, the ultimate 
aim was liberation. However, he intended to help liberate not only individuals, but the whole 
society” (p. 43). Our collective and individual metamorphoses are contemporaneous reactions.  
Liberation, in Engaged Buddhist tradition, must come through an awakening to the systemic, 
structural causes of suffering. Engaged Buddhism, very much like, traditional Buddhism 
necessitates an engagement in and with the world as means to raise awareness, heighten 
consciousness, and catalyze meaningful societal transformation.  
Conclusion 
Thich Nhat Hanh (1999) reminds us that “transformation is gradual, but once we see 
clearly the causes of our suffering, we can make the effort to change our behavior and bring our 
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suffering to an end” (Hanh, 1999, p. 43). Believing that “even the most flawed people have 
Buddha-nature, and reconciliation begins with the acknowledgement of common humanity and 
shared suffering” (Sivaraksa, 2005, p. 32), Buddhism provides an epistemology and 
methodology (pedagogy) to transform our collective ontology—in fact, they inter-are (Hanh, 
1999). Infusing the theory and practice of the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and the 
Four Immeasurable Minds into the fabric of American education can, along with Ubuntu, bring 
about a revolutionary societal metamorphosis. Holding deeply Buddha’s teaching on Nirvana, 
that is, “we already are what we want to become.[…] We only need to return to ourselves and 
touch our true nature” (Hanh, 1999, p. 140), we come to understand that the transformation that 
we seek already lies within in. Now is always the time to transform our current ‘reality’ into our 
future hope.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
A MAP NOT A TRACING: (re)THINKING AS (NON)METHOD 
“…thinking is living at a higher degree, at a faster pace, in a multidirectional manner.” 
- Rosi Braidotti - 
Method is an ontological decision, it signals a way of being-doing in the world (Law, 
2004). I desire to think the unthinkable, and imagine the not yet as if it were. At the 
recommendation of Deleuze (1995), I have started at the middle in the space sans authors, sans 
canonical works, or the stability of traditional methodologies (Koro-Ljungberg, Carlson, Tesar, 
& Anderson, 2015). I start in the middle, on this plateau25 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) not 
because I want to make use of the DeleuzoGuattarian concept as methodological trope, but 
because I have no place else to begin. I dwell in the present-present dragging along the present-
past, that is to say, I am situated in the now, while being held captive by the past, while looking 
toward an “unthinkable absent future-present” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 613). Attempting 
to transcend the cage of Cartesian thought, I am trapped in it–stuck in the middle attempting to 
free myself not physically, but ontologically, cognitively, and imaginatively. My present help is 
bi-directional, it “moves into two directions at once: one oriented toward the past and [the] other 
contracting toward the future” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 612); thinking how did we get 
ourselves in this mess—past, imagining how we can get ourselves out—future, and wrestling 
with the reality that while “everything is possible, ..not everything is”—present (Koro-Ljungberg 
et al., 2015, p. 613). This is my middle, this is my plateau, this is my becoming-researcher, 
25 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) states, “A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. 
A rhizome is made of plateaus” (p. 21) and “[e]ach plateau can be read starting anywhere and can be 
related to any plateau” (p. 22).  
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becoming-Ph.D., becoming-more human (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). This is both the beauty 
and the daunting task of an absent present-future qualitative inquiry. 
Koro-Ljungberg et al. (2015), writing on brute methodologies and qualitative inquiry’s 
enablement of thinking the once unthinkable thought, asks: 
How can anyone “predict” future-to-come or describe the absent-present or absent-future-
presence of qualitative inquiry without being sidetracked? By fleeting presuppositions. 
By our human-ness. By that bug on the wall over there. By eggplant. How can one think 
about presence or future of something that is under erasure—something without origins 
and something one needs to let go as soon as she or he starts to use it? Deleuze (1990) 
wrote “instead of a present which absorbs the past and future, a future and past divide the 
present at every instant and subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both 
directions at once” (p. 164). (Koro-Ljungberg et. al, 2005, p. 613) 
While traditional qualitative researchers and methodologists may argue the illusory nature of an 
absent future-present sidetracks us from the a very real present, I argue that (re)thinking absent-
future-present is a rhizomatic engagement, the creation of maps not tracings26 (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987; Parr, 2005). Thinking with Buddhism and Ubuntu, creating a map is thought-
action engagement in the co-creation of a future to come. To be fair, I have just done what I 
accuse traditional positivist methodologists of doing, reducing a thing down to its most simple 
state and creating dualist positionalities. The contrasting of maps and tracings creates a false 
value judgment dualism. Deleuze and Guattari (1987), in dealing with this dualism, inquire: 
26 Distinguishing the a map from a tracing, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state: “The rhizome is altogether 
different, a map and not a tracing. Make map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of 
the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that 
it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an 
unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the 
removal of blockages on bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the 
rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible 
to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an 
individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn upon a wall, conceived as a work of art, 
constructed as a political action or as meditation. Perhaps on of the most important characteristics of the 
rhizome is that it always has multiple entry ways… 
A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back “to the same.” The 
map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged ‘competence’” (pp. 12-
13). 
 104 
Is it not of the essence of the map to be traceable? Is not of the essence of the rhizome to 
intersect roots and sometimes merge with them? Does not a map contain phenomena of 
redundancy that are already like tracings of its own? Does not a multiplicity have strata 
upon which unifications and totalizations, massifications, mimetic mechanisms, 
signifying power takeovers, and subjective attributions take root? Do not even lines of 
flight, due to their eventual divergence, reproduce the very formations their function it 
was to dismantle or outflank? But the opposite is also true. It is a question of method: the 
tracing should always be put back on the map. This operation and the previous are not at 
all symmetrical. For it is inaccurate to say that a tracing reproduces a map. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 13) 
 To create a mapping, the cartographer must know the terrain, and yet constructs the map through 
his or her own perception. (re)Thinking as (non)method is cartography, mapping-in-action. 
(re)Thinking pushes personal and methodological paradigmic boundaries, “subverting and 
transgressing limits and boundaries and liberating research that traditionally has managed and 
marginalized the researcher” (Koro-Ljungberg et. al, 2005, p. 613). Thinking and (re)thinking 
with as (non)method is an active, subjective engagement in inquiry, in life (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2012). Thinking, asserts Braidotti (1994), “is living at a higher degree, at a faster pace, in a multi 
directional manner” (p. 167). (re)Thinking as (non)method is “inquiry as in-betweeness, 
multiplicity that is not a component or a collection” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 617). 
I Am a Multitude. As a researcher, philosopher, problemitizer, and being-human, I resist 
the epistemological and methodological dungeons created by positivist researchers and reified in 
the once liberating approach of traditional qualitative research. Koro-Ljungberg et al. (2015) 
declare: 
Traditional paradigms mould, discipline, test, tweak, digitalize, approve, surveille, and 
treat anything and everything alike. In that sense, the researcher’s role is to tame the data, 
participants, and stakeholders to place them into their appropriate places in the research 
process, allowing them to operate, ghost-like, in the research machine, to produce safe, 
often emotionless research, to cultivate and mould them into ideal forms that will 
eliminate disruptions or potentially uncomfortable knowledge interests and outcomes. 
Through promoting simplistic practices, using dangerous, seductive numbers (and 
sometimes language), offering ready-to-deliver solutions and a business-like “operating” 
manual the aim is to answer most if not all questions of the social life. (p. 615) 
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Embracing my present-past, present-present, and imagining my absent present-future, 
(re)thinking as (non)method is an ethical, ontological, and epistemological engagement (Koro-
Ljungberg et al., 2015; St. Pierre, 2014). It is an engagement in a critical ontology of ourselves 
(Foucault, 1984), the world we inhabit, and the world-to-come that we hope to inhabit—the 
future, which “is not only coming but in some way it is already here in its absent, present, and 
absent present elements” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 614). Koro-Ljungberg et al. (2015) 
pose an interesting question: “What does our collective gaze on absent present-future produce?” 
(p. 614). Perhaps, “it finally kills the subject, either ‘I’ of ‘we’” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 
614). Perhaps it refocuses our perception of Other or encourages us to meet and fully encounter 
the Other in the beauty of their otherness. Perhaps it does all of the above (Oliver, 2001; Koro-
Ljungberg et al., 2015). As Eze (2008) asserts in his discussion on the philosophy and culture 
that is Ubuntu, “The process of encounter with the other helps me to shed any prior 
misgivings…[t]his experimental moment informs and enriches my own perspective and frees me 
from dogma in judgment” (p. 394). Ubuntu and Buddhism, the two philosophical perspectives 
that I (re)think with in this inquiry, represents an “ethical consciousness…that does not seek for 
uniformity or identity of interest, but understanding; it appropriates empathy, but eschews 
unanimity and conformity” (Eze, 2008, p. 394). Understanding, according to Hanh (1999) is 
simply love by another name. This is the promise of (re)thinking; the hope of creating maps and 
not tracings (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  
(re)Thinking as (non)Method 
(re)Thinking as (non)methodological inquiry is a rendezvous with both “philosophy and 
disciplinary knowledge that leads us to the rethinking of ontological, epistemological and ethical 
notions” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 615). Essentially, it is an attempt at ‘un-doing’, 
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transgressing, subverting, and resisting the epistemological and methodological violence 
inflicted on beings-human; it is a resistance to the creativity killing assimilationist machines that 
we call American schooling; it is a decolonizing response to the academic colonization to which 
we have been subjected through (un)hidden curricula (Pinar et al., 2008; Apple, 2013; St. Pierre, 
2014; Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015; Freire, 1970/2000). The ‘un-doings’ of (post)qualitative 
inquiry have evolved “through connectivity by reaching out to others for ideas, thoughts, and 
philosophies to support the reversal of the injustices of earlier research paradigms” (Koro-
Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 615).  
Let me reiterate (re)thinking as (non)method, I assert, is simply the onto-cognitive 
process by which we take what we know, what we have experienced, and intention of the 
endeavor we are pursuing–what I call assemblages27 of (un)knowing–and process them through 
the abstract machine called the mind (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). (re)Thinking raises more 
questions rather than producing solutions, produces more lines of flight; it is provocation of 
thought. More succinctly, “It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or 
collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking of and starting up 
again” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 20). This is (re)thinking.  
When speaking on the function of qualitative inquiry, Koro-Ljungberg et al. (2015) aver 
its function presents “an opportunity for readers to be rendered speechless but willing to act 
differently themselves with others through continual provocation” (p. 617). In other words, it 
incites contagious provocation and makes uncomfortable present and past-present onto-
epistemological stances. Given the calcification of traditional epistemological methodologies, 
27 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) write: “There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality 
(the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, an 
assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so 
that a book has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as its subject (p. 23).  
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this shift in thought and practice is difficult; however, the potential opportunities for new ways of 
knowing, being-becoming, and doing far outweigh the risks. In my appreciation, Kincheloe’s 
(2001, 2004, 2005, 2008) description of bricolage is a comparable conception. Bricolage, 
according to Kincheloe (2008), assists in “transcending the reductionism of the zombies of 
positivism…[who proclaim] the correct ways to teach” (pp. 134-135) and do research through 
epistemological unilogicality. Additionally, Kincheloe (2008) professes, the bricolage takes 
seriously Freire’s “concept of radical love…concurrently producing new modes of human 
connectedness and fresh ways of seeing, new modes of consciousness, new forms of knowledge, 
and new ways of acting in the world” (p. 134). Jackson and Mazzei (2012), two post-qualitative 
researchers, have described this as thinking with theory. Thinking with theory is an attempt to de-
center humanist qualitative research al a Patti Lather and Elizabeth St. Pierre (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2012). Moreover, it employs “Deleuze’s conceptual play of the zigzag: ‘The zigzag is the 
lighting bolt spark of creation, unpredictable, undisciplined, anti-disciplinary, and non-static’” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. vii) to plug in the same data to various theories to demonstrate 
“how knowledge is opened up and proliferated rather than focused and simplified” (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2012, p. vii).  
An aside on post methodologies. In agreement with St. Pierre (2014) and others, the 
post epistemological methodology discourses are actually 'return to' discourses–a pre-qualitative 
methodology (i.e. simply thinking); however, even when we wish it away, the Western colonial 
(positivist) gaze rears its ugly head. I mean to say, in the West we are not satisfied to say this 
thing existed before, but must plant our flag, stake our claim, assert our authority over that 
which, in truth, existed millennia before we arrived and will continue long after we have 
departed for other shores. What is more, the gaze not only claims the person, place or thing as its 
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own, but “invents its eastern face and western face, and reshapes them both––all for the worst” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 20). This understanding of Western domination is particularly 
relevant given the crux of this inquiry, which involves de-centering Western knowledges and 
philosophies to (re)think the Western subject through the once denigrated ways of knowing and 
philosophical perspectives of Africa and the East. The idea of naming or renaming represents, 
what LeGrange (2011) refers to as the “hegemony of Western science/philosophy as a 
consequence of military, economic and political power…” (p. 73). Nonetheless, even while I 
castigate it, I too, am transfixed by the gaze and held captive by Western cognitive imperialism 
(Battiste, 2002). Despite my criticisms and recognizing the limitations of language, I will engage 
the term–sparingly–within the confines of this inquiry for the sake of communicatory clarity.  
(re)Thinking as (non)method works against the colonizing forces of the positivist regime 
through an engagement of “creative methodological stammering” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, 
p. 617)—the employment of an array of methodological and epistemological tools to (re)imagine
or to (re)think an absent present-future. Specifically, I will enlist ‘philosophy as method’ (in the 
tradition of Barad, Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari) and Kincheloe’s (2001, 2004, 
2005, 2008) generative conception of the bricolage to think the once unthinkable.  
Abstract Machine Composition: Holonic28 Assemblages of Knowing 
Philosophy as Method 
Simply stated, philosophy is a conceptual response to problems that arise within the 
human experience (Venter, 2004). “Philosophy as method is an engagement, an ethical 
relationship with thought” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 617). It is an engagement within the 
context of the present-present’s social, political, ideological, and pedagogical milieu, which 
28 A holon is “whole in one context, yet at the same time is a part of another context” (Forster, 2010, p. 5). 
They are whole–parts. All things are holons.  
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through (re)thinking yields something anew—imagines a new present-future. Philosophy as 
method is devoid of boundaries, borders, or limits (Koro-Ljungberg, 2015). Offering a wealth of 
provocations, Koro-Ljungberg et al. (2015) aptly state:  
With philosophy as a method, qualitative inquiry has re-thought the research discourses 
not to construct, create, and necessarily argue for another “paradigm,” but to demonstrate 
that research is limitless in its ontological, epistemological and ethical reach, and 
possibilities. Qualitative inquiry has become political and poetic at the same time. It has, 
with mostly liminal and cosmetic wounds, resisted the preparation of/for simplistic 
reductionist mechanistic and machine-like subjects. Of course, there are dangers and 
seductive notions that await qualitative inquiry in the future: to complete the research and 
to “compete” with other forms of research also within. […] Qualitative inquiry can never 
be satisfied with itself as it continues thinking the unthinkable with philosophy as its 
method and rawness as its strategy. (p. 618) 
This assertion is exemplified in the provocative work of Barad’s new materialism; Deleuze and 
Guattari’s rhizo- and schizoanalysis; Derrida’s deconstruction; and Foucault’s archaeology, 
genealogy, and power-knowledge (St. Pierre, 2014; Spivak, 1993). 
Utilizing the rhizomatic nature of philosophy as method, that is, the ability to “[connect] 
any point to any other, [even when] its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same 
nature” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 21), I am able to bring “theory into practice and ontologies 
into the research process” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 618). The introduction of philosophy 
into method and educational research methodology dictates a new methodological becoming, 
forcing researchers to release themselves from the methodological choke hold—ridding 
themselves of method “as an objective set of procedures, automated activity, or predetermined 
single, and simplified task” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 618). Within the old guard, this new 
way of (re)thinking method is sure to catalyze cacophonic discourse; however, for those of us 
who embrace philosophy as method and who hover in the in-betweeness, we understand that 
philosophy as method is (re)thinking, is life. Philosophy as method, like (re)thinking as 
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(non)method, creates “movement and diversity within ‘methods’ when thinking and doing blend 
and interact continuously and seamlessly” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 618).  
The Bricolage: A Holon within a Holon 
In addition to philosophy as method as an holonic assemblage of knowing within 
(re)thinking as (non)method, I utilize the “…theoretical embrace and methodological 
employment of the bricolage” (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 680) to sift through, re-imagine, and make 
sense of the human complexities that the research question(s) seek to interrogate. Bricolage is a 
holon within a holon. The concept of bricolage, first introduced by Levi-Strauss (1966) in The 
Savage Mind is derived from the “French word, bricoleur, [which] describes a handyman or 
handywoman who makes use of the tools available to complete a task” (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 
680). Again, the employment of bricolage both theoretically and methodologically allows for a 
mutltiperspectival approach (Kellner, 1995) drawing on various "textual and critical strategies to 
'interpret, criticize, and deconstruct the cultural artifacts under observation" (Kincheloe, 2001, 
682). In resonance with multiperspectivism, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) call for bricoleurs to 
utilize "hermeneutics, structuralism, semiotics, phenomenology, cultural studies, and feminism" 
(p. 3). Each of these methodological tools seek to deeply understand the human experience. 
Hermeneutics, according to Webster and Mertova (2007) is the "art and science of interpretation" 
(p. 5). In agreement with Denzin and Lincoln's (2000) assertion and given the nature of the 
research questions, this study utilizes the methodological tools contained within hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Webster & Mertova, 2007; Savin-Baden & Major, 2012; Creswell, 2013), 
narrative inquiry (Webster & Mertova, 2007; Savin-Baden & Major, 2012; Clandinin, 2008; 
Creswell, 2013; Keats, 2009; Hendry, 2010), and critical hermeneutics (Kincheloe, 2008) to re-
imagine American higher education through the lens of two seemingly disparate notions of 
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subjectivity–Buddhism and Ubuntu. Each of these tools in the proverbial methodological toolkit 
directly correlates with the aim of the study and work in tandem to compose (re)thinking as 
(non)method’s assemblages of knowing. More specifically, the methodological tools being 
employed within the bricolage deeply explore the manner in which human beings make meaning 
of themselves and world. In alignment with this study and the theoretical and methodological 
tenets of bricolage, through textual analysis or hermeneutics I seek to understand human 
experience, and re-imagine the human experience. In the following paragraphs, we will expound 
on the benefits, limitations, and potential challenges associated with bricolage, in general, and 
the trinity of methodological approaches employed for analyzing and interpreting the ideas of 
this inquiry, which construct a holonic assemblage of knowing.  
Kincheloe (2001) argues bricolage is one response to the implosion of social research that 
no longer fits "neatly into disciplinary drawers" (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 681). He contends, "we 
must operate in the ruins of the temple, in a postapocalyptic social, cultural, psychological, and 
educational science where certainty and stability have long departed for parts unknown" 
(Kincheloe, 2001, p. 681). Within the academy, specifically, traditional data reigns supreme; in 
fact, an enterprise once focused on the edification of human beings now reduces those same 
human beings to data points, percentages, and statistics that serve not to edify, but rather 
dehumanizes (Barnett, 2011). Bricolage seeks to transcend the reductionism of traditional social 
science research methodology through an understanding and acceptance “that human experience 
is marked by uncertainties and that order is not always easily established” (Kincheloe, 2004, p. 
5). In the Levi-Straussian sense, bricoleurs use their knowledge of various research 
methodologies, active agency, and understanding of the “complexity of the lived world” 
(Kincheloe, 2004, p. 2) to tinker with research methods given the educational, political, and 
 112 
social contexts. “This tinkering is a high-level cognitive process involving construction and 
reconstruction, contextual diagnosis, negotiation, and readjustment” (Kincheloe, 2004, p. 3). 
Kincheloe rightly reminds those employing both the theory and method of bricolage that the task 
is complex and demands a lifetime effort (Kincheloe, 2001). To avoid reductionism, one must 
"learn a variety of ways of seeing and interpreting in the pursuit of knowledge" (Kincheloe, 
2001, p. 682; Kellner, 1995). In short, we must simply be-do what already comes naturally: 
(re)thinking. “Thus, bricolage is concerned not only with multiple methods of inquiry, but with 
diverse theoretical and philosophical notions of the various elements encountered in the research 
act” (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 682). 
It is through this varied, mutltiperspectival methodological, theoretical, and philosophical 
approach to inquiry that as e.e. cummings (1959) proclaims, “now the eyes of [our] eyes are 
opened,” and new understandings emerge–new ways of seeing, thinking, and being-becoming 
are illuminated. In strong resonance with (re)thinking as (non)method, as bricoleurs and 
researchers becoming-bricoleurs (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), Kincheloe (2001) writes: 
the limitations of a single method, the discursive structures of one disciplinary approach, 
what is missed by traditional practices of validation, the historicity of certified modes of 
knowledge production, the inseparability of knower and known, and the complexity and 
heterogeneity of all human experience, they understand the necessity of new forms of 
rigor in the research process. (p. 681) 
As the researcher constructs the most useful bricolage, these assumptions guide the study and the 
selections of the most appropriate tools in the researcher’s methodological toolkit (Kincheloe, 
2001). In agreement with Kincheloe (2001), “such diversity frames research orientations as 
particular socially constructed perspectives not sacrosanct pathways to the truth. All methods are 
subject to questioning and analysis, especially in light of so many other strategies designed for 
similar purposes” (p. 686). In other words, methodological diversity yields new modes of 
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thought and opens the cognitive space to think the once unthinkable, which has the potential to 
manifest new ontological perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Lester, 1997; Thomas, 1998). 
With respect to analysis, born of the questioning and perpetual interdisciplinary methodological 
interrogation are synergistic interpretative perspectives of the artifact(s) (Kincheloe, 2001). 
Interdisciplinarity, then, becomes a most important aspect of bricolage. In fact, Kincheloe 
(2001), in agreement with (re)thinking as (non)method, argues that bricolage operates as a deep 
form of interdisciplinarity and states, “bricolage is unembarrassed in its effort to rupture 
particular ways of functioning in the established disciplines of research. One of the best ways to 
accomplish this goal is to include what might be termed philosophical research to the bricolage” 
(p. 688). A mode of inquiry, philosophical research interrogates the nature of knowledge 
construction, understanding and subjectivity, and their subsequent effects (Kincheloe, 2005). 
Philosophical research or philosophy as method “…provides bricoleurs with the 
dangerous knowledge of the multivocal results of humans' desire to understand, to know 
themselves and the world (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 688). In the study of the subjective meaning 
making of human beings, bricoleurs 
use their philosophical modes of inquiry to understand that this phenomenological form 
of information has no analogue in the methods of particular formalist forms of empirical 
research. Thus in an obvious example, a choice of methods is necessitated by particular 
epistemological and ontological conditions–epistemological and ontological conditions 
rarely recognized in monological forms of empirical research (Haggerson, 2000; Lee, 
1997). (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 688) 
With respect to this study, the three philosophical notions of subjectivity are onto-
epistemological in nature and the aspects of bricolage not only allow for the full bubbling up of 
onto-epistemological insights, but also recognizes the "important lived world political 
consequences, as they shape the ways we come to view the social cosmos and operate within it" 
(Kincheloe, 2001, p. 682). Undertaking bricolage is complex, and Kincheloe (2001) argues: 
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To account for their cognizance of such complexity bricoleurs seek a rigor that alerts 
them to new ontological insights. In this ontological context, they can no longer accept 
the status of an object of inquiry as a thing-in-itself. Any social, cultural, psychological, 
or pedagogical object of inquiry is inseparable from its context, the language used to 
describe it, its historical situatedness in a larger ongoing process, and the socially and 
culturally constructed interpretations of meaning(s) as an entity in the world. (p. 682) 
It is in this way, the bricouler recognizes and asserts that ontology and epistemology cannot be 
and are not separate as the old guard of social researchers would have us believe where human 
inquiry and sense-making are concerned; hence the use of word 'onto-epistemological'. In 
agreement with Kincheloe (2001), the understanding of the inseparability of ontology from 
epistemology (and/or vice versa) requires "...bricoleurs [to] devise new forms of rigor, new 
challenges to other researchers to push the methodological and interpretive envelopes" (p. 688). 
This understanding of the inseparability of ontology and epistemology allows the bricoleur and 
(re)thinker to “subvert the finality of the empirical act” (Kincheloe, 2004, p. 6) in a number of 
ways. First, there is a comprehension of the research process as subjective and inscribed at the 
level of human experience. Further, through a multilogical approach to inquiry bricoleurs are 
“emancipated from the tyranny of pre-specified, intractable research procedures” (Kincheloe, 
2004, p. 13) thus allowing research methodologies to adapt to the milieu and the research itself to 
engage in inquiry that “becomes thicker, more insightful…more rigorous” (Kincheloe, 2004, p. 
11). Moreover, through the work of Varenne (1996) and in the employment of bricolage, we 
come to discover: 
What is produced is something new, a new form, a hermeneutical historiography or 
historical hermeneutics. Whatever its name, the methodology could not have been 
predicted by examining historiography and hermeneutics separately, outside of the 
context of the historical processes under examination (Varenne, 1996). The possibilities 
offered by such interdisciplinary synergies are limitless. (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 686) 
It is in the use of hermeneutics as a means to explore human meaning that led to the utilization of 
the tools of hermeneutic phenomenology, critical hermeneutics, and narrative inquiry. We now 
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seek to explore the limitless possibilities through an exploration of the first tool: hermeneutical 
phenomenology (Webster & Mertova, 2007; Savin-Baden & Major, 2012; Creswell, 2013).  
Hermeneutic Phenomenology. Before delving into hermeneutic phenomenology, we 
will begin with an exploration of the philosophy, assumptions, and limitations of its parent–
phenomenology. Phenomenology attempts to uncover the experience of a phenomenon and 
reveal the commonalities of that experience (Creswell, 2013). Particularly useful to qualitative 
researchers concerned with exploring and understanding the nature of human experience, 
phenomenology allows for the investigation of phenomena both internal or outwardly through 
the analysis and observation of things (objects) and actions and/or interiorly through the analysis 
of cognation, pictorial artifacts, and emotions (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012). Conversely, 
phenomenology seeks to reduce individual experience in relation to a phenomenon or an "'object' 
of human experience" (van Manen, 1990, p. 163 as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 77) to an essence 
or a universal essence (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012; Creswell, 2013) "a grasp of the very nature 
of the thing" (van Manen, 1990, p. 177 as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 76). The reductionist nature 
of phenomenology presents certain challenges to the study and will be discussed in detail in 
subsequent sections.  
Phenomenology, like bricolage, contains a strong philosophical component (Creswell, 
2013). In fact, "...Merleau-Ponty (1962) raised the question, "What is not phenomenology?" 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 77) and "Husserl was known to call any project currently underway 
"phenomenology" (Creswell, 2013, p. 77). However, given the reductionist tendencies of the 
methodology, Creswell (2013) identifies four primary philosophical perspectives of 
phenomenology:  
[1.] A return to the traditional task of philosophy. [He asserts] by the end of the 19th 
century, philosophy had become limited to exploring a world by empirical means, which 
 116 
was called "scientism." The return to the traditional task of philosophy existed before 
philosophy became enamored with empirical science is a return to the Greek conception 
of philosophy as a search for wisdom.  
[2.] A philosophy without presuppositions. Phenomenology's approach is to suspend all 
judgments about what is real–the "natural attitude"–until they are founded on a more 
certain basis. This suspension is called "epoche" by Husserl.  
[3.] The intentionality of consciousness. This idea that consciousness is always directed 
toward an object. Reality of an object, then, is inextricably related to one's consciousness 
of it. Thus reality, according to Husserl, is divided not into subjects and objects, but into 
the dual Cartesian nature of both subjects and objects as they appear in consciousness.  
[4.] The refusal of the subject-object dichotomy. This theme flows naturally from the 
intentionality of consciousness. The reality of an object is only perceived within the 
meaning of the experience of an individual.  
[5.] An individual writing a phenomenology would be remiss not include some 
discussion about the philosophical presuppositions of phenomenology along with the 
methods in this form of inquiry. (Creswell, 2013, pp. 77-78) 
Contained within Creswell's (2013) four primary philosophical perspectives of phenomenology 
are assumptions that problematize the very nature of the philosophical presuppositions of the 
researcher. More specifically, the philosophical perspectives presented by Creswell (2013) 
expose a grand limitation and causes one to ponder: Is there a common lived human experience? 
Is there an essence of humanness or humanity with respect to the phenomenon of life? 
Additionally, situating myself conceptually as a critical postmodernist, I question: (1) the 
centering of the human being as sole meaning maker; and (2) if the human being is center of 
meaning making, which human beings are constructing the meaning. More specifically, I am 
skeptical of the notion that the reality of an object is only perceived with the meaning of the 
experience of the human being and seemingly holds all other living things and objects at the 
mercy of human experience and interpretation. As a counterbalance, the research of 
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1964/1998) seemingly channels Buddhist (Hahn, 1999) and 
Ubuntu (Waghid, 2014; Eze, 2008, 2010, 2011) notions of (post)humanism, focused specifically 
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on the phenomenology of the body. Merleau-Ponty (1964/1998) argued “that ‘being embodied’ 
was the main way of understanding the world but he argued that embodiment was not restricted 
to our own bodies; [rather] we also unite with others and other things” (Baden & Major, 2012, p. 
214). Secondly, in parallel with (re)thinking as (non)method, I question the objectification of 
research through bracketing and hold that all research is subjective; one is incapable of removing 
one's experiences and/or preconceived notions from the research process (St. Pierre, 2004; P. 
Hendry, personal communication, January 2014). Hermeneutic phenomenology, in the tradition 
of Heidegger, provides another tool to loosen the shackles of Cartesian thought (Baden & Major, 
2012). 
Hermeneutic phenomenology, developed by Heidegger, focuses on "shedding light on the 
taken for granted experiences that then enable researchers to create meaning and develop 
understanding" (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012, p. 216). Particularly relevant to the undertaking at 
hand, van Maren (1990) further expanded Heidegger's definition. van Maren (1990) argued "the 
purpose of phenomenology is the interpretation of a text or a study in history in order to gain 
understanding (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012, p. 216). According to Baden and Major (2012), the 
central component of Heidegger's work "was the hermeneutic circle, whereby the researcher's 
interpretation move from seeking to understand a particular component of experience to 
developing a sense of the whole, then back again to examining a further component, in an 
iterative cycle" (p. 216). Thus enabling the researcher to deeply engage, through self-reflexivity, 
in the phenomena of interest (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012).   
Heidegger having worked with Husserl to establish phenomenology later re-evaluates his 
position and begins to advocate for a more holistic understanding of humanity. Heidegger, in 
contrast to Husserl, begins to focus not on individual perception or thought of the world, but 
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“dasein, the mode of being human” (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012, p. 213-214). In short, 
Heidegger begins to focus not on comprehending phenomena, but holistically understanding 
what it means to be human. Additionally, where Husserl advocated for the researcher to bracket 
or suspend their personal judgments of the world, Heidegger (1927/1962) argued against 
bracketing and saw “the person and their experiences as coexisting. He saw bracketing as being 
impossible, as it was not possible to stand outside experience” (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012, p. 
214).  Reinforcing this incommensurability of the person-experience dichotomy, Savin-Baden 
and Major (2012) aver:  
In phenomenology, philosophy and method are inextricably linked; thus the origins of 
phenomenology should be traced back to the philosophies of Husserl and later Heidegger. 
Phenomenology was founded by Husserl (1907/1964), who argued that consciousness 
was an important concept and proposed the study of lived experience of the life world. 
Husserl criticized psychology for trying to use objective scientific methods to study 
human issues. He founded phenomenology on the basis that what needed to be examined 
was the way people lived in the world, rather than the world being seen as a separate 
entity from the person. He argued that life world is what individuals experience pre-
reflectively, before humans categorize or conceptualize an experience. His arguments to 
some extent stood against the Cartesian model in which the mind and body were seen as 
separate and distinct entities. (p. 213) 
Critically important to this inquiry, these points reinforce the position that ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology are not only inextricably linked, but are one and the same; they 
inter-are (Hahn, 1999). As human beings, our understanding of the world is not divided into the 
subjective, man-made categorizations turned orthodox truth of the old regime–ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology (Kincheloe, 2001). However, our being, knowing, doing, and 
experiencing are rhizomatic (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987)—conducting, producing, and 
reproducing in an on-going process of iteration—living–that is as natural as breathing. In 
consonance with (re)thinking as (non)method, our present-past, present-present, and absent 
present-future are fluid, immanent, inseparable, and interdependent. 
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In keeping with the bricolage approach (Kincheloe, 2001, Berry & Kincheloe, 2004), the 
following six hermeneutic phenomenological research activities will work with and against 
critical hermeneutics (Kincheloe, 2008), and narrative inquiry (Webster & Mertova, 2007; Baden 
& Major, 2012; Clandinin, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Keats, 2009) to guide the study. van Manen 
(1990) holds that phenomenological researchers should undertake the following activities:    
1. Turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and commit us to the
world;
2. Investigating experience as we live rather than as we conceptualise it;
3. Reflecting on the essential themes which characterise the phenomenon;
4. Describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and rewriting;
5. Maintaining a strong and oriented pedagogical relation to the phenomenon;
6. Balancing the research context by considering the parts and the whole. (van
Manen, 1990, pp. 30-31 as cited in Baden & Major, 2012, p. 216)
In contrast to van Manen (1990), Giorgi (1989) illuminates four core features common across the 
phenomenological methodological approach. Giorgi (1989) argues "the essences or structures are 
revealed through use of the imaginative variation" (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012, p. 215). As I 
(re)think or (re)imagine Western subjectivity and higher education, this point is particularly 
cogent to the research questions that guide this inquiry.  
Additionally, Spiegelberg (1960) drawing unintended inference to Buddhist (Hahn, 1999) 
thought outlines three steps phenomenological researchers take when engaging in research 
irrespective of type. He asserts researchers intuit by “experiencing or recalling the phenomenon. 
[Spiegelberg (1960)] suggests the researcher “‘Hold’ it in your awareness, or live in it, be 
involved in it; dwell in it or on it” (Baden & Major, 2012, p. 215). Second, phenomenological 
researchers analyze or “examine the phenomenon, by examining [:] the pieces, parts, in the 
spatial sense; the episodes and sequences, in the temporal sense; the qualities and dimensions of 
the phenomenon; settings, environments, surroundings; the prerequisites and consequences in 
time; the perspective or approaches one can take; cores or foci and fringes or horizons; the 
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appearing and disappearing of the phenomena; the clarity of the phenomena” (Savin-Baden & 
Major, 2012, p. 215). The last step, according to Spiegelberg (1960), is “describing: write down 
your description. Write it as if the reader had never had the experience. Guide them through your 
intuiting and analyzing. (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012, p. 216).  Taking into account 
Spiegelberg’s (1960) and van Maren’s (1990) emphasis on narrative, it is important to explore 
the use of narrative inquiry (Webster & Mertova, 2007; Savin-Baden & Major, 2012; Clandinin, 
2008; Creswell, 2013; Keats, 2009) as the third tool in the my bricolage toolkit.   
Narrative Inquiry. Narrative is so deeply interconnected with the human experience that 
empirical data alone cannot capture these experiences; “human beings think, perceive, imagine 
and make more choices according to narrative structures” (Sarbin, 1986, p. 8 as cited in Webster 
& Mertova, 2007, p. 3). From ancient times to present day, narrative–text, voice, picture–is used 
to describe the breadth and depth of human experience and the endeavors of humanity (Webster 
& Mertova, 2007). Narrative speaks into (in)existence and (un)writes us onto the pages of 
history. According to Carr (1986) narrative is not concerned with the short-term, rather it 
“…pertains to longer term or larger-scale sequences of actions, experiences and human events. 
He argues that action, life, and historical existence are themselves structured narratively, and the 
concept of narrative is our way of experiencing, acting and living, both as individuals and as 
communities, and that narrative is our way of being and dealing with time” (Webster and 
Mertova, 2007, p. 2). Given that “experience happens narratively… [and] should be studied 
narratively”, narrative or rather the meaningful connections we form in our lives are inseparable 
from the daily-lived experiences of human beings (Webster & Mertova, 2007). In the ethno- and 
sagacity philosophic traditions of Ubuntu and within the African culture, narrative or storytelling 
takes on the importance of transmitting cultural wisdom from generation to generation (Eze, 
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2010, 2011; Nafukho, 2006). The need for storytelling in the human experience is as basic a need 
as food, water, and shelter; according to Dyson & Genishi (1994), 
Stories help to make sense of, evaluate, and integrate the tensions inherent in experience: 
the past with the present, the fictional with the 'real', the official with the unofficial, 
personal with the professional, the canonical with the different and unexpected. Stories 
help us transform the present and shape the future for our students and ourselves so that it 
will be richer or better than the past. (pp. 242-243) 
In harmony with Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology (Savin-Baden & Major, 2012), 
narrative is not objective; rather it is a perceived reconstruction of human experience and 
therefore makes no claims at ‘truth’ (Webster & Mertova, 2007). Stories, according to 
Amsterdam and Bruner (2000), “derive their convincing power not from verifiability but from 
verisimilitude; they will be true enough if they ring true” (p.30) for human beings under their 
spell. Similarly, I argue mythology–hyperreal truth– becomes more important than facts due to 
its ability to both captivate and educate. Moreover, narrative allows for the holistic presentation 
of depth and complexity of human experience, and recognizes temporal elasticity of 
interpretation and experience (Webster & Mertova, 2007). Keeping all of this in mind, the 
transformative possibilities of story, of voice and text are of particular interest to this study; 
hence the utilization of narrative inquiry within the bricolage assemblage.  
Narrative inquiry with its foundation in stories of human experience and provides a 
generative framework for investigating human experience through their stories (Webster & 
Mertova, 2007). More formally defined, narrative inquiry is a “specific type of qualitative design 
in which "narrative is understood as spoken or written text giving an account of an event/action 
or series of event/actions, chronologically connected" (Czarniawska, 2004, p. 17). Resting on the 
assumption that humans make sense of random events by imposing story structures (Bell, 2002), 
narrative inquiry endeavors “to capture the 'whole story', whereas other methods tend to 
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communicate understandings of studied subjects or phenomena at certain points, but frequently 
omit the important 'intervening' stages (Webster & Mertova, 2007, pp. 3-4). Narrative inquiry 
requires a depth of analytic examination that goes beyond what is merely written, and unearths 
the meaning concealed behind and within the words on the page. Narrative as close reading of 
texts assists 
the researcher in understanding how participants experience, live, and tell about their 
world. People construct and understand the world through stories (Bruner, 1990; 
Polkinghorne, 1988), and as Richardson (1997) asserts, narratives are able to act both as a 
‘means of knowing and a method of telling’. (Keats, 2009, p. 58) 
Utilizing narrative text to understand the construction of human subjectivity in the notions of 
Buddhism and Ubuntu is an important component of this (re)thinking engagement. Additionally, 
I posit, the influence of postmodernism on narrative inquiry is recognized in “the influence of 
experience and culture on the construction of knowledge” (Webster & Mertova, 2007, p. 4) and 
provides the necessary philosophical underpinning to explore the culture(s) that construct 
knowledge and shape the lives of human beings in their grasp through the analysis of narrative 
texts.  
Narrative texts are written and may include “travel journals, poetry, letters, emails, 
books, articles, and other such texts. The texts that become important in the research process may 
be created by the participants, the researcher or other authors” (Keats, 2009, p. 186). Each of 
these texts tells a story, its own story and aids the researcher in understanding the lived 
experience of human beings. It is through story–narrative–that human beings come to know and 
construct the world (Bruner, 1990; Polkinghome, 1988), which allows narrative the ability to 
cross the perceived divide, that is narrative texts are able to provide the researcher with “a means 
of knowing and a method of telling” (Richardson, 1997, p. 58). Turning now to the 
methodological aspects of narrative inquiry, Webster and Mertova (2007) distinguish narrative 
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inquiry from the confining concepts and strict adherence to procedure at the foundation of 
traditional empirical research methodology. Narrative inquiry, then, “does not strive to produce 
any conclusions of certainty, but aims for its findings to be ‘well grounded’ and ‘supportable’, 
retaining an emphasis on the linguistic reality of human experience” (Webster & Mertova, 2007, 
p. 4). The theoretical nature of the study coupled with the exploration of notions of human
subjectivity by (re)thinking with and through various texts commands the repeated emphasis of 
the latter point (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). The “findings” of the study, if they can be deemed as 
such, are not finite conclusions rather the inquiry seeks to disrupt or break open the current 
American higher education metanarrative to expose the field of limitless possibilities in 
becoming-more human. 
Illuminating the analytic perspectives of narrative inquiry, Keats (2009) turns to Lielblich 
et. al (1998) to describe the four types of interpretive models a researcher would employ to 
derive meaning from text. They include:  
(a) holistic-content where story content is considered holistically as the researcher 
explores both explicit and implicit meaning; (b) holistic-form where content is 
considered in terms of formal aspects of story structure such as plot development 
over time; (c) categorical-content where specific segments of story content are 
counted and categorized into researcher-defined categories; and (d) categorical-form 
where characteristics of style or language use are counted and categorized into 
defined categories (e.g., frequency of passive utterances). (Keats, 2008, p. 188) 
For the purposes this inquiry, the holonic assemblage of the bricolage will employ the analytical 
tools of both holistic-content and categorical-content (Keats, 2009). Moreover, utilizing 
marginalia or notes in the margin similar to traditional coding, the researcher will conduct 
relational readings or close reading of the multiple texts in search of relationships, linkages, 
similarities, and disagreements (Keats, 2009; Creswell, 2013). The exploration of intertextual 
relations allows the “researcher the opportunity to understand how the texts are related and 
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influence each other” (Bazerman, 2004 as cited in Keats, 2009, p. 191). Arising from relational 
or intertextual reading, the researcher can identify and notate the themes, patterns, and 
perspectives that emerge. Finally, the use of multiple texts “opens the possibility for creating 
new realities of meaning and knowledge” (Keats, 2009, p. 193). 
Critical Hermeneutics. In keeping with Creswell (2007), each of the methodological 
approaches contained within the bricolage assemblage works to uncover human experience 
and/or the commonality of experience within the biological phenomenon of human life (Savin-
Baden & Major, 2012; Keats, 2009; Webster & Mertova, 2007). I counter the reductionist 
interpretations of hermeneutic phenomenology and narrative inquiry through the utilization of 
critical hermeneutics (Kincheloe, 2008), which “build[s] bridges between reader and text, text 
and its producer, historical context and present, and one particular social circumstance and 
another” (p. 58). Critical hermeneutics holds that knowledge is constructed solely through 
interpretation; in fact, there is only interpretation (Kincheloe, 2008). Kincheloe argues, research 
and perception are simply acts of interpretation;  “[t]hus, the quest for understanding is a 
fundamental feature of human existence, an encounter with the unfamiliar always demands the 
attempt to make meaning, to make sense” (Kincheloe, 2008, p. 57). 
Combining the hermeneutic tradition, postmodernism critique, and critical theory, critical 
hermeneuts problematize the authority of claims found within texts (Kincheloe, 2008). Central to 
this study is Kincheloe’s (2008) insistence that  
[n]o pristine interpretation exists–indeed, no methodology, social or educational theory, 
or discursive form can claim a privileged position that enables the production of 
authoritative knowledge. Human beings must always speak/write about the world in 
terms of something else in the world, ‘in relation to…’ As creatures of the world, we are 
oriented to it in a way that prevents us from grounding theories and perspectives outside 
of it. […] In its critical theory-driven context, the purpose of hermeneutical analysis is to 
develop a form of cultural criticism revealing power dynamics within social and cultural 
texts. (pp. 57-58) 
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As with (re)thinking as (non)method, our situatedness in the world greatly affects our 
perspectives and the thoughts we are able to think. In agreement with Kincheloe (2008), this 
inquiry is an attempt to make sense of and re-imagine the socio-cultural fix that we now find 
ourselves in through a dialogue between philosophical texts and an engagement “in the back-
and-forth of studying parts” (p. 58). The utilization of critical hermeneutics as methodological 
tool, argues Kincheloe (2008), “can produce profound insights that lead to transformative action 
(Coben, 1998; Gadamer, 1989; Goodson, 1997; Kincheloe and Berry, 2004; Mullen, 1999; 
Peters and Lankshear, 1994)” (p. 58); namely, the re-conceptualization of American higher 
education, a transformation in human relations, and a robust dialogue on humanness–on what it 
means to be a human being.  
Method, No Method 
“…[A] moment comes when we realize that our life is the path, and we no longer rely 
merely on the forms of practice. Our action becomes “non-action,” and our practice becomes 
“non-practice” (Hahn, 1999, p. 122). Each of these holonic assemblages of knowledge resonate 
deeply with the philosophical assumptions and presuppositions, which undergird my 
(re)thinking. While I take the time to provide an explanation of the traditional qualitative 
methodologies that constitute a part-whole of my assemblages of knowing, I continue to 
maintain that my method is actually no method at all. (re)Thinking as (non)method is simply 
being-thinking; an engagement with ideas and concepts “always under conditions of 
discontinuity, rupture, and multiplicity” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 16) within the abstract 
machine of the mind. It is both cognitive and intuitive. Therefore, if you come to this space/time 
in search of enumerated lists of objectivist procedures that can be replicated by others, you will 
not find that here. If you come here looking for the positivist words that demonstrate rigor: data, 
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validity and reliability; they do not reside here. If you come here looking for a discussion of the 
research instrument; no external instrument exists. I am the researcher, the instrument, and the 
analytical matrix – thinking and re-thinking, being-becoming, problematizing and (re)producing, 
connecting and reconnecting all points of knowledge that I embody (known and unknown) with 
hope in an absent present-future.  
Qualitative inquiry, in general, but most especially (re)thinking is what Koro-Ljungberg 
et al. (2015) call a generous and generative inquiry” (p. 615), which 
invites others and subaltern to work alongside with the mainstream and alongside “the 
center” or practices that might be considered normative. It generously welcomes the other 
and generates spaces for others to express, create, and speak; maybe spaces of 
displacement and shadow spaces (see Spivak, 1993). It gives until it has nothing else to 
give and it shares until nothing else can be shared. (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 615) 
In other words, it is an engagement in (re)thinking with, to borrow language from the 
mathematical sciences, distributive proprieties. Its impact extends beyond the boundaries of this 
page or the collection of neurons and glial cells that construct the physicality of our abstract 
machine–the brain. It alters our very being-becoming, which necessitates a new doing. 
(re)Thinking, in agreement with Koro-Ljungberg et al. (2015), asserts: 
Any attempts to create streamlined unity through centralized control or “the theory or 
method policing” would be quite foolish as this unification will ultimately only serve 
those doing the policing. The desirable and sustained mode of multiplication, a welcome 
by the machine, could also promote diverse applicability and creativity embedded in 
many qualitative inquiry processes whereas theoretical or methodological exclusiveness, 
surveillance, and control may generate homogeneous field and docile scholars within it; 
scholars who can follow but not lead, scholars who repeat history rather than create or 
change it. (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 617) 
This is the result of a tracing: an imitation mutating the once rhizome into root, which has 
“organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of significance and 
subjectification belonging to it” (Deleuze & Gauttari, 1987, p. 13). Traditional methodology is a 
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tracing: “a plane of organization”29 (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 270), a tree–living and 
growing in the city, its horizontal expansion strangled by cement that demarcates its place in the 
world, yet its roots burrow deeper, clutching earth for fear of toppling over while its branches 
grow heavenward teeming with the poisoned lifeblood of a very present-past. 
(re)Thinking and other experimental qualitative (non)methodologies, offer Koro-
Jjungberg et al. (2015), are:  
In comparison, methodological and theoretical extensions, seen as a part of the 
multiplication process, will continue to challenge scholars to seek and generate new 
connections across disciplines, traditions, and individuals. A field that is unified and 
singular is also easily controllable and replaceable. Instead, diverse and unpredictable 
multiplications of practices and theories can generate energy that might be hard to 
harness and control both methodologically and onto-epistemologically. (Koro-Ljungberg 
et al., 2015, p. 617) 
(re)Thinking as (non)method is a map not a tracing. It is a rhizome, “an acentered, 
nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or 
central automation..[it is] all manner of becomings” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 21). As 
opposed to the tree metaphor, (re)thinking is the vine—folding, unfolding, curling and 
elongating, scaling gracefully and randomly up the sides of ruins soon to be overtaken by lush 
greenery and deceptively delicate appearing vine tentacles reproducing ad infinitum. 
(re)Thinking as (non)method is unlimited, multiplicitous, liberated, magnanimous, “a 
plane of consistency”30 (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 270). To reiterate, the Braidotti (1994) 
29 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe the plane of organization as “constantly working away at the 
plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the movements of 
deterritorialization, weigh them down, restratify them, reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of 
depth” (p. 270).  
30 “The plane of consistency is the body without organs. Pure relations of speed and slowness between 
particles imply movements of deterritorialization, just as pure affects imply an enterprise of 
desubjectification. Moreover, the plane of consistency does not preexist the movements of 
deterritorialization that unravel it, the lines of flight that draw it and cause it to rise to the surface, the 
becomings that compose it.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 270).  This is the goal of  (re)thinking as 
method. ( also see D&G, 1987, p. 251) 
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quote that opens this chapter and Hahn’s (1999) contemplation that commences this section, 
(re)Thinking is no method at all, it is simply life—living and being in active engagement with 
the world.  
Limitations 
Some scholars may view this approach as a limitation as it does not follow a traditional 
empirical methodological approach. However, the intent of this original inquiry is to (re)think/re-
imagine/reconceptualize the Western subject and higher education through the utilization of the 
philosophical notions of Buddhism and Ubuntu, and as a milieu within which rhizomatic 
thinking can flourish and lines of flight emerge (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The holonic 
assemblages of knowing, which compose my abstract machine–the mind–work with and against, 
at varying intensities, the colonizing forces of the positivist regime through an engagement of 
“creative methodological stammering” (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015, p. 617)—the employment 
of an array of methodological and epistemological tools to (re)imagine or to (re)think an absent 
present-future.  
Arriving At a New Plateau 
With no beginning and no end, we now arrive at the middle, at a new plateau––new 
imaginings, new provocations, new perspectives. Acknowledging that this is not a traditional 
methodology, I am guided by my experience as, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin asserted, a spiritual 
being having a human experience. To clarify, (re)thinking is simultaneously an experiential 
recollection, intuitive knowing, and cognitive recall. In keeping with (re)thinking, the totality of 
my experiences as a higher education practitioner and as a being-human in relationship with 
other beings-human, propels me toward new thought-action, into thinking what was once 
unthinkable. (re)Thinking with Buddhism and Ubuntu, offers the possibility of new onto-
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epistemological becoming(s); new ways of being-becoming and doing. Mindfulness, an 
understanding of our mutual subjectivity (intersubjectivity), and dialogue all components of the 
generative Buddhist and Ubuntu philosophy, catalyzes new lines flight, new rhizomatic 
becomings. (re)Thinking through Buddhism and Ubuntu, makes thinkable a once unthinkable 
absent present-future, where students become more human in the act of being-doing education 
and where they are not dehumanized by data or physical, emotional, ontological and 
epistemological violence. (re)Thinking makes possible an absent present-future Being-West, 
who recognizes beings-human as co-creators of humanity, interdependent, and interconnected 
with all in the known universe. Imagine the world we would live in if higher education were 
primarily concerned with being-becoming, becoming-consciousness, becoming-more human, 
becoming-just society, and becoming-radical love. Imagine higher education as an environment 
where communalism, dialogue, respect, dignity, and learning over knowledge acquisition thrive 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Kincheloe, 2001, 2004, 2008; Freire, 1970; Eze, 2008, 2010, 2011; 
Hahn, 1999). This is the absent present-future’s revolutionary becoming (Deleuze, 1990). 
Transfigured, metamorphosed by (re)thinking, we arrive again just as we started on a new 
plateau burgeoning with new lines of flight, new rhizomatic becomings toward an ever-present 
absent present-future.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE RECONCEPTUALIZED BEING-WEST 
“We are here to awaken from the illusion of our separateness.” 
- Thich Nhat Hanh - 
“…we are definitely not alone…we don’t form relationships, they form us. 
We are constituted by webs of interconnection. Relationship comes first, and we emerge as more 
or less distinct centers within the vast and complex networks that surround us. In this new view, 
we are noted in the complex web of life. Each of us is a meeting point, a center of convergence, 
for countless threads of relationship. We are moments in time and locations in space where the 
universe shows up – literally, as a phenomenon (from the Greek “phainomenon”, ‘to appear’ or 
‘to show’). In other words, in this “new story” we emerge as subjects from intricate networks of 
interrelatedness, from webs of intersubjectivity.” 
- Christian de Quincy - 
Derrida (1991) proclaims, “This question of the subject and the ‘who’ is at the heart of 
the most pressing concerns of modern societies” (p. 115). Who is the ‘I’ that we speak? Were we 
born into the ‘I’ or was the ‘I’ born within us–semiotically reproduced, simultaneously 
generating and ameliorating; disrupting the peace of simply being? Is the ‘I’ that we think we 
know truly ever known or is it formed like clay in the perfervid hands of socio-political 
discourse–unabatedly shaping and molding, folding and breaking us into interpretations 
unrecognizable from genesis to new genesis? Beginning with Aristotle, revolutionized by 
Descartes (1996, 1970) and his cogito, romanticized by Rousseau (1953), rationalized by Kant 
(1929), and reconceptualized by Heidegger (1962), ontological and epistemological notions 
regarding the subject and nature of subjectivity have dominated Western thought from the 
Enlightenment to current day (Mansfield, 2000; Costanzo, 2015; Dezhi, 2001). As Nick 
Mansfield writes, “The focus of the self as the centre both of lived experience and of discernible 
meaning has become one of–if not the–defining issues of modern and postmodern cultures 
 131 
[emphasis in original]” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 1). Today, the debate has intensified with the, albeit 
reductionist, emergence of the “Anti-subjective” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 8) school of thought 
birthed by German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1989) (1844-1900) and reproduced through 
the works of Michel Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984), Jacques Derrida (1987, 1991), Judith Butler 
(1990), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) among others (Mansfield, 2000). In 
resonance with the so-called “anti-subjectivists” and notions postulated by Heidegger, Buddhist 
and other indigenous thought is becoming recognized as a common thread woven throughout 
these various theories of anti-subjectivity (Mansfield, 2000; Hanh, 1999; Safran, 2013; 
O’Sullivan, 2014).  
Postmodernism, in critique of modernity, with its skepticism toward grand meta-
narratives, emphasis on the power of language in the construction of culture and subjectivity, and 
commitment to the exploration of difference has ushered in the permeation of ancient Buddhist 
and indigenous thought within psychoanalytic and social sciences theories allowing the West to 
fall in pace with Eastern and southern African thought and re-imagine dominant notions of self, 
human-ness, and humanity in relation to the world/planet we inhabit and in turn inhabits us 
(Lyotard, 1992; Mansfield, 2000; Natoli & Hutcheon, 1993; Slattery, 2013, Waugh, 1992; 
Safran, 2013). Writing from a psychoanalytical perspective, Safran (2013) asserts that 
postmodernity has shifted the field of study from that of the individual as a separate entity to the 
relational field of self. More specifically, “Human beings are regarded as being fundamentally 
interpersonal in nature; mind is regarded as composed of relational configurations; and self is 
regarded as constructed in a relational context” (Safran, 2013, p. 8). Shifting glacially, but 
shifting nonetheless, notions of subjectivity in postmodernity are beginning to take flight; 
however, to imagine where we are going, we must understand where we have been.  
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The subject, notions of subjectivity, or the ‘I’ that I speak and who in turn speaks me, 
following Derrida’s (1991) assertion, in the West this terrain of self—located at the intersection 
of the physicality and mental capacity (consciousness), and spirit of the human being—remains 
much contested. While in the East and southern Africa, the notion of the subject is neither 
contested nor bound by grounding metaphors; the subject is liberated, fluid, dynamic, blissfully 
becoming in relationship with all things. The subject in community, or rather in communion, 
with all things seen and unseen provides the foundation for an intersubjective being-becoming 
(Hanh, 1999; Eze, 2008, 2012; Forster, 2010; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012; Ramose, 2002). Eastern 
and southern African cosmologies through the generative onto-epistemologies of Buddhism and 
Ubuntu provide fertile soil from which a new, reconceptualized Western subject will sprout. This 
chapter will begin at the very beginning with a genealogical exploration and operationalization 
of the Western ‘subject’ and major modern and postmodern notions of Western subjectivity. 
Next, this chapter explores Buddhist (Hanh, 1999) and Ubuntuist (Eze, 2008, 2012; Forster, 
2010; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012; Ramose, 2002; Menkiti, 1984) notions of intersubjectivity, 
respectively. Finally, (re)thinking with Buddhism and Ubuntu, I will conclude with a 
reconceptualization of the Western subject as the Being-West.  
The Elusive Subject 
What, who is this elusive subject? “Etymologically, to subject means to be ‘placed (or 
even thrown) under’. One is always subject to or of something [emphasis in original]” 
(Mansfield, 2000, p. 3). Mansfield (2000) utilizes the word ‘subject’ to “describe interior life or 
selfhood, especially as it is theorized in terms of its relationship to gender, power, language, 
culture and politics, etc” (p. 185). Mansfield (2000) contends that the subject and the self are at 
times used interchangeably; however, “‘self’ does not capture the sense of social and cultural 
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entanglement that is implicit in the word ‘subject’: the way our immediate daily life is always 
already caught up in complex, political, social, and philosophical–that is, shared–concerns” (p. 
3). Therefore, using the word ‘self’ to mean subject belies the very entanglements that construct 
‘self,’ if there is such a conception, which is swept up and into in every moment of life 
(Mansfield, 2000). “The word subject therefore, proposes that the self is not a separate and 
isolated entity, but one that operates at the intersection of general truths and shared principles”–
discourse that we construct and reciprocally constructs (Mansfield, 2000, p. 3). It is precisely this 
notion of entanglement, what can be interpreted as a rhizomatic ontology and epistemology 
(onto-epistemology or being-knowing), that problematizes the Western humanist notion of 
subjectivity and sets us on the path of resonance with both the Buddhist onto-epistemological 
notion of subjectivity–interbeing and the Ubuntist intersubjective notion of personhood (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987; Lather & St. Pierre, 2013; Hanh, 1999; Eze, 2008, 2012; Menkiti, 1984; 
Letseka, 2013; Forster, 2010; Waghid & Smeyers, 2011; Imafidon, 2012; Ramose, 2002; 
Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005). Moreover, the notion of the self as an entanglement (Lather & St. 
Pierre, 2013), originating from the work of Karen Barad (2007), de-centers the human, turns 
Descartes cogito on its head and recognizes, in the Buddhist perspective, the “impermanence–
interpenetration–insubstantiality” of being (O’Sullivan, 2014, p. 258). Similarly, Ubuntu, the 
essence of African ontology, “is diametrically opposed to the Cartesian schema” (Forster, 2010, 
p. 6). However, we are getting ahead of ourselves and will come back to this point later in the
discussion. In short, the subject requires linkage to something; it does not exist outside of 
relationship (Mansfield, 2000). In the Cartesian sense, God is the floor of being and the subject is 
ever linked to that “something outside of it–an idea or principle or the society of other subjects. 
To be ‘subject’ insists upon the existence of ‘object’ (Mansfield, 2000; Hanh, 1999). The 
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‘subject’ has come to define our understanding of and relationship with the world. So, what then 
is subjectivity? Mansfield (2000) offers: 
‘Subjectivity’ refers, therefore, to an abstract or general principle that defines our 
separation into distinct selves and that encourages us to imagine that, or simply helps us 
to understand why, our interior lives inevitably seem to involve other people either as 
objects of need, desire and interest or as necessary sharers of common experience. (p. 3) 
The philosophical concept of subjectivity first introduced by Aristotle and furthered by 
Descartes, Kant, and William James presupposes a ‘subject’ possesses consciousness (feelings, 
desires, beliefs); a ‘subject’ has agency or holds sway (power) over an object(s); and the object 
or the truth of the object is determined by the subject. With respect to this inquiry and in 
agreement with Mansfield (2000), subjectivity can be understood as “primarily an experience 
[that] remains permanently open to inconsistency, contradictions, and unself-consciousness” (p. 
6). 
What types of subjects exist? Defining our relation with the world around us, there are 
innumerable subject positions; however, Mansfield (2000) focuses on four broad categories: the 
subject of grammar, the politico-legal subject, the philosophical subject, and the subject as 
human person. For the purposes of the inquiry, we will focus on both the philosophical subject 
and the subject as human person. The philosophical subject or the ‘I,’ writes Mansfield (2000) 
“is both the object of analysis and the ground of truth and knowledge” (p. 4). The subject as 
human person or selfhood avers Mansfield (2000) is the type of subjectivity to which human 
beings continue to return in an effort to make sense of themselves and the world. He writes: 
[W]e remain an intense focus of rich and immediate experience that defies system, logic 
and order and that goes out into the world in a complex, inconsistent and highly charged 
way. Sometimes we seek to present this type of subjectivity as simple and unremarkable: 
we want to show ourselves as normal, ordinary, straightforward. At other times, we long 
for charisma, risk and celebrity, to make an impression, to be remembered. Usually we 
live an open-ended yet known[,] measured yet adventurous journey into experience, one 
we see as generally consistent and purposeful. It is this unfinished yet consistent 
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subjectivity that we generally understand as our selfhood or personality. (Mansfield, 
2000, p. 4) 
It is precisely the human being as subject—the double consciousness, the interdependent co-
arising, the flow of energy, the knot of physicality, consciousness, and spirit; swept up and 
transfigured in the rhizomatic ballet of becoming we understand as life—upon which this inquiry 
is centered (Hanh, 1999; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; O’Sullivan, 2014; Lather & St. Pierre, 
2013).  
The Western Subject in Modernity: A Brief Genealogy 
The historicity of the artistic, political, and intellectual period classified as modernity is 
varied; however, many historians classify modernity over three phases beginning mid-fifteenth 
century and lasting well into the twentieth century. Modernity, according to Sim (1999) or 
philosophical modernity has come to be defined by the enduring legacy of seventeenth century 
Enlightenment thought located in the works and thinking of Descartes, Kant, Locke, and Bacon. 
Their influence upon all aspects of philosophy and subsequently every field of study is profound 
(Sim, 1999). Marked by rationality and reason, the cornerstone of Western thought, the 
individual instead of God becomes the unit of reality (Kant, 1929). This is a radical notion and 
complete change from the Aristotelian metaphysical notion, which cosmologically and 
ontologically posited the wholeness and completeness of the universe and human beings, 
respectively. Epistemologically, the metaphysical worldview contends knowledge is fixed or 
rather all the knowledge that will ever exist already exists and that knowledge is supernaturally 
gifted to living beings (Davis, 2004). Conversely, in the physical worldview of modernity, 
knowledge is ever changing, always evolving and the subject now “possessed of a free and 
autonomous individuality that is unique to [it], …develops as part of [its] spontaneous encounter 
with the world” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 12). Epistemologically, we come to know the world 
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through observation; namely, rationalism and empiricism. Western thought in modernity, 
according to Mansfield (2000), where the subject is concerned dominates psychoanalysis; 
believing the “object of analysis is quantifiable and knowable–in short a real thing with a fixed 
structure, operating in knowable and predictable patterns” (p. 9). The psychoanalytic view of 
subjectivity reifies the belief of an individual, autonomous, and knowable subject.  
Mansfield (2000), discussing the impact of the Enlightenment and Descartes’ lasting 
influence, expresses the historically radical ontological and epistemological notions that have 
undergirded Western thought:  
firstly, the image of the self as the ground of all knowledge and experience of the world 
(before I am anything, I am I) and secondly, the self as defined by the rational faculties it 
can use to order the world (I make sense). (Mansfield, 2000, p. 15) 
These two thoughts, in a time ruled by God-Omnipotent and therefore unthinkable in the 
theocratic regime, shook the West in the 1500’s; however, while Descartes was able to 
epistemologically escape the regime, his ontological position remained static, held captive by 
tradition and theology (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Mansfield, 2000; Hicks, 2004). Today, we 
continue to experience the impact of Cartesian thought and are struck nauseous by the persistent 
shaking of its aftershock, yet strangely comforted by the rhythmic rumble of its reliability. 
With respect to theorizing about the ‘subject’ or the Cartesian ‘I,’ the works of Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804), the late eighteenth century German philosopher, has also left a lasting 
contribution to Western thought about self and consciousness (Mansfield, 2000). In Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781), Kant explains the human ability to first observe, transform the observation 
into a representation, and then think about the image, which allows human beings to know the 
world (Mansfield, 2000). Mansfield (2000), interpreting Kant (1929) suggests:  
We turn these observations into representations as they enter our minds and become 
things to think about. They circulate in our minds as images. Each and every 
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representation a human being makes of the world, according to Kant, from the simplest 
sensory perception to the most complex formula, is understood to be grounded in the ‘I’ 
that perceives. Kant writes: ‘it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all of my 
representations’ (Kant, 1929, p. 152). (Mansfield, 2000, p. 18) 
Mansfield (2000) continues: 
Before we perceive anything, something must be there, in place to do the perceiving. We 
do not open every observation or statement with the phrase ‘I think’, especially when we 
are merely communicating with ourselves. Yet, although it is unspoken, any dealing with 
the world is impossible without being challenged through the ‘I’. Furthermore, this ‘I’ at 
the heart of ‘I think’ is always ‘in all consciousness and the same’ (Kant, 1929, p. 153). 
(Mansfield, 2000, p. 18) 
With the Kantian subject, all experiences of the world are connected to the self, the self that 
thinks, and all appears to be occurring within and to a single self. Every understanding or 
relationship with world around us must be entered through the door of human experience or 
observation with the expectation that “even the most primitive or abstract, must cross the 
threshold of the thinking ‘I’ (Mansfield, 2000, p. 19). Kant (1929), introducing the concept of the 
self-conscious, posits: 
The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, is 
therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness…I call 
them one and all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. 
(p. 154)  
The notion of the self-conscious, then becomes critically important in Western understanding of 
the subject and reinforces the subject-object dichotomy. For Kant, the awareness of self precedes 
meaning making through observation or experience and unlike the Cartesian cogito is solely 
identified through thought and not God (Mansfield, 2000; Davis, 2004). In short, before humans 
can come to understand the world, “first you must think yourself. This self is the feeling of 
connection or consistency between all your perceptions, the collection point of your thoughts” 
(Mansfield, 2000, p. 19). Subjectivity, in Kantian philosophy, is only realized through an 
awareness of the world that passes through or crosses the threshold of the naturally imbued or 
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predestined ‘I’, which “operates before we discover all the things that make our 'I separate from 
everyone else’s” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 19) and not the interiority of representation. Finally, it is 
important to note, the Kantian subject is not merely an osmotic being, passively allowing 
messages to flow through its membrane rather the Kantian subject is agentic, active. To state it 
more succinctly, the Kantian subject “grasps the outside world in a positive act of thought that 
not only connects it with things, but gives it a strong, unified and purposeful sense of selfhood” 
(Mansfield, 2000, p. 20). The focus on the individual’s experience and sense making, through the 
evangelization of Kant’s Cartesian bifurcation, emerges and remains the focus of the human 
experience (Mansfield, 2000; Davis, 2004). 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), critiquing Descartes and the various bifurcations that 
evolve directly from Cartesian thought, argues the notion of the human subject is “dependent 
upon a fixable and self-aware entity…that is the most fundamental form of human experience–
indeed, the very ground of the possibility of experience” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 22) fails or refuses 
to inspect the thought behind the thought. Heidegger (1962) writes: 
In the course of this history certain distinctive domains of Being have come into view and 
have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics: the ego cogito [I think] of 
Descartes, the subject, the ‘I’, reason, spirit, person. But all these remain uninterrogated 
as to their Being and its structure, in accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which the 
question of Being has been neglected. (p. 44) 
Prior to Heidegger (1962), the philosophical dialogue of subjectivity centered the perceiving self, 
reason, and the human spirit (Mansfield, 2000). Questioning the notion that human beings “may 
be able to talk about how we experience and know the world, but what does it mean that we exist 
in the first place?” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 22); Heidegger shifts the Enlightenment dialogue on 
subjectivity from its epistemological nature to its ontological core and concerns himself with 
questioning the “the most fundamental aspect of life” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 23): the very nature of 
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Being (Heidegger, 1962). The mere fact that ‘we are’ is the bedrock of human life, and 
everything else that structures the human life must proceed it, argues Heidegger (1962). 
Turning his attention to the very nature of human Being, Heidegger (1962) begins his 
theorizing of “Daisen, commonly meaning ‘existence’, but literally being-there (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 27). Disrupting the Enlightenment divide of human separate from the world, Heidegger 
contends that no such separation does or can exist. In resonance with Buddhist subjectivity and 
Ubuntu personhood, Mansfield (2000) argues, the very essence of Heidegger’s 
Dasein is constituted by the fact that it is in the world and belongs to it. The world 
concerns us, and our relationship to it is one of care. We are not aliens enclosed within 
our fortress-selves, in a world that is absolutely foreign to us. Our experience conjoins us 
to the world. (Mansfield, 2000, p. 23) 
The Enlightenment subject “possessed of a free and autonomous individuality” that is unique and 
develops as “part of our spontaneous encounter with the world” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 11) in 
Heidegger’s estimation, is nothing more than an illusion “perpetrated on us by Descartes and the 
philosophers he influenced” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 11). Today, the seemingly commonsensical 
Heideggerian notion of human beings as in, of, constructing and simultaneously being 
constructed by the world literally turned Enlightenment subjectivity on its head and opened up 
the field of possibility allowing for the reconceptualization of subjectivity altogether (Mansfield, 
2000).  
Nietzsche’s Node: The Postmodern “Anti-Subjectives” 
The reconceptualization of the subject with its nascence in the node of Nietzsche has 
rhizomatically proliferated into what Mansfield (2000) terms the “Anti-Subjectives” or the 
theoretical school of thought that holds the idea of the subject and thus the notion of subjectivity 
is a mere illusory invention of language. Nietzsche’s understanding of human life was not an 
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aware, thinking person illuminating their way one-encounter at a time guided by morality and 
discernment. On the contrary, Nietzsche takes up the position that human beings are  
the embodiment of a quantum of force called ‘will’. Those with little of this life-force–
the herd of the weak–try to constrain those with more–the elite of the strong–by inventing 
all sorts of moral categories that assert doctrines of guilt and responsibility. (Mansfield, 
2000, p. 10) 
This Nietzschean notion of will is also problematic because it presupposes intensities of will and 
causes to question: Are these intensities of will innate? In a poststructuralist read of Nietzsche 
and indeed the knot of agreement binding the Anti-Subjectivitists is the complicity and the 
imprisonment of language in the construction of the illusion of moral categories and 
responsibility. We are all constructed by and within the world through discourse, and the subject 
is not innate, but an invention caught up in power relations (Mansfield, 2000; Foucault, 1979, 
1980, 1984).  
Michel Foucault, whose work is majorly influenced by Nietzsche, has absorbed the idea 
of the duplicity of the subject in reality. Subjectivity is an invention used “by dominant systems 
of social organsation in order to control and manage us” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10). In agreement 
with Foucault’s theorizing on power and discourse, Mansfield (2000) asserts, we are browbeaten 
by education and discourse to believe that division, fixed categories that separate, divide and 
conquer is the way the world is and should be organized based on socially constructed principles 
and truths ingrained as gospel truth. The subject, pressed under the powerful thumb of discourse 
and paralyzed by power (Foucault, 1979, 1980, 1984) is not the embodiment of  “the free and 
spontaneous expression of our interior truth” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 10). In fact, there is no 
subjectivity at all rather we are subjectified – the victims of subjectification; systematically “led 
to think about ourselves, so we will police and present ourselves in the correct way, as not 
insane, criminal, undisciplined, unkempt, perverse or unpredictable” (Mansfield, 2000, p.10). 
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The subject is an invented normalizing epistemological construct utilized as a mechanism of 
ontological and epistemological disciplining. 
Given the interest of space/time, we will not illuminate the positions of the likes of 
Derrida, Lacan, Irigaray, Freud, or Kristeva; however, given its strong resonance with the 
Buddhist perspective, we will briefly discuss the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987). To 
simply summarize the complexity of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) notion of self is quite a feat. 
However, Mansfield (2000) suggests: 
To them, the self is merely the collection of point of infinite and random impulses and 
flows (to use their terms, lines of flight, and machinic assemblages) that overlap and 
intercut with one another, but that never form any but the most transitory and dynamic 
correspondence. (Mansfield, 2000, p. 136) 
Reducing Buddhism to a philosophical perspective, both Buddhist and DeleuzoGuattarian 
ontology recognizes the “groundless ground of being” (O’Sullivan, 2014, p. 258). Within this 
ontological position, the subject-object dichotomy disintegrates; reinforcing this point, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) write: 
There is no longer tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of 
representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, an assemblage 
established connections between certain multiplicities drawn from these orders, so that a 
book has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one of the several authorities as its 
subject. In short, we think that one cannot write sufficiently in the nature of a name 
outside. (p. 23) 
In fact, all things are multiplicities, organs without bodies connected in various assemblages, 
perpetually and rhizomatically becoming—an endless expansion, a constant folding and 
unfolding (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Instigating the shift from the arborescence31 of 
Enlightenment thinking, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) usher in a Western era of thinking East; 
31 Arborescence, utilizing the metaphor of a tree, refers to the blind acceptance of “hierarchical systems 
with centers of significance and subjectification… [that] only receives information from…pre-established 
paths [roots and trunks]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 16).  
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that is to say emanating from their conception of rhizomatics, lines of flight, and becoming are 
the Buddhist principles of interbeing, interconnectedness, insubstantiality, and immanence 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Hanh, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2014).  
Buddhist Subjectivity: Interbeing, Saturated in Emptiness 
The individual is myth; all things are interconnected, endlessly interwoven in an 
assemblage of relationships in perpetual process (Hanh, 1999). More importantly, the nature of 
reality is emptiness, no static essence and not existing outside the existence of every thing else 
(Hanh, 1999). Emptiness does not imply lack, but complete fullness, the fullness of everything. 
Emptiness is the complete recognition of interdependence; that there is no division between you-
I, there is no ‘and’–we are one-same. In fact, we are the cosmos, the trees, the sun and moon–
where one begins and one ends is but an illusion. We “inter-are”; “interbeing” or non-self is 
Buddhist subjectivity (Hanh, 1999, p. 125).  
Waldron (2003), utilizing both evolutionary science and Buddhism to understand the 
afflictions of self-identity or subjectivity, argues that the utilization of both science and 
Buddhism to understand the misguided formation of human identity or the human condition is 
due to Western thought finding commonality among the notion of traditional Buddhism 
(Waldron, 2003). He writes:  
There is a growing consensus that we may understand ourselves and our world more 
deeply and fully if we conceive of things in terms of interconnected patterns of 
relationship rather than as reified entities existing somehow independently of their own 
developmental history, their internally differentiated processes or their enabling 
conditions. (Waldron, 2003, p. 146)  
In keeping with Harvey (2011), Waldron (2003) thinking-West alludes to the idea that all things 
are interconnected as a new discovery or needing Western approval, and fails to recognize their 
origins lay in ancient Eastern and African ontologies. At any rate, Waldron (2003) through 
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traditional Indian Buddhist perspectives attempts to understand or make sense of the human 
condition.  
Waldron (2003) asserts Western “thinking in terms of unchanging essences, entities, and 
identities deeply misconstrues the human condition” (p. 146) and leads to human suffering and 
evil. However, reinforcing the rhizomatic nature of self (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), the Buddhist 
perspective affirms:  
1. that all “conditioned phenomena” (saüskçta-dharma) are radically dependent
(pratītya-samutpāda) and hence lack any fixed or unchanging “essence” (svabhāva); 
2. that what we are, rather, are assemblages of dynamic yet wholly conditioned
“constructs” (saüskāra) that have been painstakingly carved out (upādāna) of these 
contingent dependent relationships; 3. that we tend to construe these assembled 
constructs as substantial “selves” or fixed identities (ātman); 4. that in our efforts to 
fashion and secure such an “identity” we actively ignore and attempt to counteract its 
contingent, constructed nature; and, finally, 5. that these efforts effectively channel 
human activities (karma) into the repetitive behavioral patterns that actually bring 
about more evil and suffering. These activities, in short, represent misguided and 
futile efforts to deny our dependence, to counteract our impermanence and to attain 
lasting security for this putative, substantial “self”—attempts, as the Buddhists would 
say, to “turn reality on its head.” (Waldron, 2013, p. 146) 
Essentially, instead of recognizing ourselves as “bodies without organs” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 4) and “assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 23), human beings have attached 
themselves to the idea or sense that their identity is fixed, “unitary, autonomous entit[ies], 
independent and isolated from the dynamically changing and contingent world around us” 
(Waldron, 2003, p. 146). This unyielding attachment to self in an effort to counteract our 
impermanence (natural death) is the cause of our suffering (Hanh, 1999; Waldron, 2003). 
In agreement with Deleuze and Guattari (1987) [D&G], the Buddhist perspective of self 
holds that we 
are ever-changing conglomerates of processes (skandha) [“molecular” (p. 34) and 
“rhizomatic” (p. 23)] formed in self-organizing patterns that are ever open 
[“assemblages” (p. 156)], like all organic processes, to change, growth and decay based 
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upon the natural functions of assimilation, interpenetration and dissolution [“organs 
without bodies” (p. 4)]. (Waldron, 2003, p. 147)  
Identity, then, in the Buddhist perspective is constructed through the affliction of the “three 
poisons” (Waldron, 2003, p. 147): aggression, ignorance, and attachment. Human beings 
poisoned at birth with these afflictions, much like the original sin concept in Christianity, cause 
their own suffering through their attempts to sustain the discursively constructed ‘self’ (Waldron, 
2003). Further, Buddha’s teaching on “The Two Truths” (Hanh, 1999, p. 121), confirms 
“suffering is not objective [, but]…depends largely on the way you perceive” (Hanh, 1999, p. 
123). Affirming the Buddhist onto-epistemological notion of interbeing, Hanh (1999) writes, 
“With the eyes of interbeing, we can always reconcile the Two Truths. When we see, 
comprehend, and touch the nature of interbeing, we see the Buddha” (p. 123). Further, taken 
from Ekottara Agama 18, “this verse (gatha) was spoken by the Buddha shortly before his death: 
All conditioned things are impermanent.  
They are phenomena, subject to birth and death.  
When birth and death no longer are,  
the complete silencing is joy. (Hanh, 1999, p. 123) 
Ignorant or wrong perception, then, in Buddhist philosophy causes suffering (Waldron, 2003; 
Hanh, 1999). Perceiving oneself as subject and that outside of self as object is a false perception 
or “eye-consciousness” (Ñāõamoli 1995, 1134, M III 285 as cited in Waldron, 2003, p. 151) and 
fails to recognize the nature of interbeing (Hanh, 1999).  
Affirming the necessity of “Right View” (Hanh, 1999, p. 51), Hanh (1999) argues the 
notion of self or self as subject is the result of false perception; he writes: 
To perceive always means to perceive something. We believe that the object of our 
perception is outside the subject, but that it is not correct. When we perceive the moon, 
the moon is in us. When we smile at our friend, our friend is also us, because she is the 
object of our perception.  
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When we perceive a mountain, the mountain is the object of our perception. When we 
perceive the moon, the moon is the object of our perception. When we say, “I can see my 
consciousness in the flower,” it means we can see the cloud, the sunshine, the earth, and 
the minerals in it. But how can we see our consciousness in a flower? This flower is our 
consciousness. It is the object of our perception. It is our perception. To perceive means 
to perceive something. Perception means the coming into existence of the perceiver and 
the perceived. The flower that we are looking at is part of our consciousness. The idea 
that our consciousness is outside the flower has to be removed. It is impossible to have a 
subject without an object. It is impossible to remove one and retain the other.  
…Our perceptions carry with them all the errors of subjectivity. (Hanh, 1999, p. 53)
Therefore, the insight of Right View liberates us from suffering, and from the constrictions of 
space/time. Right View allows us to awaken from the illusion that we are autonomous, static 
entities.  
Keeping the limitations of language in mind and the realization that Buddhism is devoid 
of such subjective value judgments, Hanh (1999) and Waldron (2003) both contend within 
Buddhist thought the Western notion of subjectivity is viewed as wrong viewing and wrong 
thinking. Realizing the impermanence of all formations, we come to understand that we “inter-
are” striking the notion of self for “inter-being, non-self” (Hanh, 1993, p. 125). In harmony, 
Waldron (2003) asserts, “Both the distinction between self and non-self and their 
interdependence are therefore not only logical, but ontological as well, for they are intrinsic to 
the notion of “self” identity from its very inception” (p. 157). Subjectivity is but an illusion, the 
result of ignorant perception, failure of interdependent recognition and need for self-protection, 
permanence, and the accumulation of a priori biological evolutionary karma (Hanh, 1999; 
Waldron, 2003).  
From Evangelical Monist to Inter-Multiplicities 
Releasing the West from its stagnancy and unleashing the kinetic energy of the Universe, 
Buddhism in resonance with the postmodern understanding of subjectivity, contains within its 
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onto-epistemological web the ability to rid contemporary culture of the individualistic and 
atomistic perspective that has come to dominate every fiber of our Western dominated, global 
culture (Slattery, 2013). Within the field of psychoanalytics and the social sciences, the 
postmodern turn has been accompanied by an understanding of knowledge as human 
constructed; the constructivist epistemological position asserts “reality is intrinsically ambiguous 
and is given form only through our interpretation of it” (Safran, 2013, pp. 8-9). Consistent with 
Buddhist philosophy, the constructivist epistemology within psychoanalysis recognizes the 
subjective, positional nature of knowledge (Safran, 2013; Slattery, 2013). Additionally, the 
postmodern coalescing with Buddhism is implicated in the “shift toward viewing the self as 
multiple rather than unitary” (p. 9)–as a multiplicity (Hanh, 1999; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). In 
the tradition of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, postmodern thought challenges traditional 
notions of power and authority (Mansfield, 2000; Safran, 2013). Constructing is an endless 
hermeneutic engagement, which gives way to an infinite number of meanings over modernity’s 
conception of universal truth (Safran, 2013; Creswell, 2013). 
Buddhism and other indigenous onto-epistemologies, knowingly or unknowingly, has 
released all things from the shackles of universal truth and chains of knowledge exposing the 
“fertile ground of pure creativity and freedom” (Chopra, 1994, p. 86). The Western obsession 
with truth, knowledge, and delimiting categorization 
is actually an attachment to the known. And what’s the known? The known is our past. 
The known is nothing other than the prison of past conditioning. There’s no evolution in 
that – absolutely none at all. And when there is no evolution, there is stagnation, entropy, 
disorder, and decay.  
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is the fertile ground of pure creativity and freedom. 
Uncertainty means stepping into the unknown in every moment of our existence. The 
unknown is the field of all possibilities, ever fresh, ever new, always open to the creation 
of new manifestations. (Chopra, 1994, pp. 86-87) 
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Haunted by the original sin of Adam and Eve, the dominant Judeo-Christian West’s need to eat 
from every tree of knowledge has impeded the growth and poisoned the once fertile ground of a 
world interconnected and limitless (P. Hendry, personal communication, April 21, 2015).  
All is not lost, nothing is ever lost nor found; however, in the Buddhist tradition 
meditation offers a way toward heightened awareness (Hanh, 1999). Buddha offers the practice 
of meditation, that is, setting oneself apart to develop the interior life. However, Hanh (1999) 
contends that simply living can be/is meditation. It is in the absolute mundanity of life that we 
come to understand the wonder of the world. In the Deleuzian sense, “Buddhism provides 
instruction on how to access–and in a sense determine–this groundless ground of our being: 
meditation for example, that allows for a contact with an infinite potentiality that lies behind our 
habitual, and finite being…” (O’Sullivan, 2014, p. 259). Meditation cultivates awareness and 
provides insight into the multiplicitous interconnectedness of our being. It is through the practice 
of meditation and ethical living that we come to truly experience the onto-epistemological nature 
of Buddhist subjectivity (Hanh, 1999).  
The evangelical monist, believers of a unitary self, continue to hold tightly to the belief of 
self as stable and cohesive (Safran, 2013). However, the tide is turning; self-multiplicity, argues 
Safran (2013) “has more potential than the unitary self” (p. 10) and liberates us. Buddhism’s 
onto-epistemological notion of subjectivity (non-self) attempts to liberate and alleviate suffering 
in praxis. The way of the Noble Eightfold Path: Right View, Right Thinking, Right Speech, 
Right Action, Right Diligence, Right Concentration, and Right Livelihood–provides not a 
departure from, but a return to frontiers long forgotten (Hanh, 1999). The self as rhizomatic, 
fluid, dynamic, ever changing deeply interconnected and inter-being with all in the known 
universe revolutionizes and reconceptualizes the very notion of East/West, death/life, 
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minority/majority, and subject/object. More importantly, the Buddhist notion of self commingled 
with the southern African philosophical concept of Ubuntu can turn the giants of Western 
subjectivity and education on their head (Hanh, 1999; Eze, 2010). We now turn to a discussion 
of subjectivity or personhood within an Ubuntuist or southern African worldview.  
Ubuntu: A Relational Ontology and Intersubjective Alchemy of Personhood 
Intersubjectivity, from an African perspective, maintains a person becomes more human 
and may only grow into the fullness of their humanity through and in relationship– active 
engagement–with other persons (Eze, 2008; Forster, 2010). As Tutu (2004) reminds in Chapter 
2, “Ubuntu does not say, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong. I 
participate. I share’” (p. 27). Southern Africa remains deeply entrenched in tribal or communal 
worldview (Eze, 2012; Kochalumchuvattil, 2010). Much like Buddhism (Hanh, 1999), the 
notions of interdependence, inter-being, and communalism are the very fibers that constitute the 
fabric of African society. The philosophical construct of Ubuntu and ubuntu as an ethic of which 
an African’s being in the universe is “inseparably anchored upon” (Ramose, 2002, p. 230) is a 
way of life that “has for many centuries sustained the African communities in South Africa, in 
particular, and in Africa as a whole” (Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005, p. 215). Letseka (2013) argues, 
“Ubuntu is a normative concept (a moral theory), a humane notion, and a potential public policy” 
(p. 351). Morality within Africa, according to Letseka (2013), is that which evolves from the 
process of living and is grounded in the context of communal life” (Verhoef & Michel, 1997, p. 
394 as cited in Letseka, 2013, p. 352). To reinforce the point that morality is born of communal 
living, Menkiti (2004) argues African morality “demands a point of view best described as one 
of beingness-with others” (p. 324). Moreover, the expression “Umuntu ngumntu ngbany’ abantu 
(Xhosa)” (Mnyaka & Mothlhabi, 2005, p. 218), which is translated to mean ‘a person is a person 
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through other people’ serves as the foundation of the notion of personhood within an 
Ubuntugogical worldview. Mnyandu (1997) reminds: 
ubuntu is not merely positive human qualities, but the very human essence itself, which 
“lures” and enables human beings to become abantu or humanised beings, living in daily 
self-expressive works of love and efforts to create harmonious relationships in the 
community and the world beyond. (p. 81)  
Indeed, in addition to the description of ubuntu offered by Mnyandu (1997), the very definition 
of ubuntu on which this inquiry is centered proffered by Eze (2010) speaks to the alchemy of 
personhood in community and communion with others. One is not born a person, but rather 
becomes human person in community with others (Eze, 2012; Menkiti, 1984; Letseka, 2013; 
Forster, 2010; Waghid & Smeyers, 2011; Imafidon, 2012; Ramose, 2002; Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 
2005). In fact, Gade (2012) argues that some Black South Africans did not consider Whites 
persons in apartheid South Africa because they did not inhabit the values of ubuntu. As a 
reminder, Eze’s (2010) understanding of Ubuntu, which guides this inquiry states:  
‘A person is a person through other people’ strikes an affirmation of one’s humanity 
through recognition of an ‘other’ in his or her uniqueness and difference. It is a demand 
for a creative intersubjective formation in which the ‘other’ becomes a mirror (but only a 
mirror) for my subjectivity. This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not embedded 
in my person solely as an individual; my humanity is co-substantively bestowed upon the 
other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other. We create each other and need 
to sustain this otherness creation. And if we belong to each other, we participate in our 
creations: we are because you are, and since you are, definitely I am. The ‘I am’ is not a 
rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this otherness creation of 
relation and distance. (Eze, 2010, p. 190-191) 
Ubuntu is not solely an accounting of human action, but finds its core in the ontological–in 
being. In fact, it is an ontological and axiological philosophy of life that seeks to first contribute 
to the well-being of others and community. To reiterate, within the southern African worldview, 
one that is born a human does not and cannot become a human being or human person alone 
(Eze, 2010, 2008, 2014; Menkiti, 1984; Letseka, 2013; Forster, 2010; Waghid & Smeyers, 2011; 
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Imafidon, 2012; Ramose, 2002; Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005). More specifically, African 
humanity or humanness 
is not something that I can acquire or develop by my own isolated power. I can only 
exercise or fulfill my humanity as long as I remain in touch with others for it is they who 
empower me…”remaining in touch” is not just a sociological notion but a moral one. It 
implies certain chosen attitudes on my part and qualities of relationship with others. 
(Hartin, Decock, & Connor, 1991, p. 189) 
Within the culture and philosophy of Ubuntu, personhood is an intersubjective32 formation, that 
is, a shared ontological process of personhood—of being-becoming.  
Intersubjective Being-becoming: A Contemporaneous Formation 
If personhood is not given at birth, then what constitutes a person? First, it must be stated 
explicitly that Ubuntu is grounded in a pre-Enlightenment (non-Western) understanding of 
personhood or subjectivity, that is, the subject is understood as communal, a holon–part/whole of 
society (Letseka, 2013; Foucault, 1975; Forster, 2010). Eze (2008) reiterates this point with a 
reminder that the “term ‘person’ must be understood differently from the enlightenment 
codification of a person as essentially rational, where ‘rationalism’ remains the sole criterion for 
subjectivity” (p. 387). He argues that while rationality is presupposed, the more critical element 
of subjectivity within an Ubuntu onto-epistemological framework is an understanding of 
personhood as a dialogical engagement with and in community (Eze, 2008). A person is 
incomplete without other persons and only in community is one able to recognize their humanity 
(Eze, 2008; Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005). This point and understanding of subjectivity within a 
southern African worldview is often misunderstood as the flourishing of community at the 
expense of the individual, which is not the case. Attempting to enhance our understanding of 
African personhood, Ramose (1999) writes:  
32 Eugene de Quincey (2005) describes intersubjectivity as “knowing through relationship – a form of 
non-senory, non-linguistic connection through ‘presence’ and ‘meaning’, rather than through mechanism 
or exchanges of energy…intersubjectivity [is]…‘consciousness as communion’” (p. 2).  
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The African concept of a person as wholeness does not deny human individuality as an 
ontological fact, as an analytic finitude, but ascribes ontological primacy to the 
community through which the human individual comes to know both themselves and the 
world around them. (p. 79) 
One cannot exist nor obtain their humanity outside of community. In essence, Ramose (1999) 
regards both the individual and the community as a holon—a part/whole—that is, a whole in one 
context and a part in another (Forster, 2010). In agreement with Eze (2008), “the community in 
my view, is not prior to the individual and the latter does not pre-exist the community. The 
individual and the community are not radically opposed in the sense of priority but engaged in a 
contemporaneous formation” (p. 386). One is not lost at the expense of the other, but each are 
entangled and flourish (or perish) together. 
According to Wiredu (1992) there is a descriptive and a normative African conception of 
a person, that is, an ontological and a social conception. The ontological or descriptive 
conception of southern African personhood includes: “okra—the life principle and source of 
human dignity and destiny, sunsum (the personality or charisma principle), and mogya (the blood 
or kinship principle)” (Onah, 2002, p. 75). Similarly, in the Asante tradition, Appiah (2004) 
writes: 
…a person consists of a body (nipadua) made from the blood of the mother (the mogya);
an individual spirit, the sunsum, which is the main bearer of ones personality; and a third 
entity, the okra. The sunsum derives from the father at conception. The okra, a sort of life 
force that departs from the body only at a person’s last breath; is sometimes as with the 
Greeks and the Hebrews, identified with breath; and is often said to be sent to a person at 
birth, as the bearer of ones nkrabea, or destiny from Nyame. The sunsum, unlike the 
okra, may leave the body during life and does so, for example, in sleep, dreams being 
thought to be the perceptions of a person’s sunsum on its nightly peregrinations… (p. 28) 
Reducing the descriptive conception of personhood to Western vernacular, a person is a tripartite 
intermingling of mind, body, and soul (spirit). 
 152 
The normative African conception of a person holds that one is not born with personhood 
rather a person’s humanity is acquired through and in social intercourse (Eze, 2008). Imafidon 
(2012) posits, “a person is not just any human being, but one who has attained the status of a 
responsible member of society” (p. 7). Again, unlike the Western conception of the subject, the 
African subject is a Being communal. To reinforce this point, Mbiti (1969) writes: 
In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except corporately. He 
owes his existence to other people, including those of past generations and his 
contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The community must therefore make, 
create, or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate 
group…whatever happens to the individual happens to whole group, and whatever 
happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say, “I am, 
because we are; and since we are therefore I am.” This is the cardinal point in the 
understanding of the African view of man [emphasis added]. (p. 108-109) 
While Mbiti’s communalist notion of personhood or humanity strikes a cord with other Ubuntu 
philosophers and researchers, others (Eze, 2008; Forster, 2010; Imafidon, 2012) take issue with 
his promotion of a sociocentric view of personhood, which appears to sacrifice the individual for 
the sake of the community or whole. 
In agreement with Mbiti (1969) and Menkiti (1984), Eze (2008) concurs that an 
individual’s subjective formation is a dependent, communal “discursive formation” (p. 388). 
However, Eze (2008) and Imafidon (2012) argue that a radical communitarian notion of 
subjective formation must be problematized. Eze (2008) offers: 
In my view, the identity or subjectivity of the individual and community are mutually 
constitutive and hence none is supreme…In advancing the good of community, the 
individual’s good is concomitantly advanced precisely because the community’s and 
individual’s goods are not radically opposed but interwoven. The community is a 
guarantor or my subjectivity, whereas I guarantee the community’s survival by advancing 
its constitutive goods, knowing that if the community hurts, it is the individual that hurts. 
(p. 388) 
The dichotomy of individual and community is a permeable, if not invisible, barrier. The 
individual and community relationship is symbiotic—each creating and maintaining the other. 
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As Shutte (2001) reinforces, “the community is not opposed to the individual nor does it simply 
swallow the individual up; it enables each individual to become a unique center of shared life” 
(p. 9). More to the point, one’s humanity is only realized through recognition of the humanity of 
the Other. This intersubjective relationship, through recognition, “preserves the other in her 
otherness, in her uniqueness, without letting her slip into the distance” (Louw, 2001, pp. 10-11). 
One’s place of belonging and being-becoming are engaged in a web of interconnection, of 
discursive engagement. Ubuntu holds that personhood or one’s humanity is born through, within, 
and between the interactions of self with the various nested holarchies of the Other—individuals, 
community, and society writ large.  
A New Perspective 
Forster (2010) argues the southern African ethic of ubuntu with respect to ontological 
being and identity has the potential to add a new perspective to what it means to be a human 
person in relationship with other human persons, which run counter to science and 
epistemologically dominated approaches to being-human. In keeping with Derrida’s assertion at 
the opening of the chapter, Forster (2010) agrees the “question ‘who am I?’ is fundamental to 
human existence” (p. 2). Moreover, he asserts subjectivity or the ability to know one’s place in 
the world is central to our wellbeing as beings-human. To put it differently, “ontologically, it 
shapes the image we have of ourselves, as well as our relation to the others, and ultimately 
informs our understanding of the place we understand ourselves to occupy within the whole 
Kosmos” (Forster, 2010, p. 2). The intermingling of Buddhist and Ubuntist perspectives 
regarding relational ontology provides the energy necessary to wake us from the illusion that we 
are separate (Hanh, 1999).  
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Forster (2010), indicting postmodernism, suggests where one once held a firm foundation 
with regard to questions of identity and subjectivity, they are now uncertain. To illustrate his 
point, Forster (2010) utilizes a quote from JRR Tolkien’s cinematic version of Lord of the Rings, 
“The world is changed. I feel it in the water. I feel it in the earth. I smell it in the air. Much that 
once was, is lost, for none now live who remember it” (Forster, 2010, p. 2). As a postmodernist, I 
applaud postmodernism’s certain uncertainty, that is, its ability to question and problematize 
once taken for granted notions and maintain a fluidity of thought on all things (un)thinkable. The 
notion of subjectivity, in the wake of modernity, “One cannot say ‘I am …’ without the necessity 
of qualifying that by saying ‘but, I am also…’ The rigid categories of modernity simply fail to 
take into account the richness of diversity and experience that comprise the rich tapestry of 
contributing factors that shape our individual and collective identity” (Forster, 2010, p. 2). 
Postmodernism, as a challenge to the foundationalism of Enlightenment thinking, catalyzes a 
rethinking of truth and rationality. In agreement with the (non)methodological approach of the 
this inquiry, John R. Franke reminds: 
This rethinking has resulted not in irrationality, as is often claimed by less informed 
critics of postmodern thought, but rather in numerous redescriptions and proposals 
concerning the understanding of rationality and knowledge. These postmodern ideas 
produce a more inherently self-critical view of knowledge than modernity. (Forster, 2010, 
p. 2) 
Within this paradigm, identity is no longer an easily verifiable anything and it is no longer 
acceptable to simply accept knowledge as truth. Moreover, everything in the epistemological 
strata must be questioned and the ontological strata uncovered. 
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Resonance with Buddhist Teaching 
Forster (2010) via Richards’ (2002) exploration of the work of Ray Kurzweil,33 poses a 
central question: “Am I the stuff in my brain and body?” (p. 42 as cited in Forster, 2010, p. 2). In 
direct opposition to the Cartesian cogito, Kurzweil makes two observations to debunk the once 
taken for granted notion of subjectivity (Forster, 2010). First, borrowing from quantum physics, 
he illuminates the common misconceptions of permanence and physicality. More specifically, 
Kurzweil writes: “Consider the particles making up my body and brain are constantly changing. 
We are not all permanent collections of particles” (Richard, 2002, p. 42 as cited in Forster, 2010, 
p. 3). Kurzweil’s assertion of the perpetually changing nature of material or physical matter
resonates deeply with the Buddhist and DeleuzoGuattarian notions of impermanence (Forster, 
2010; Hanh, 1999; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). More specifically, the work of quantum physicist 
David Bohm (1980) has demonstrated the rhizomatic nature of reality or rather that “physical 
reality is an ever-changing movement of constituent elements that we understand to make up 
physical matter” (Forster, 2010, p. 3), which Bohm (1980) terms “holomovement” (p. 185). 
Again, counter to a Cartesian or Newtonian worldview, a Bohm (1980) holds “that reality is a 
dynamic whole in a constant state of change; an explication of the undivided whole that is in a 
perpetual state of flux” (Bohm, 1980, p. 185). This is a redistribution of the impermanence and 
insubstantiality of Buddhist ontology (Hanh, 1999).  
Additionally, the essence of interbeing (Hanh, 1999) is found in Shutte’s (2004) 
conception of African personhood. Southern Africans understand, he writes,  
self and other as co-existing, each in the other in the sense of being identified with each 
other. The fundamental human reality must be seen as a field of personal energy in which 
each individual emerges as a distinct pole or focus. The field of life is the same in each; 
in each it is their humanity. All persons form a single person, not as part for a whole, but 
33 Kurzweil is an American futurist, transhumanist, computer scientist, and author 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Kurzweil, n.d.) 
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as friends draw their life and character from the spirit of a common friend. They have a 
common identity. (Shutte, 2004, pp. 52-53) 
We–each of us–are a mirror of the Other. Similarly, equating Ubuntu with Hanh’s (1999) 
conception of interbeing, Green (2004) writes, “We belong in a bundle of life. My humanity is 
caught up, is inextricably bound up with others. For Buddhist, this is what Thich Nhat Hanh 
refers to as ‘interbeing’” (p. 87). Green (2004) continues, “Interbeing, or ubuntu, is the human 
condition” (p. 87). We share a common humanity, which makes us always already responsible 
for one another (Waghid, 2014). This is akin to the Buddhist notion of immanence—the non-
duality of being and the DeleuzoGuattarian (1987) notion of existing on a plane of immanence. 
To further emphasize the misconception of a static self and reinforce the notion of 
impermanence, Kurzweil (2004) writes: 
The cells in our bodies turn over at different rates, but the particles (e.g. atoms and 
molecules) that comprise our cells are exchanged at a very rapid rate. I am just not the 
same collection of particles that I was even a month ago. It is the pattern of matter and 
energy that are semipermanent (that is, changing only gradually), but our actual content is 
changing constantly, and very quickly. We are like the pattern that water makes in a 
stream. The rushing water around a formation of rocks makes a particular, unique pattern. 
This pattern may remain relatively unchanged for hours, even years. Of course the actual 
material constituting the pattern – the water – is replaced in milliseconds. The same is 
true for Ray Kurzweil. Like the water in a stream, my particles are constantly changing, 
but the pattern that people recognize as Ray has a reasonable level of continuity. This 
argues that we should not associate our fundamental identity with a specific set of 
particles but rather the matter and energy that we represent. (p. 404) 
Kurzweil (2004), in agreement with Deleuze and Guattari (1987), contends that we are in fact 
not our bodies, but rather a DeleuzoGuattarian ‘Body without Organs (BwO)’, which “is not a 
dead body, but a living body all the more alive and teeming…a body populated by multiplicities” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 3) existing on a plane of immanence. What makes us who we are 
is not the physical, not our bodies, but something much deeper—our consciousness—hidden in 
the ontological strata (Hanh, 1999; Forster, 2010; Kurzweil, 2004). 
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Necessity of A New Paradigm 
Forster (2010) contends identity and subjectivity are generally analyzed through one of 
two paradigms: objective and subjective approaches. The subjective analytical approach seeks to 
validate identity and subjectivity at the level of the individual via psychology and spirituality 
(Forster, 2010). The objectivist analytical approach, through observation of the subject, explores 
the manner in which an individual constructs their subjectivity given their particular 
environmental influences (Forster, 2010). While each of these analytical categories surmise the 
two dominant analytical paradigms, they fail in the wake of modernity and the certain 
uncertainty of postmodernism. More specifically, they both rely on the foundationalism of 
Enlightenment thinking, which has constructed certain knowledges as truth. In the postmodern 
age, “it can no longer be assumed that persons understand and attach the same meaning to what a 
certain discipline, or community, or faith, considers unquestionably true” (Forster, 2010, p. 4). 
The perturbation of these once taken-for-granted notions requires a new paradigm through which 
we reconceptualize the Western subject into what I term the Being-West.  
A generous ontology. In agreement with Forster (2010), what is not needed is “a new set 
of incontestable foundational truths relating to [subjectivity], but rather, a more generous 
ontology!” (p. 4). What is a generous ontology? Forster (2010) states:  
By this I mean an ontology that is open enough to learn from both objective and 
subjective discoveries, yet is not limited by the truths of these discoveries. Rather a 
generous ontology recognizes that truth is neither static, nor absolute and as such, identity 
is developmental and complexly related to aspects of being that are not only subjectively 
experienced or objectively observed. (p. 4) 
A generous ontology, much like (re)thinking as (non)method, requires active engagement in and 
with the reality of being human. In other words, it requires every being-human to be in 
relationship with one another and actively engaged in the dance of life. Being implies motion, 
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action, and relationship; it is not passive, but rheomodic (Ramose, 2002; Forster, 2010). More 
succinctly, like being relationships 
are living, dynamic, fluid and constantly changing. A relationship cannot be 
fundamentally ‘characterised’ or quantified, neither can it be wholly experienced or 
explained. Relationships require ‘generous’ discoveries and a constant interpretation to 
glean elements of truth – truths that may change from moment to moment. (Forster, 2010, 
p. 4) 
A generous ontology has no end, but rather produces further provocation, new thoughts, more 
questions, new ontological perspectives, and alters one’s very consciousness or being-in-the-
world. It is with Forster’s (2010) conception of a generous ontology in mind that I begin the task 
(what can be a lifelong undertaking) of (re)conceptualizing the Western subject through the 
generous onto-epistemologies of Buddhism and Ubuntu.  
The Being-West 
Mansfield (2000) elucidates the ‘self’ does not capture the sense of socio-cultural and 
political entanglement of which the concept of subject is pregnant. Conversely, I argue the notion 
of the subject does not capture the socio-politico-philoso-cosmological entanglement that 
comprises the concept of being. Therefore, I am retiring the use of the notion of the subject and 
resurrecting the long abandoned metaphysical and ontic conception of human as Being—as 
being-human. As Setiloane (1986) offers within an Ubuntuist cosmology “…the essence of being 
is participation in which humans are always interlocked with one another…the human being is 
not only a ‘vital force’, but a more ‘more vital force’ in participation” (p. 14). The Being-West 
reimagines the notion of self as interconnected always and in all ways to all things seen and 
unseen, material and immaterial. The Being-West is a bundle of intensities, a sacred 
interweaving, a body without organs mutually becoming through the linkage of assemblages 
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always already caught up in a process of folding and unfolding, creation and dissolution 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Waldron, 2003; Hanh, 1999; Forster, 2010).  
Jean Luc Nancy posed the following question to Derrida: “Who comes after the subject?” 
(Derrida, 1991, p. 96). This is indeed the question of our time, which Heidegger and Lacan both 
attempt to answer in their own way through a metaphysical formulation (Heidegger, 1962) and a 
liquidation of the subject, respectively (Derrida, 1991). I proffer, the Being-West is in a sense 
both a return to the pre-Enlightenment subject and an evolution proceeding from the 
Enlightenment subject. The Being-West disintegrates Descartes ego cogito, and answers the call 
of being—that is, answers the powerful and strange yet familiar call of itself as a Being-in-the-
world (Heidegger, 1962; Courtine, 1991). The Being-West is an ontological response to the 
unabashed epistemological discipline and violence of a world post-Enlightenment.  
Taking Foucault’s (1984) call for a critical ontology of ourselves seriously, the Being-
West is named such because it cannot divorce itself from history nor spatial, temporal, or 
geographical situatedness as a citizen of and having been subjugated to the epistemology, 
axiology, and methodology of the West. The Being-West, while attempting to transcend the 
ontological and epistemological violence, which the West has wrought and decolonize itself 
from the onto-cognitive imperialism of the West, continues to live, move, and have its being in a 
world West; therefore, even while attempting to transgress West it must persist in discovering 
and maintaining its place of belonging in the space/time of the West.  
Western Ideological Barriers to Burgeoning 
With the primary focus of this inquiry centering on a (re)thinking of American 
institutions of higher education and the fact that the being-human is situated in the West, there 
are a host of ideological barriers to a burgeoning of the notion of the Being-West, which must be 
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overcome in concert with a reconceptualization. More to the point, in America the “culture, 
history, and geographical context are inextricably intertwined in shaping behavior and in 
determining the collective and individual identity” (Holdstock, 2000, p. 81) of the society. 
America colonized by people seeking to assert their independence through a separation from a 
monarchy has emerged as a nation with an overwhelmingly individualistic nature (Hanks, 2008). 
The American, from the halls of government to hallowed halls of the Academy, is indoctrinated 
with an ideology of individualism, which runs counter, generally speaking, to both an indigenous 
African and Eastern worldview. Hanks (2008) reiterates, “We are a nation that prides itself on 
personal initiative and independent success. Our collective identity is not one of a united whole 
but that of an aligned many” (p. 122). Not only does America and the West pride itself on a 
culture of individualism, but this individualism along with competition and materialism is the 
criteria with which we now define ‘self’ (Myers, 1993; Hanks, 2008). Again, the culture of 
individualism, which has penetrated every corner of American society, is one of a litany of 
factors that has created and reified the illusion that we are separate.  
The same too can be said for the American (Western) obsession with ethnocentrism, 
which Vontress and Epp (2001) reminds us that “culture should not be viewed separately from 
the rest of life; it is the compass of life” (p. 374). Speaking of Western psychology, but with 
applications to subjectivity and education, Hanks (2008) advocates for a more holistic approach 
to life—culture, personhood—in the West. Finally, the last barrier to the burgeoning of the 
Being-West or new modes of being is education, which in the West are bastions of white male 
European domination (Harvey, 2011). As Battiste (2002) avers and Myers (1993) reinforces “the 
intellectual imperialism of Western patriarchy has proven to be viciously intolerant of any 
perspective that breaks the bonds of its conceptual incarceration” (p. 4). Seeing that this inquiry 
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seeks, among other things, to privilege non-Western indigenous onto-epistemologies and 
necessitates both an ontological responsibility to embody and an epistemological ability to 
comprehend, Western onto-cognitive imperialism becomes a nearly impenetrable barrier to 
burgeoning. Nearly impenetrable but not impossible. 
In agreement with Slattery’s postmodern credo, the Being-West is an attempt to make 
thinkable an ontological modality previously unthinkable. Slattery (2013) expresses: 
Humanity must transcend modernity, according to the Center for a Postmodern World 
(1990), in ways that include the following features: a post-anthropocentric view of living 
in harmony with nature rather than a separateness from nature that leads to control and 
exploitation; a post-competitive sense of relationships as cooperative rather than as 
coercive and individualistic; a post-militaristic belief that conflict can be resolved by the 
development of the art of peaceful negotiation; a post-patriarchal vision of society in 
which age-old religious, social, political, and economic subordination of women will be 
replaced by a social order based equally on the “feminine” and the “masculine”; a post-
Eurocentric view that the values and practice of the European tradition will no longer be 
assumed to be superior to those of other traditions, or forcibly imposed upon other, 
combined with a respect for the wisdom embedded in all cultures; a post-scientific belief 
that, while the natural sciences possess on important method of scientific investigation, 
there are also moral, religious, and aesthetic intuitions that contain important truths that 
must be given a central role in the development of worldviews and public policy; a post-
disciplinary concept of research and scholarship with an ecologically interdependent view 
of the cosmos rather than the mechanistic perspective of a modern engineer controlling 
the universe; and, finally, a post-nationalistic view in which the individualism of 
nationalism is transcended and replaced by a planetary consciousness that is concerned 
first and foremost about the welfare of the earth. (p. 20) 
The Being-West, or simply the being-human, emancipates self from the illusion of separateness. 
It is a response to Slattery’s (2013) clarion call, it is an onto-epistemological revolution which 
releases us from the chains of ontological and epistemological violence wrought by Western 
patriarchal domination, and a return to the rheomodic34 nature of being within a dynamic and 
interconnected universe. Now that the possible barriers have been illuminated, we return to a 
discussion on the nature of the Being-West. 
34 Ramose (2002) defines the rheomode as the “philosophical language of ubuntu. The rheomode is 
derived from the Greek verb ‘rheo’ meaning to flow. It is a ‘new mode’ of language…” (P. 233).  
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Who Is This Being-West? 
The Being-West, following Heidegger’s (1962) postulation, is not an ‘I am’ but a ‘we 
are’. The Being-West is the double consciousness, an interdependent co-arising, a flow of 
energy, bundle of intensities; the knot of physicality, consciousness, and spirit; swept up and 
transfigured in the rhizomatic ballet of being-becoming that we understand as life. The Being-
West disrupts the divide as human separate from the world and re-thinks itself as a being-in-
world, that is, in relationship with all things (Heidegger, 1962).  
Communal. Being-West embodies the generous onto-epistemologies of Buddhism and 
Ubuntu, and understands its being-ness as relational. Utilizing the words of De Quincey (2005), 
the Being-West embodies, knows, and intuits that  
…we are definitely not alone …we don’t form relationships, they form us. We are
constituted by webs of interconnection. Relationships come first, and we emerge as more 
or less distinct centers within the vast and complex networks that surround us. In this new 
view, we are noted in the complex web of life. Each of us is a meeting point, a center of 
convergence, for countless threads of relationship. We are moments in time and locations 
in space where the universe shows up — literally, as a phenomenon… In other words, in 
this “new story” we emerge as subjects from intricate networks of interrelatedness, from 
webs of intersubjectivity. (De Quincey, 20005, p. 182) 
Within the new story of being-human, the division between you-I deteriorates; there is no ‘you’ 
and there is no ‘I’—we inter-are (Hanh, 1999). Being-ness is infinite, taking shape and form but 
for a moment in time/space and identifying in that moment as a particular composition, vibration, 
and reverberation of molecular intensities appearing then vanishing in the blink of an eye.  
Inbetween-ness, interwoven with the infinite. The Being-West represents the 
inbetween-ness of being. Utilizing Martin Buber’s (1970) ‘I-Thou’ conceptual framework, 
primacy is neither bestowed upon the ‘I’ nor the ‘Thou,’ rather the Being-West has its being and 
mutual becoming in the inbetween-ness. The same can be said for the Ubuntist communal 
conception of personhood. Buber (1970) asserts:  
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When I confront a human being as my Thou and speak the basic word I-Thou to him, 
then he is no thing among things nor does he consist of things. He is no longer He or She, 
limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition 
that can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. Neighborless 
and seamless, he is Thou and fills the firmament… 
Even as a melody is not composed of tones, nor a verse of words, not a statue of lines—
one must pull and tear to turn a unity into a multiplicity-so it is with the human being to 
whom I say Thou. I can abstract from him the color of his hair or the color of his speech 
or the color of his graciousness; I have to do this again and again, but immediately he is 
no longer Thou. (p. 59). 
Buber’s (1970) assertion speaks directly to the Buddhist perspective of the being interwoven 
with the infinite (Adams, 2012). It is an affirmation of the East’s conception of ever-changing 
essences—one never steps in the same river twice. The Being-West is the embodied denial of the 
Western attachment to human as “unitary, autonomous entit[ies], independent and isolated from 
the dynamically changing and contingent world around us” (Waldron, 2003, p. 146). To state it 
in the affirmative, the Being-West is the embodied recognition of being-human—an ever-
changing living organism with illusory semi-permeable boundaries, who has its being in relation 
with all in the universe. The Being-West is the ontic crystallization of Right View, Right 
Thinking, African humanism, and Ubuntu saturated communalism. 
Non-anthropocentric. The Being-West is non-anthropocentric, that is, it understands the 
subject as a creation of language. Be-ing, according to Ramose (2002), implodes the linguistic 
reduction of subject-object and breaks the silence of be-ing from which only then a discussion of 
being may follow. How does one conclude the Being-West as post-anthropocentric? One may 
come to this conclusion through an interrogation of the very formation of be-ing through 
language (Ramose, 2002). The structure of language is such that there is a noun, a verb, and an 
object. The noun, which functions as the subject or actor is engaged in act of doing (verb), which 
is directed toward a particular object. This too appears to be the sequencing of thought, which 
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according to Ramose (2002), following this pattern reveals “the separate and independent 
existence of the noun on the one hand and the object on the other” (p. 232). The disciplinary 
force of Western imperial cognitive domination—reason—would have us believe the “subject-
object distinction is a fundamental and ineradicable ontological datum” (Ramose, 2002, p. 232). 
Within this framework of reasoning, the verb is simply a vehicle, a middleman of the subject and 
object, which reinforces an ontologically sound separatist logic (Ramose, 2002). “This places the 
doer, the noun or the subject, in the position of moulding and ordering be-ing. Be-ing as a 
wholeness is thus the object of the subject” (Ramose, 2002, p. 232). Within this linguistic 
framework, be-ing is molded by the doer and becomes reality, and dismisses the function of 
doing as a molder of be-ing. This dismissal of the doing–the verb–privileges the doer–the 
subject, and therefore fragments being as a wholeness (Ramose, 2002). This fragmentation, 
posits Bohm (1980), is a result of the Enlightenment’s divorce “between man and nature and 
between man and man” (p. 3). More pointedly, it is a product of the Cartesian ego cogito, which 
establishes a mode of thought that fragments body from mind, and (wo)man from the world in 
which we have our being. While it is easy to place the blame on Descartes, the ontological 
rupture was established and codified long before Descartes’ materialization in the flesh in the 
epochal narrative of the first man and woman—Adam and Eve—who after being warned not to 
do so eat from the Tree of Knowledge and come to privilege thought (the epistemological) over 
their infrangible being-ness with God (the ontological), and are then forever fragmented from the 
wholeness of their being-ness with their Creator. This narrative of the first ontological rupture 
used in the theocratic regime as warning actually served to reinforce the Cartesian ego cogito, 
ergo sum through the doctrine of Original Sin, which presupposes a nearly irreconcilable, 
eternal, and inherent ontological rupture. 
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So, why is the exercise of exploring the function of language important? Bohm (1980) 
writes: 
Being guided by a fragmentary self-world view, man then acts in such a way as to try to 
break himself and the world up, so that all seems to correspond to his way of thinking. (p. 
3).  
As a beloved professor is apt to say, “language speaks us” (P. Hendry, personal communication, 
January 2014) while at the same time makes certain thoughts unthinkable. Therefore, it is 
through language—a creation of man born of a mode of thought—that this fragmentation of 
being is both reified and “seems to have an autonomous existence, independent of his [or her] 
will and of his [or her] desire” (Bohm, 1980, p. 3). In short, (wo)man is ignorant to the fact that 
the proverbial hell in which we live is the product of our own making. Given that the result is a 
product of our own making, we also have the ability to make it anew, to think a different 
thought. The fragmentation of be-ing, avers Ramose (2002), which posits 
the noun as the source of all activity in relation to be-ing also involves the idea that the 
noun (subject) – in this case the human being – is the centre of the universe. This idea is, 
however, questionable because in all probability the universe has got no centre at all. 
(Ramose, 2002, p. 232) 
In a universe that is alleged to have no center at all, the human cannot situate itself at the center; 
however, the West utilizing language through an exercise of its power to make certain thoughts 
thinkable and unthinkable has tenaciously promulgated the idea of human as center of the 
universe, subject fragmented from verb, and being separate from doing. This view of a separate 
and autonomous existence, according to Waldron (2003) and Hanh (1999) is the root of the 
suffering of humanity. Similarly, the philosophy of Ubuntu holds that humanness can only be 
achieved in and through relationship, interconnection with other beings. The very language that 
has reified the fragmentation, also speaks to a long held belief in the necessity of a holistic mode 
of thought. Exploring the etymology of the word ‘health,’ Bohm (1980) proffers:  
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It is instructive to consider that the word ‘health’ in English is based on the Anglo-Saxon 
word ‘hale’ meaning ‘whole’: that is, to be healthy is to be whole, which is, I think 
roughly the equivalent of the Hebrew ‘shalem’. Likewise, the English ‘holy’ is based on 
the same root as ‘whole’. (pp. 3-4) 
The notion of wholeness as health reinforces the dissolution of dichotomous fragmentation with 
respect to our being-in-the-world and points to a rudimentary mode of thought—of being-human 
not as center, but as one component of a grand cosmological schema.  
Ontologically and epistemologically, Ramose (2002) argues, language’s persistence of 
the subject, “as the cause of political and social organization, is based upon a false opposition 
between be-ing and becoming” (p. 233). More importantly, the recognition of being-becoming as 
“infrangible incessant motion,” as an onto-epistemology where order is born of chaos and no 
center exists establishes the Being-West as rhizome, as a line of flight enfolding and unfolding, 
linking with and detaching from a multitude of assemblages within the pantareic cosmic ether. 
Situated and indoctrinated as thinking-West, the Being-West’s mode of thought remains one of 
division as means to make sense of the world; however, no importance is disproportionately 
given to ontology or epistemology–they inter-are. The Being-West is never center, but 
recognizes itself as a holonic assemblage in a perpetual motion and intra-action with other 
Beings (Barad, 2007). The interdependency of subject-verb, being-doing are key insights of 
Ubuntu and Buddhism.  
Embraces certain uncertainty. The Being-West embraces the certain uncertainty of life 
and in relationship with other Beings constructs an endless hermeneutic engagement, which 
necessarily gives way to an infinite number of meanings. Truth, or “true reality is a sacred 
interweaving of all these things – true reality is beyond one single quantifiable truth, it is 
generous” (Forster, 2010, p. 10). In the same vein, the Being-West recognizes identity as “a 
dynamic engagement and discovery of mutual identity and shared dignity – that is a generous 
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ontology” (Forster, 2010, p. 10). The Being-West is detached from the known, and is 
ontologically and epistemologically situated with the field of all possibilities (Chopra, 1994). 
Consciousness made manifest. The Being-West recognizes itself and others as a 
manifestation of consciousness and consciousness is holonic (Forster, 2010). Within the 
Buddhist perspective, Hanh (1999) notes: 
In the year 255, Vietnamese Meditation Master Tang Hôi taught that our consciousness is 
like the ocean with the six rivers of our senses flowing into it. Our mind and our body 
come from consciousness. They are formed by ourselves and our environment. Our life 
can be said to be a manifestation of our consciousness. Because of the food that our 
consciousness consumes, we are the person we are and our environment is what it is. In 
fact, the edible foods we take into our body and the foods of our sense-impressions and 
intention all end up in our consciousness. Our ignorance, hatred, and sadness all flow 
back to the sea of consciousness. We should know the kind of food we feed our 
consciousness every day. When vijñana (consciousness) ripens, it brings forth a new 
form of life, nama rupa (mind/body). (p. 36) 
Reiterated in Chapter 2 (see opening quote on p. 80), Buddhism asserts an inextricable linkage of 
an individual and collective consciousness (Hanh, 1999). Through the practice of mindfulness 
the Being-West is able to ripen its consciousness, which “brings forth a new form of life” (Hanh, 
1999, p. 36)—a new mode of being. The embodiment of the communalistic philosophy of 
Ubuntu and the Buddhist notion of interbeing manifest a specific aspect of being or conscious 
awareness within the Being-West and metamorphs the once atomistic, individualist subject into 
the mindful Being-West. The Being-West, made manifest through consciousness, is holonic. 
Holonic reality, explains Wilber (1995), 
…is not composed of things or processes; it is not composed of atoms or quarks, it is not
composed of wholes nor does it have any parts. Rather, it is composed of whole/parts, or 
holons. This is true of atoms, cells, symbols, ideas. They can be understood neither as 
things nor processes, neither as wholes nor parts, but only as simultaneous whole/parts, 
so that standard ‘atomistic’ and ‘wholistic’ attempts are both ways off mark. There is 
nothing that isn’t a holon…Before an atom is an atom, it is a holon. Before a cell is a cell, 
it is a holon. Before an idea is an idea, it is a holon. All of them are wholes that exist in 
other wholes, and thus they are whole/parts, or holons, first (long before any particular 
characteristics are singled out by us). (pp. 33-34)  
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Given that consciousness is holonistic any change in being, thinking, and/or doing will affect all 
parts. What does this mean? The Being-West is not an individual, but exists in community—it is 
a part/whole, a holon of a greater dynamic, living organism; any change to one part of the whole 
or a whole of any part alters the entirety of the organism. If logic holds, then it follows that a 
change in consciousness (positive or negative) in one Being-West affects all of the Beings-West. 
This consciousness (positive or negative) is made manifest in reality, that is, the daily-lived 
experience of all beings-human. This is akin to Foucault’s (1972) claim regarding discourse’s 
ability to shape one’s subjectivity, thereby altering one’s lived experience and the practice 
Buddhism’s Noble Eightfold Path discussed in Chapter 3.  
Dwells in love. The Being-West dwells in love, that is, is saturated in the 
Brahmavirharas or the Four Immeasurable Minds—love, compassion, joy, and equanimity 
(Hanh, 1999). Hahn (1999) asserts, “if you practice them, they will grow in you every day until 
they embrace the whole world” (p. 169). How much stronger the embrace of the world if these 
dwelling places of love were not simply practices, but saturated our entire being? Would not then 
the world become a place of more love, more compassion, more joy, and more equanimity? 
While not always succeeding, the Being-West strives to abide in love. To say it another way, the 
Being-West dwells in a place of understanding, which Hanh (1999) suggests is simply love by 
another name. This releases the Western need to judge or measure, and allows the Being-West to 
meet all Beings exactly where they are and as exactly who they are. For the Beings finding their 
home in the West, dwelling in love is a continual act of courage (Freire, 1970). Using the words 
of Thomas Merton, the Being-West—in spite of being in the West—dwells in love and 
understands anew in each moment that “love is our true destiny. We do not find the meaning of 
life by ourselves alone—we find it with another” (hooks, 2000, p. 222).  
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An Onto-triadic Rheomode. Borrowing from the philosophy of Ubuntu, which to a 
degree has been colonized by the cognitive imperialism of the West (Battiste, 2002), and 
resonating with Hanh’s Buddhism, the Being-West is an “onto-triadic rheomode” (Ramose, 
2002, p. 237)—onto-triadic in that being is tri-dimensionally engaged and rheomodic in that it is 
always moving away from fragmentation toward wholeness (Ramose, 2002; Bohm, 1980; 
Forster, 2010). More specifically, in keeping with Buddhism and Ubuntu, the Being-West as 
onto-triadic rheomode is always already engaged in a tri-dimensional dance of cosmic harmony 
with the living dead, the living, and those yet to come (Ramose, 2002). Drawing from the 
Buddhist tradition, Hanh (1999) writes: 
It would be sad if the wave did not know that it is water. It would think, Some day, I will 
have to die. This period of time is my life span, and when I arrive at the shore, I will 
return to nonbeing. These notions will cause the wave fear and anguish. We have to help 
remove the notions of self, person, living being, and life span if we want the wave to be 
free and happy. (p. 124)  
To put it another, much like (re)thinking as (non)method (see Chapter 4), the Being-West is 
always already caught up and engaged in an absent present-past, a present-present, and an absent 
present-future (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2015). As illustrated by the quote above from Hanh 
(1999), the Being-West is engaged in a three dimensional onto-epistemological relationship and 
the rheomodic “understanding of entities as the dimensions, forms, and modes of the incessant 
flow of simultaneously multi-direction motion” (Ramose, 2002, p. 233). This understanding 
forms the basis of a Being-West metaphysics with its nascence in the marriage of Buddhist and 
Ubuntist philosophy.  
The Being-West in Embodied Philoso-Praxis 
Much like ubu- is always oriented toward –ntu, and Ubuntu is lived and practiced in an 
effort for the being to achieve its humanness or umuntu, I argue too that an ontological 
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recalibration within the epistemologically privileging milieu of the West must engage in an 
embodied praxis. One of the many possible modes of being-becoming the Being-West, I offer, 
can be found in the intertwining of the practice of Buddhism’s Noble Eight Fold Path (Hanh, 
1999), the Brahmaviharas, and southern Africa’s Nguzo Tani (Five Principles) 
(Kochalumchuvattil, 2010).  
The Noble Eight Fold Path, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, focuses on the 
transformation of being-becoming through active praxis. The Noble Eightfold Path is a non-
hierarchical interconnection of Right View, Right Thinking, Right Speech, Right Action, Right 
Livelihood, Right Diligence, Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration (Hahn, 1999). The 
three broad categorizations of the Noble Eightfold Path are the attainment of wisdom 
(epistemological), moral action (ontological and axiological), and mediation or the 
metamorphosis of consciousness (onto-methodological) (Buddhism, n.d., Ortwein, 2013). The 
richness of the Noble Eightfold Path is that it does not privilege any of the ways of knowing over 
the other, but rather “each limb contains all seven” (Hahn, 1999, p. 50). They inter-are. In 
addition to the Noble Eightfold Path, the practice of Brahmaviharas or the Four Immeasurable 
Minds—love, compassion, joy, and equanimity—allow the Being-West to maintain its dwelling 
in love. The Brahmaviharas are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
The Nguzo Tani or five principles, draws on the African-American tradition of Kwanzaa 
to cultivate a being-ness-in-the-world necessary to engage in and with the world, while also 
respecting the humanity of the other being-becoming Beings-West (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010; 
Pleck, 2001). The five principles include: kujichagulia (self-determination), ujimaa (collective 
work and responsibility), nia (purpose), kuumba (creativity), and imani (faith) 
(Kochalumchuvattil, 2010; Obijiofor, 2003).  
 171 
Remembering the nature of personhood in the southern African cosmology is 
intersubjective and holonic, that is, the individual is maintained by and in relation to the 
community (and vice versa), kujichagulia, which is defined as self-determination or “an internal 
transformation of the African self from within” (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010, p. 119) constitutes the 
practice and cultivation of personal freedom toward responsible decision-making. 
Kochalumchuvattil (2010) supposes self-determination gives birth to a responsible being-human, 
a responsible Being-West. Responsibility, the ethical responsibility born of kujichagulia, coupled 
with the consciousness awakening practices of ujimaa allows the Being-West to recognize the 
other in the fullness of its the humanity (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010; Obijiofor, 2003). More 
importantly, it shifts the individualistic Western notion of responsibility for self to responsibility 
for all.  
Ujimaa, or collective work and responsibility, furthers the cultivation of responsibility 
inherent in kujichagulia and sets the Being-West on a path of cultivating “a sound conscience, 
tak[ing] responsibility for his/her decisions and life choices and liv[ing] with a sense of 
accountability, fairness, and transparency” (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010, p. 119). Through the 
cultivation of responsibility and collective action not only is the Being-West transformed, but so 
too the community of Beings. 
The consistent practice of ujimaa and kujichagulia rests heavily on both the Being-
West’s individual and communal sense of purpose or nia (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010; Obijiofor, 
2003). According to Kochalumchuvattil (2010), 
Nia is a principle directed towards the realization of a vision where each individual self is 
able to determine and pursue their own goal. This goal should not be for selfish ends but 
must be concerned with the well-being of the individual self and that of the community. 
The cultivation of the principle of Nia is the interface between subjectivity and the 
community. (p. 120) 
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In essence, nia is the equated to the inbetween-ness of Buber’s (1970) ‘I-Thou’; it is an 
intersubjective becoming—individual and communal—whereby the action of the individual is 
directed toward the transformation of socio-politico-economic environments for the good of the 
whole (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010). While, I do not assert a causal relationship, it is commonly 
believed that from nia flows kuumba.   
Kuumba, or creativity, is the harnessing of an individual’s “physical, mental, and spiritual 
energies…for creative purposes” (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010, p. 120). In light of the cognitive 
imperialism of the West (Battiste, 2002), this principle recaptures the creativity inherent in all 
Beings-West. For example, it counters the dominant Western narrative of White patriarchal 
artistic and knowledge production, and calls for a development of “new institutions and [a] 
restricting [of] the existing institutions to encourage creative thinking and learning” 
(Kochalumchuvattil, 2010, p. 120). Kuumba encourages that assimilation of one’s own cultural 
beliefs into new philosophies and knowledges (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010; Obijiofor, 2003). 
Kuumba locates the ability of knowledge production and creation at the site of each Being in 
every community; it flattens the knowledge production structure and infuses ethno-cultural 
vitality in the pursuit of thinking, learning, and producing.  
Finally, imani or faith is the “development of an attitude of confidence, self belief, 
optimism and hope” (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010, p. 120). Imani for the Being-West is an 
unshakable hope in the dawning of a new day and it is an active engagement in, what Ramose 
(2002) terms, the ontology of the invisible—that which is unseen, but deeply felt. Imani is a 
transcendental ideal born of a prophetic spirituality of onto-epistemological improvement. 
Ubuntu (Forster, 2010; Eze, 2008; Ramose, 2002; Broodryk, 2006; Nafukho, 2006) and 
Buddhism (Hanh, 1999) are utilized in this inquiry as philosophical knowledges; however, both 
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have been elevated to a spirituality, so it is no surprise that faith and hope are an integral 
components in the being-becoming of the Being-West. It is also no surprise that only through the 
praxis of all five principles simultaneously does one achieve umoja (unity), which encapsulates 
ubuntu and catalyzes a being-becoming umuntu (Obijiofor, 2003; Ramose, 2002).  
The generous onto-epistemologies of Buddhism and Ubuntu harnessed through the 
“philoso-praxis” (Ramose, 2002, p. 237) of the Noble Eightfold Path and the Nguzo Tano, 
respectively, orient being toward wholeness and sets the Being on a path of cosmic harmony 
through peaceful and just relations with all things/beings seen and unseen in the universe. 
Ramose (2002) perfectly expresses the interrelatedness of peace and justice; he offers, “Justice 
without peace is the negation of the strife towards cosmic harmony. But peace without justice is 
the dislocation of umuntu from the cosmic order” (p. 237). Through the philoso-praxis of the 
Noble Eightfold Path, the Brahmaviharas, and Nguzo Tani, the Being-West becomes the 
embodiment and concrete realization of the perpetual striving of being-becoming more human 
and begins to dance in sync with the harmonious rhythm of the cosmos.  
Conclusion 
The subject, born of an Enlightenment regime mode of thought, created and reified 
through language, remains the most pressing concern of society (Derrida, 1991). However, 
within the current discursive regime, a move from humanism to post-humanism has been set in 
motion and has changed the question from ‘Who am I?’ to ‘Who comes after the subject?’ 
(Derrida, 1991). After conducting a genealogical analysis of Western subjectivity and exploring 
Buddhist and Ubuntist notions of subjectivity, I have concluded that subjectivity is not an 
ontological certitude, but an epistemological construction. The fragmentation of being through 
language has produced a false dichotomization of being and doing. The fallacy of an ontological 
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rupture is reinforced in the intersubjective, onto-epistemological notions that comprise Buddhist 
and Ubuntist philosophical traditions. (re)Thinking Western subjectivity through Buddhism and 
Ubuntu, I find that the conception of ‘self’ does not fully capture the socio-politico-philoso-
cosmological entanglement of our being-in-the-world; therefore, I offer forth the Being-West. 
The Being-West is an onto-epistemological response to the unabashed epistemological 
privileging, disciplining, and violence in the world post-Enlightenment consumed by fear.  
The Being-West is conceptualized as a holonic, interconnected bundle of intensities, a 
sacred interweaving, a body without organs mutually becoming in a linkage of assemblages 
always already caught up in an on-going process of folding and unfolding, creating and 
dissolving (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Waldron, 2003; Hanh, 1999; Forster, 2010; Ramose, 
2002). Posing and attempting to answer the question: Who is this Being-West? I have concluded, 
but not indefinitely, that the Being-West can be characterized as: communal, the inbetween-ness, 
interwoven in the infinite, dwelling in love, non-anthropocentric, the embracer of uncertainty, 
consciousness made manifest, and an onto-triadic rheomode. The Being-West is a return to a pre-
Enlightenment being-in-the-world, where one then had nothing to do but be, and an evolution of 
contemporary notions of subjectivity. Given the Being-West’s situatedness in the historicity and 
space/time West, the being-becoming of the Being-West is achieved through an intentional 
philoso-praxis—the intermingling of Buddhism’s Noble Eightfold Path, the Brahmavirharas, 
and the Nguzo Tano (Ramose, 2002; Hahn, 1999; Kochalumchuvattil, 2010; Obijiofor, 2003). It 
is through this engaged philoso-praxis, undergirded by the philosophies of Buddhism and 
Ubuntu, that being-becoming re-orients toward the realization of the Being-West, toward being 
more human, and toward active engagement in the universal web of interconnectedness.  
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(Re)reading the preceding segments through a Western lens, it would seem that much 
attention has been given to the single Being-West and very little credence eschewed for the 
collective, for a societal being-becoming. This re-reading would be false. The Being-West is 
holonic, which in biological terms holds: 
Any change in an organism will affect all the parts; no aspect of a structure can be altered 
without affecting the entire structure; each whole contains part and is itself a larger 
whole. (Wilber, 1995, p. 17) 
Therefore, the transformation of one Being-West affects all Beings-West and cannot help, but to 
alter the whole. Both the Being-West and society undergo a simultaneous and mutual 
metamorphosis. The being-becoming of the Being-West is a contemporaneous being-becoming. 
There is nothing that is not affected, no Being or being-ness left unchanged. What, then, is the 
state of education in the shadow of this totalizing ontological metamorphosis? 
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CHAPTER 6: 
LET LEARN AND LET BE: (RE)THINKING HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS 
AS ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL WOMBS OF BEING-BECOMING 
“When our understanding of what beings are changes historically, our understanding of what 
“education” is transforms as well.”  
- Ian Thomson -  
We live in the age of the ‘Multi-versity’35, that is, “an internally fragmented Uni-versity-in-
name-only, where the sole communal unity stems from a common grievance about parking 
spaces” (Thomson, 2001, p. 251). Much like the Western fragmentation of the ontological and 
epistemological, the university too has become a fragmented entity that has lost sight of its 
communal and intersubjective goals of the ontological formation of its students and its 
epistemological aim of knowledge cultivation (Thomson, 2001; Harvey, 2011; Barnett, 2000, 
2011). As Harvey (2011) and Barnett (2011) assert the modern university and institutions of 
higher education serve as socio-economic classifiers, sorting mechanisms, and ideological filters 
that impact culture through the (re)production of dominant ideology. Barnett (2011) asserts “a 
university has being” (p. 13) and like the beings who inhabit it, it too is a holonic being-in-the-
world, which derives its composition from the being-ness of other Beings. The university has 
“possibilities, and they are infinite. It has multiple options. Each university could be other than it 
is,” (Barnett, 2011, p. 13) yet while each university could be other than it is–it is not. As 
illustrated in Chapter 1, the modern American university has always resided in the tensions of 
espoused principles and the operational realities of its situatedness in a social and political 
milieu; namely, the university promotes itself as a democratic and egalitarian institution, but in 
35 A term coined by Clark Kerr (1911-2003), Chancellor of the University of California (UC) Berkley 
between 1952 and 1958, and the twelfth president of the UC system (1958-1967) (Soo & Carson, 2004). 
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reality is hierarchical, practices racism, sexism, homophobia, discrimination, and prejudice. 
Institutions of higher education, asserts Harvey (2011), have failed on its moral societal 
obligation to live up to its original aim (Harvey, 2011); they have failed to live up to the 
principles they espouse. Not only are institutions of higher education failing students on the true 
aim of education—making strange the familiar and promoting an understanding of our shared 
being-becoming as human, but as I assert in Chapter 1, within society and every level of the 
educational system we continue to experience the effects of higher education’s past cowardice to 
traverse the terrain of moral injustice; namely, in a deficient understanding of our humanity as 
intersubjective. In tandem with Eric Ashby, I argue, institutions of higher education “must be 
sufficiently stable to sustain the ideal which gave it birth and sufficiently responsive to remain 
relevant to the society which it supports” (Altback et al., 2001, p. 4), and given the litany of 
socio-politico-cultural ills which I enumerate in Chapter 1—they are failing and failing badly.  
In essence, today’s universities are market-driven institutions comprised of siloed 
“epistemological [sub]regime[s] characterized by fear” (Barnett, 2011, p. 25)—fear of the 
market, fear of the government, and fear of the students they were created to educate. Institutions 
of higher education operate in ways dictated by the market for the sake of its own survival; they 
have become suppliers in an environment driven by consumer demand—an education 
supermarket (Apple, 2013). In short, Heidegger’s critique of the way in which universities 
“increasingly instrumentalize, professionalize, vocationalize, corporatize, and ultimately 
technologize education” (Thomson, 2001, p. 244) has proliferated. In an attempt to illuminate the 
possibilities of being differently in the world, this inquiry has reconceptualized the Western 
subject, and through Ubuntu and Buddhism has conceived an onto-epistemological Being-West 
(Chapter 5). The Being-West, turns the Western subject on its head, and ontologically (re)thinks 
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the subject as an interconnected Being—a bundle of intensities, a sacred interweaving, a body 
without organs mutually becoming and interconnected in a linkage of assemblages always 
already caught up in a process of folding and unfolding, creation and dissolution (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987; Waldron, 2003; Hanh, 1999; Forster, 2010). The reconceptualization of the 
Western subject and the conceptualization of the Being-West through the generous and 
generative onto-epistemologies of Ubuntu and Buddhism mandate a contemporaneous 
metamorphosis of the educational milieu—higher education, in particular. It is true, as Thomson 
(2001) writes:  
Our very ‘being-in-the-world’ is shaped by the knowledge we pursue, uncover, and embody. 
[There is] a troubling sense in which it seems that we cannot help practicing what we know, 
since we are ‘always already’ implicitly shaped by our guiding metaphysical presuppositions. 
(p. 250) 
In other words, a new ontological understanding must yield new epistemological and 
pedagogical perspectives. A new ontological understanding is akin to an ontological paradigm 
shift—an ontological revolution, which as Kuhn (1962/2012) avers, “…when paradigms change, 
the world itself changes with them” (p. 15). Following Kuhn’s (196/2012) assertion, the being-
doing of institutions of higher education must change because the beings-human who inhabit 
them have embarked on their own journey of onto-transformation. Given the conceptualization 
of the Being-West, how is higher education re-imagined or (re)thought to both meet and 
challenge this new mode of being?  
In agreement with Harvey (2011) and Thomson (2001), the modern university has failed 
to live up to its original metaphysical aim: to encounter knowledge, that is, to make strange the 
familiar and thereby open one up to new modes of being and new understandings of what it 
means to be a human being (Barnett, 2011). The idea of metaphysics as the base of 
understanding and function of the university, I argue in agreement with Barnett (2011), is deeply 
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connected to the idea of the university as “the transcendent university,” (p. 12) which 
presupposes the scholar through his or her “own cognitive efforts…can glimpse an entirely new 
mode of being” (Barnett, 2011, p. 12). Nostalgia in most cases is a lie, this notion of the 
transcendent university is equally as problematic in some respects as the mess we now find 
ourselves in; however, the idea of the transcendent university does offer certain possibilities. 
Currently, we find ourselves on the extreme end of the spectrum conceiving the university not as 
a place of higher learning, but as economic engine and supplier. (re)Thinking institutions of 
higher education with the onto-epistemologies of Ubuntu and Buddhism, I theorize that a return 
to the idea of a modified transcendent university situated in this space/time may provide the 
proper ideological counterbalance to the enterprising multi-versity (Barnett, 2011; Thomson, 
2001). This counterbalance has the potential to re-enliven the equal privileging of ontology and 
epistemology, and re-ensoul of the endeavor of higher education towards an enhanced 
understanding of our shared humanity. First, this chapter looks to an absent present-past to 
illuminate the possibilities of an absent present-future with a discussion of aims of education 
from Plato to Heidegger, conducts an ontohistorical analysis of the philosophy of American 
higher education through the seminal documents that established the field of Student Affairs in 
higher education (American Council on Education Studies, 1937, 1949; NASPA, 1987), and 
concludes with an ontological (re)thinking of higher education institutions through Ubuntu and 
Buddhism, which I assert re-ontologizes higher education and re-essentializes being-becoming 
more human through the pursuit of higher learning. Slattery (2013) suggests within education 
“…the slightest perturbation has a significant impact on future patterns” (p. 271); I am 
emboldened by Slattery’s (2013) assertion and hopeful that this perturbation will catalyze a 
metamorphosis of higher education institutions as not only spaces of knowledge production and 
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acquisition, but also as fertile wombs of interconnected being-becoming and as the awakener of 
conscious awareness of our shared humanity. 
For What Purpose?: From Plato to Heidegger 
What is the purpose of higher education? What is the idea behind the idea of the (higher) 
education? Dewey (1902) would argue the goal of education is “not knowledge or information, 
but self-realization” (p. 9); the transformation of self or the molding of being through the 
knowledge we pursue is the goal of education (Thomson, 2001). Thirty years later, Dewey 
(1938/1997) would add: “The history of educational theory is marked by opposition between the 
idea that education is development from within and that is it formation from without” (p. 17). 
This debate regarding the purpose and aims of higher education has been raging since the 
founding of Harvard in 1636, continues today, and I predict will continue on into the unforeseen 
future as society changes (Thelin, 2004). I argue that one must look towards an absent present-
past to understand the present-present, and the illuminate the possibilities and limitations of our 
absent present-future; therefore, to answer the questions posed, I begin with a brief history on the 
idea of the aims of Western education first presented in Plato’s “Allegory of Cave” (Plato, 
1968/360B CE). The excavation of Plato’s cave leads perfectly into Heidegger’s notion of 
ontological education (Thomson, 2001). 
Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) recollection of the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon in 
the “Allegory of the Cave” establishes for the West the components, method, and function of 
education that has proliferated over two millennia. The classic allegory lays the foundation for 
the aims of Western education. He writes:  
“Next then,” I said, “make an image of our nature in its education and want of education, 
likening it to a condition of the following kind. See human beings as though they were in an 
underground cave-like dwelling with its entrance, a long one, open to the light across the 
whole width of the cave. They are in it from childhood with their legs and necks in bonds so 
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that they are fixed, seeing only in front of them, unable because of the bond to turn their 
heads all the way around. Their light is from a fire burning far above and behind them. 
Between the fire and the prisoners there is a road above, along which see a wall, built like the 
partitions puppet-handlers set in front of the human beings and over which they show 
puppets.” (Plato, 1968/360B CE, p. 193) 
Plato is establishing the belief that human beings come into the world chained by ignorance and, 
in the Buddhist sense, plagued with wrong perception. Unable to turn their heads, unable to 
properly perceive the world these prisoners are fooled by the shadows cast on the cave wall 
created by the fire that burns behind them. The prisoners believe these shadows to be other than 
what they are, which Socrates identifies as: 
human beings carrying all sorts of artifact, which project above the wall, and statues of men 
and other animals wrought from stone, wood, and every kind material; as is to be expected, 
some of the carriers utter sounds while others are silent. (Plato, 1968/360B CE, p. 193) 
Declaring that these prisoners are like us, Socrates avers: 
“For in the first place, do you suppose such men would have seen anything of themselves 
and one another than the shadows cast by the fire on the side of the cave facing them?” 
“How could they,” he said, “if they had been compelled to keep their heads motionless 
throughout life?” 
“And what about the things that are carried by? Isn’t it the same with them?” 
“Of course.” 
“If they were able to discuss things with one another, don’t you believe they would hold 
that they are naming these things going by before them that they see?” (Plato, 1968/360B 
CE, pp. 193-194) 
Within the dialogue, Glaucon inquires as to the ability of the prisoners to see, and later their 
ability to hear as a means of releasing them from the false perception of the shadows as anything 
other than shadows. This establishes both the importance of the visual and the dialogical in the 
ability to reason, to know, and discern truth. If they were able to see and hear, Plato (1968/360B 
CE) avers, “Then most certainly,” I said, “such men would hold that the truth is nothing other 
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than the shadows of artificial things” (p.194). Through this dialogue between Socrates and 
Glaucon, Plato (1968/360B CE) suggests one aim of education is the revelation of truth through 
knowledge obtained by experience and reasoning. However, this is not all.  
Plato (1968/360B CE) alludes the prisoner, now set free from the bondage of wrong 
perception and freed from the shackles of ignorance remains conditioned by his or her former 
condition. Their bodies wracked with pain from years of bondage and their eyes so accustomed 
to the darkness, they are not able to stand upright or see clearly. They are stupefied by ignorance. 
More to the point, he writes:  
“Now consider,” I said, “what their release and healing from the bonds and folly would be 
like if something of this sort were by nature to happen to them. Take a man who is released 
and suddenly compelled to stand up, to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the 
light; and who, moreover, in doing all this is in pain and, because he is dazzled, is unable to 
make out those things whose shadows he saw before. What do you suppose he’d say if 
someone were to tell him that before he say silly nothings, while now, because he is 
somewhat nearer to what is and more turned toward beings, he sees more correctly; and in 
particular, showing him each of the things that pass by, were to compel the man to answer his 
questions about what they are? Do you suppose he’d be at a loss and believe that what was 
seen before is truer than what is now shown?” (Plato, 1968/360B CE, p. 194) 
Essentially, Plato (1968/360 BCE) asks: At the revelation of knowledge, would the prisoner turn 
back to the (un)knowing of the cave? Would he bemoan his previous state as prisoner of the cave 
now that he has revelation of the light of knowledge? Will the prisoner return to the cave to free 
the other prisoners and pass on his knowledge? The prisoner-no-more is liberated; however, this 
liberation, I argue, from one-hell leads to bondage in another. Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) prisoner 
now free of the chains of ignorance remains bound in the place of unknowing, but moving ever 
closer to the light of the sun he removes himself from the cave of unknowing into the light of 
day; his eyes are opened to his condition and a different way of being-in-the-world. However, 
the happiness of his new knowing-being is brief, he is bound anew in the gilded chains of the 
responsibility of the knower and obligated to pass on his knowledge and liberate others. Freedom 
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is not lost; rather, joy and true liberation are found in the act of liberating others, but there is a 
risk. Plato (1968/360 BCE) asserts if this prisoner now free does return to the cave he is likely to 
be killed by the shackled cave dwellers, who not knowing any knowledge other than that of the 
cave will accuse him of being mad. This is the allegory of the cave—ignorant of their condition 
the prisoners take their situation to be the norm; however, armed with knowledge of the light 
they are able free themselves from the bondage of the cave and be differently in the world. 
Liberation—freeing one’s soul and the souls of others, then, becomes the metaphysical aim of 
the educative pursuit. Liberation is the knowledge and the practice of being differently in the 
world. 
In the voice of Socrates, Plato (1968/360B CE) writes: 
“Then, if this is true,” I said, “we must hold the following about these things: education is not 
what the professions of certain men assert it to be. They presumably assert that they put into 
the soul knowledge that isn’t in it, as though they were putting sight into blind eyes.”  
[…] 
“But the present argument on the other hand,” I said, “indicates that this power is in the soul 
of each, and that the instrument with which each learns—just as an eye is not able to turn 
toward the light from the dark without the whole body—must be turned around from that 
which is coming into being together with the soul until it is able to endure looking at that 
which is and the brightest part of that which is. And we affirm that this is the good, don’t we? 
[emphasis added]” (p. 197)  
Plato (1986/360 BCE) establishes education as an onto-epistemological endeavor. His assertion 
that education must turn around the whole body “around from that which is coming into being 
together with the soul…” linguistically establishes a binary, but intuitively is recognition of the 
inseparability of body-soul and the inseparability of ontology and epistemology. Plato (1968/360 
BCE) conceives the purpose of education as not solely about pouring knowledge into an empty 
soul vessel, but rather education is simultaneously a blossoming of the soul from within and a 
watering of the soul from without through the exposition of knowledge(s) of “that which is” 
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(Plato, 1968/360 BCE, p. 197)—the real, that which is real and not a shadow—or a posteriori 
knowledge. Later, Plato (1968/360 BCE) rejects the a priori knowledge of intuition, the senses, 
or embodied knowing and starts the West on the path of rationalism, which a millennium later 
would splinter into empiricism (Davis, 2004). Education, in the Platonic sense, is an ontological 
aim achieved through rational epistemological means. More specifically, education or knowledge 
should “draw [(wo)]men toward being” or cause (wo)men to “rise up out of becoming and take 
hold of being” (Plato 1968/360 BCE, p. 204). Following the “Allegory of the Cave”, Book VII of 
the Republic continues to elucidate the components of education, which echo our modern 
educational structure and curriculum—the arts, gymnasium, astrology, and mathematics (Plato 
1968/360 BCE). Additionally, Plato (1968/360 BCE) lays out the system of education roughly 
adhered to in the West today with the education of children (elementary and secondary 
education), and the establishment of a graduated post-secondary education or university system. 
He writes:  
“Then, after this time,” I said. “those among the twenty-year-olds who are given preference 
will receive greater honors than the others. And the various studies acquired without any 
particular order by the children in their education must be integrated into an overview which 
reveals the kinship of these studies with one another and with the nature of that which is.” 
(Plato, 1968/360 BCE, p. 216) 
The nature of this graduated education is dialectical, Socratic. Additionally, Plato (1968/360 
BCE) recalling Socrates establishes what we have come to know as graduate or doctoral 
education, whereby the men and women who are most steadfast in their studies “when they are 
over thirty, you will give preference among the preferred and assign greater honors” (Plato, 
1968/360 BCE, p. 217). Later, Plato (1968/360 BCE) establishes disciplinary procedures for 
schools (p. 218). Finally, interpreting this translation of the Republic, in addition to teaching, it is 
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the responsibility of the learned men and women36 to actively engage in the life and leadership of 
the polis—to become engaged citizens of the world.  
Indeed, Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) Republic lays the foundation for our modern Western 
conception of education—it’s aims and purposes. Most notable for this inquiry is Plato’s 
insistence that education or knowledge is the vehicle by which human beings move from the 
perpetual striving of becoming to what reads as a more static state of being. Seymour (2004) 
parallels this understanding of education and contends, “Educating is about drawing forth the 
callings within our own deeper nature” (p. 33). Nevertheless, Plato (1968/ 360 BCE) establishes 
for the contemporary West the dominance of rationality over embodied ways of knowing, and 
the utilization of knowledge (episteme) as a means to an ontological end. Today, the ontological 
aims of education have been caste aside and the epistemological given a place of primacy within 
higher education. We have maimed Plato’s notion of education as both ontological and 
epistemological; however, Heidegger (1962b) utilizing Plato (1968/360 BCE) attempts to bring 
the ontological and the epistemological to a state of homeostasis with his notion of ontological 
education (Thomson, 2001).  
Onto-education: A Heideggerian Vision. Utilizing Plato’s conception of education or 
paideia37, Heidegger (1927/1962, 1931/1998) deconstructs education and offers a poignant 
diagnosis of the current mess we now find ourselves in within higher education. As Thomson 
(2001) avers Heidegger does not set out to decimate Western educational institutions and neither 
36 Plato (1968/360 BCE) writes: “Don’t suppose that what I have said applies any more to men than to 
women, all those who are born among them with adequate natures” (p. 220).  
37 Paideia: “—the classical Greek system of education and training, which came to include gymnastics, 
grammar, rhetoric, poetry, music, mathematics, geography, natural history, astronomy and the physical 
sciences, history of society and ethics, and philosophy—the complete pedagogical course of study 
necessary to produce a well-rounded, fully educated citizen” (Tarnas, 1991, pp. 29-30).  
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do I; however, his goal was to “loosen up this hardened tradition and dissolve the concealments 
it has engendered in order to recover those primordial experiences which have fundamentally 
shaped its subsequent historical development” (p. 243). Heidegger’s primary goal in his 
deconstruction of higher education was to shed light on the long forgotten aspects of education 
elucidated in Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) allegory and notion of paideia on which the Western 
conception of education is based. In other words, Heidegger is advocating for a return to paideia 
or education in the Platonic sense, which is “a pure education [whereby] the soul itself is seized 
and transformed as a whole, while at the same time man is transplanted to the region of his 
essence and oriented to it” (Heidegger, 1962b/1931, p. 256). The Platonic notion of paideia, for 
Heidegger, opens up possibilities for a future of education that was once unthinkable (Thomson, 
2001). Namely, re-essentializing the being of humans in the higher education milieu or what I 
term onto-education.  
So what is Heidegger’s conception of education? Heidegger (1962b/1931) conceptualizes 
education as Bildung, which encompasses two overarching implications:  
it means first of all forming in the sense of developing and molding a character. This 
“forming” however “forms” (molds) at the same time through its preconceived adaptation to 
a standard aspect which is therefore called the prototype. Education (Bildung) is above all 
molding and giving direction by means of a form. (Heidegger, 1962b/1931, p. 256) 
Education for Heidegger is an ontological endeavor that shapes being by leading the learner, the 
human being, away from and then back to himself. Education, then, is also a moralistic endeavor, 
a process of unfolding character from within (Thomson, 2001). Reaching back to Plato’s 
(1968/360 BCE) allegory, education is also the process of revealing “unhiddeness in Greek, 
which is translated as truth” (Heidegger, 1962b/1931). Unhiddenness is always hiding in plain 
sight, yet one must have eyes to see. To summarize Heidegger’s (1962b/1931) connection 
between truth and education, he asserts, if education is liberation and liberation consists of 
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“turning-towards” (p. 259) the unhidden, then the “consummation of the essence of ‘education’ 
can therefore take place only in the realm and at the root of the most unhidden [i.e. the most 
true]. The essence of education is founded in the essence of ‘truth’’’ (Heidegger, 1962b/1931, 
pp. 259-260). Given my leanings toward postmodernism and its denial of an ‘essence’ of truth, I 
am at once gripped by Heidegger’s education-truth theorem, and ready to reject it. At any rate, 
he provides an interesting argument and another connection between Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) 
allegory and Western education. Much like education, the ancient Greek understanding of truth 
is much different from the contemporary Western understanding of truth as the congruence of the 
sign with the signifier—the agreement of concept and thing. Heidegger (1962b/1931) owes this 
understanding to Nietzsche who rejects the notion of an essence of truth and conceptualizes truth 
as always becoming. In critique, Heidegger (1962b/1931) argues Nietzsche’s metaphysical 
unthinking alters truth “from the unhiddeness of beings to the correctness of the glance. The 
change itself takes place in the definition of the Being of beings as [idea]” (p. 267). This change 
in the conceptualization of the nature of truth from essence to fluidity, according to Heidegger 
(1962b/1931), also alters the very idea of being. Nietzsche’s metaphysical unthought perpetuates 
a discourse of not being, but perpetual becoming, which implies the lack of a goal beyond the 
notion of progress; thereby, setting higher education on its current path of technocratic 
dominance and nihilistic ontotheology38 (Thompson, 2001).   
38 Thomson (2001) explains ontotheology as Heidegger’s argument “that our metaphysicians’ ontological 
understandings of what entities are ‘as such’ ground intelligibility from the inside-out (as it were), while 
their theological understandings of the way in which the ‘totality’ of beings exist simultaneously secure 
the intelligible order from the outside-in. Western history’s successive constellations of intelligibility are 
thus ‘doubly grounded’ in a series of ontotheologically structured understandings of ‘the being of beings’ 
(das Sein des Seienden), understandings, that is, of both what and how beings are, or of ‘the totality of 
beings as such’” (p. 247). Moreover, each ontotheological positionality grounds the various ontohistorical 
epochs (Thomson, 2001).   
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From Being to Entity. Conducting an “ontohistorical”39 (Thomson, 2001, p. 244) 
analysis of education, thinking with and through Bildung and Plato’s paideia, Heidegger “seeks 
to effect nothing less than a re-ontologizing revolution in our understanding of education” 
(Thomson, 2001, p. 254). Born out of his ontohistorical analysis of Western education, 
Heidegger understands that our current ontohistorical epoch is defined by a Nietzschean 
ontotheology that impacts educational institutions, which he argues come to embody the 
understanding of who and what beings are (Thomson, 2001; Heidegger, 1962a). Cogent to the 
argument being laid bare is Thomson’s (2001) interpretation of Heidegger’s critique of 
Nietzschean ontotheology, which contends Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the subject 
clearly demonstrates that he conceptualized ‘the totality of beings as such’ 
ontotheologically, an ‘eternally recurring will-to-power’, that is, as an unending 
disaggregation and reaggregation of forces without purpose or goal. (Thomson, 2001, p. 
249) 
Given the resonance between the Nietzschean subject and Buddhist conception of 
(non)subjectivity, I argue the only issue is the presumed lack of purpose or goal. In my 
appreciation, being-becoming given its multiplicitous nature is always moving bi-directionally—
toward and/or away from a destination (a goal)—with intentionality. More importantly, 
Heidegger avers: 
Our unthinking reliance on Nietzsche’s ontotheology is leading us to transform all 
beings, ourselves included, into mere ‘resources’ (BestandI), entities lacking intrinsic 
meaning which are thus simply optimized and disposed with maximal efficiency. 
(Thomson, 2001, p. 249) 
39 Ontohistory is the “the history of being” (Thomson, 2001, p. 248). Each epoch, asserts Heidegger 
(1962), comprises a historical series of “ontotheological understandings of what and how beings are 
[emphasis in original]” (Thomson, 2001, p. 248).  
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The ontohistorical passage from Cartesian modernity to the Nietzschean postmodernity is 
marked by a technological enframing40 of subjectivity, that is, the dehumanization of beings-
human into expendable commodities or resources (Thomson, 2001). Moreover, within this 
ontotheoretical epoch, beings-human are reduced to entities, “programmable information, [and] 
digitized data” (Thomson, 2001, p. 249). Given that Heidegger’s critiques of higher education 
begins in 1911, culminates in 1929, and continues into the 1960s, this shift in what beings are 
and for what purpose they should be educated has proliferated over the last 100 years in the 
West. However, in America, the contemporary onto-historical shift is most evident in 1968 
(Berrett, 2015)41.  
Educating Entities: Training in Postmodernity. When our understanding of beings 
change, so too must the manner in which we educate them (Thomson, 2001). The onto-
educational paradigm shift that occurred from modernity to postmodernity opens up a world of 
possibility of a different being of Beings, but limits who and what those beings may become. As 
I have argued throughout, the Cartesian notion of subjectivity and its understanding of beings as 
static, individual, and autonomous left much to be desired. Conversely, the postmodern subject 
or my evolutionary conceptualization of the Being-West is fluid, multiplicitous, rhizomatic, and 
interconnected. While Heidegger critiques Nietzschean postmodern ontotheology, I argue, the 
consummation of Descartes’ and Nietzsche’s subject has produced an awful marriage; hence, the 
reconceptualization as Being-West. This bad marriage has produced an ontotheology that makes 
possible higher education institutions that “increasingly instrumentalize, professionalize, 
vocationalize, corporatize, and ultimately technologize education” (Thomson, 2001, p. 244). It 
40 Enframing in the Heideggerian sense is best understood as “a technological understanding of being…; 
an historical ‘mode of revealing’ in which entities increasingly show up as resources to be optimized” 
(Thomson, 2001, p. 249).  
41 See Chapter 1 (pp. 11-12) 
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has made possible a technological understanding of being and the creation of nihilistic, 
technocratic educational institutions concerned with the production of widget-beings rather than 
blossoming of beings-human. What understandings of education have made possible our current 
reality?  
Heidegger emphasizes the West has falsely interpreted the Platonic notion of education. 
More specifically, the misinterpretation of paideia has yielded an understanding of education “as 
the transmission of information, the filling of the psyche with knowledge as if inscribing a tabula 
rasa or, in more contemporary parlance, ‘training-up’ a neutral net” (Thomson, 2001, p. 254). 
Human beings are not blank slates waiting to be filled or written on; we are always already being 
molded and educated from birth—the home is the first educational environment and mothers our 
first teachers (Solomon, 1985). We are always already caught up in the act of learning. The 
West’s atrophied understanding of education as knowledge transmission or acquisition is 
reflective of the “nihilistic logic of enframing” (Thomson, 2001, p. 254). What’s worse is that 
enframing through discourse has become normalized, so much so, that we are unable to 
recognize we are paralyzed by its power. Thomson (2001) writes:  
Yet here again we face a situation in which as the problem gets worse we become less 
likely to recognize the ‘impact’ of this ontological drift toward meaninglessness can 
‘barely be noticed by contemporary humanity because they are continually covered over 
with the latest information. (p. 254) 
The discourse, which propagates enframing as normal and bombards subjects with quantitative 
data, is totalizing. Today, the purpose of higher education as anything other than workforce 
training for economic upward mobility is taken for granted and exemplifies the permeation of 
free market ideas within higher education42 (Berrett, 2015). The educational milieu, at all levels, 
has experienced an “ontological drift toward meaninglessness” (Thomson, 2001, p. 254) 
42 See pp. 11-12 for the results of the Freshmen Survey conducted by the Higher Education Research 
institute at the University of California at Los Angeles.  
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perpetrated by neo-liberal ideologues and free-market capitalist evangelizers, who preach a 
gospel of education for economic mobility and use institutions of higher education as their bully 
pulpits of enculturation. Along with Heidegger via Thomson (2001), I call for an onto-
educational revolution within Western higher education, a return in this space/time to the 
metaphysical presuppositions that undergird our very being-in-the-world. Looking to southern 
Africa and the East for a new educational paradigm, I echo Heidegger’s call for a real education. 
Heidegger declares, a real education: 
lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the 
place of our essential being and accustoming us [eingewöhnt] us to it’. Genuine education 
leads us back to ourselves, to the place we are (the Da of our Sein), teaches us ‘to dwell’ 
(wohnen) ‘there’ and transforms us in the process. This transformative journey to 
ourselves is not a flight away from the world into thought, but a reflexive return to the 
fundamental ‘realm of the human sojourn’ (Aufenthaltsbezirk des Menschen). The goal of 
this educational odyssey is simple but literally revolutionary: to bring us full circle back 
to ourselves, first by turning us away from the world in which we are most immediately 
immersed, then by turning us back to this world in a more reflexive way [emphasis in 
original]. (Thomson, 2001, p. 254) 
Paideia or real education is an onto-epistemological endeavor that seeks to make strange the 
familiar and the familiar strange for the purpose of “turning around the whole human being” 
(Thomson, 2001, p. 254). In light of Heidegger’s notion of real education (Thomson, 2001), 
ontologically (re)thinking higher education sparks a revolution whereby both the being-ness of 
the institution and being of each person that inhabits the institution is contemporaneously 
metamorphosed. 
Heidegger’s (1962b/1931) ontohistorical analysis looks to an absent present-past to 
uncover the foundation of the West’s idea of education, and to deconstruct Western higher 
education. Heidegger’s deconstruction reveals the unhidden-ness of the disequilibrium between 
Plato’s metaphysical foundation and Nietzsche’s postmodern metaphysical unthinking 
(Thomson, 2001). Within the chasm of this edu-ontotheological disequilibrium has emerged, 
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asserts Heidegger (1962a, 1962b), a false interpretation of education and being. In fact, the 
current mess we are in within higher education is a result of these false interpretations. As 
opposed to Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) conception, education is now viewed as training and beings-
human have been dehumanized—reconceived as widgets, cogs in a wheel, programmable data 
points to be utilized in the most efficient means possible for maximum economic benefit. 
Heidegger’s critique rings as true today as when he reached the pinnacle of his critiques of 
higher education in 1929; however, Heidegger wrote primarily of Western universities in 
Europe. As Hendry (2011) asserts, “History performs incredible epistemological acts” (p. 19) 
and most often acts of epistemological violence; therefore, to subvert the violence of a uni-
dimensional ontohistorical analysis, we now move to an exploration of the aims and purposes of 
higher education in America before (re)thinking education with and through Buddhism and 
Ubuntu.  
The Aims of American Higher Education: An Ontohistorical Analysis. In 1937, the 
American Council on Education met to take up the issue of student personnel work, or what has 
come to be known as the field of Student Affairs in higher education. Experiencing an increase 
in collegiate enrollment and recognizing the need to professionalize positions that were once the 
in loco parentis responsibility of individual Deans of Women/Men, the American Council on 
Education (ACE) found it necessary to develop a document that clarified the nature, role, and 
direction of student personnel work (ACE, 1937). Unknowingly, the drafters provide a peak into 
the dominant ontotheoretical suppositions of the space/time and philosophy of higher education. 
The American Council on Education would meet again in 1949 to update the document to meet 
the needs of the second large influx of college students following the passage of the GI Bill 
(Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944) in post-World War II America (Schuh, Jones, & 
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Harper, 2011; Thelin, 2004). As a student affairs practitioner, these are seminal documents and 
continue to guide student affairs practice; however, given the aim of this inquiry, little attention 
will be paid to the historical development of the field of Student Affairs. The Student Personnel 
Point of View documents serve as sites of ontohistorical analysis and interestingly document the 
(de)evolution of Plato’s (1968/360 BCE) metaphysical ontotheology within American higher 
education (Thomson, 2001; ACE, 1937, 1949; NASPA, 1987).  
From Uni- to Multi-versity. The 1937 American Council on Education document, I 
argue, marks the turn or shift from the Uni-versity to the Multi-versity (Thomson, 2001). The 
drafters, experiencing “[t]he impact of a number of social forces upon American society 
following the Civil War,” (ACE, 1937, p.1) come to recognize the shift in higher education 
“away from the needs of the individual student to an emphasis, through scientific research, upon 
the extension of the boundaries of knowledge” (ACE, 1937, p. 1). This shift following the Civil 
War marks the first American ontotheological epoch, that is, a marked shift from the being of 
Beings to the epistemological objective of knowledge production. The document, eerily as 
relevant today, highlights of the pressures of faculty members to produce knowledge (research) 
to the detriment of the being-ness of their students (ACE, 1937). Therefore, the drafters and 
administrators of higher education institutions felt it necessary to appoint “a new type of 
educational officer to take over the more intimate responsibilities which faculty members had 
originally included among their duties” (ACE, 1937, p. 1); thus, the field of Student Affairs is 
born to tend to the being of students.  
Excavating the ontological perspective in the historical, one comes to the realization that 
a very different discourse regarding the purposes of education was circulating in 1937. 
Illuminating the basic purposes of higher education, the drafters write:  
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One of the basic purposes of higher education is the preservation, transmission, and 
enrichment of the important elements of culture–the product of scholarship, research, 
creative imagination, and human experience. It is the task of colleges and universities so 
to vitalize this and other educational purposes to assist the student in developing to the 
limits of potentialities and in making his contribution to the betterment of society. (ACE, 
1937, p. 1) 
It appears that the basic purpose of higher education—knowledge production, preservation, and 
diffusion—to some extent has remained static; however, what has changed is the emphasis on 
the being of students alongside their intellectual pursuits. This philosophy of education speaks to 
the wholeness of students as beings-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Higher education, in 
the perspective of 1937, is aimed at a holistic onto-epistemological development of its students. 
Further, the creation of a Student Personnel corps speaks directly to a pre-Civil War 
understanding of the inseparability of ontology and epistemology. Prior to 1937, faculty 
members served as both educators and ontological sherpa’s tending to the ontological and 
epistemological needs of their students. The drafters confirm, “Until the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century interest in the whole student dominated the thinking of the great majority of 
the leaders and faculty members of American colleges” (ACE, 1937, p. 1). This shift in the 
philosophy of education would continue and reach an epochal pinnacle following the next 
American War, World War II.  
Four years following the end of World War II, the American Council on Education 
(1949) would meet again to revise The Student Personnel Point of View report of 1937 and 
advance the work of student personnel professionals. More pointedly, The Student Personnel 
Point of View report of 1949 broadens the 1937 purposes of higher education to include three 
new goals:  
1. Education for a fuller realization of democracy in every phase of living;
2. Education directly and explicitly for international understanding and cooperation;
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3. Education for the application of creative imagination and trained intelligence to the
solution of social problems and to the administration of public affairs. (ACE, 1949, p.
2)
Putting these additions in their historical context, these goals manifest higher education 
institutions as tools of nation building and societal growth, while continuing to “affect positively 
the education and development of each individual student” (ACE, 1949, p. 2). After joining the 
Allied Forces in the war against Germany to halt Hitler’s vicious assault on humanity, it is not 
doubt that higher education begins to embody the aims of democracy, international 
understanding, and sociological resolution toward the ultimate aim of, what I argue is the 
realization of, world peace. 
Placing blame on the prototypical modern German research-centric university, the 
drafters assert that higher education in the early nineteenth century lost its way, that is, deserted 
the being of its student for epistemological dominance (ACE, 1949). More directly, they assert 
“[i]nfluenced by German models, American educators steered American higher education toward 
intellectualism” (ACE, 1949, p. 3). Seeking to distance themselves from anything German, they 
proposed a return to a colonial–holistic perspective of higher education that “gave as much 
attention to the social, moral, and religious development of students as to their intellectual 
growth” (ACE, 1949, p. 2). The onto-historical analysis of American higher education in 1949 is 
dominated by a philosophy of education that seeks to holistically develop the humanity and 
intellect of its students towards the ultimate goal of the growth of a democratic society (ACE, 
1949). Specifically addressing the being or the being-ness of the student-in-the-world, they write: 
The student is thought of as a responsible participant in his own development and not as a 
passive recipient of an imprinted economic, political, or religious doctrine, or vocational 
skill. As a responsible participant in the societal processes of our American democracy, 
his full and balanced maturity is viewed as a major end-goal of education, and, as well, a 
necessary means to the fullest development of his fellow citizens. From the personnel 
point of view any lesser goals fall short of the desired objective of democratic educational 
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processes and is a real drain and strain up the self-realization of other developing 
individuals in our society. (ACE, 1949, p. 2) 
It appears higher education, following World War II, becomes a means of nationalist 
indoctrination, intellectual development, and societal assimilation. While I am critical of the 
dictatorial formation of a student’s being-ness in the world following the reception of an 
American higher education, I am pleased with the recognition of student as the intersection of 
multiplicities, an acknowledgment of agency, and a recognition of human interconnectedness in 
our associated mode of living (Dewey, 1916). Ontotheoretically, higher education in 1949 
exhibited the influence of Plato, Heidegger, and Nietzsche and reinforced education as the means 
through which human beings made even more so could develop holistically for sake of nation 
building and peace keeping.  
The second major ontotheological epoch, I argue in Chapter 1, is the shift from the equal 
privileging of ontology and epistemology to an economic epistemological regime set in motion 
by then-Governor Roland Reagan in 1968 in California and reinforced during his presidency in 
the 1980s (Berrett, 2015). More succinctly, the 1968 shift marks the beginning of higher 
education concerned with the epistemological aim of knowledge production, and the acquisition 
of knowledge for economic vitality—the economic epistemological regime—of which we are 
still living. It is also within this second ontheological epoch that we witness the solidification of 
the “Multi-versity” (Thomson, 2001, p. 251) with the development of education as an 
epistemological enterprise (NASPA, 1987; Barnett, 2011).  
In 1987, fifty years after the original 1937 The Student Personnel Point of View was 
published, the National Association Student Personnel Administrators (NASPA) issued an 
anniversary statement that did not revise the documents of 1937 and 1949, but served as 
“perspective written in 1987 to stimulate greater understanding of student affairs among leaders 
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in higher education” (NASPA, 1987, p. 1). Ontohistorically, society from 1949 to 1987 has 
undergone gargantuan changes such as: the Great Society policies of the Johnson era (1964-65), 
passage of the civil rights legislation, the Women’s Liberation movement, the Vietnam War, and 
the height of American protest culture (Thelin, 2004; NASPA, 1987). Concurrently, changes 
were occurring within the colleges and universities—higher education enrollments doubled in 
the 1950s and 1960s, faculty member supply was insufficient to meet the demand, and the 
federal government began their heavy investment in higher education via resources for facilities, 
research, and federal student aid (NASPA, 1987; Thelin, 2004). The times had changed and The 
Student Personnel Point of View documents were necessarily modified to reflect a new societal 
becoming (ACE, 1937, 1949; NASPA, 1987).  
Keeping the additional goals of 1949 The Student Personnel Point of View document, the 
NASPA (1987) A Perspective on Student Affairs enumerates contemporary assumptions and 
beliefs regarding higher education, which has linked to form an edu-philosophical net. Briefly, 
they include:  
• The Academic Mission of the Institution is Preeminent
• Each Student is Unique
• Each Person Has Worth and Dignity
• Bigotry Cannot Be Tolerated
• Feelings Affect Thinking and Learning
• Student Involvement Enhances Learning
• Personal Circumstance Affect Learning
• Out-of-class Environments Affect Learning
• A Supportive and Friendly Community Life Helps Students Learn
• The Freedom to Doubt and Question Must be Guaranteed
• Effective Citizenship Should be Taught
• Students are Responsible for Their Own Lives (NASPA, 1987)
The assumptions and beliefs listed in the NASPA (1987) document illuminate and reflect the 
societal changes that occurred in the 50 years between the writing of the 1937 and 1987 
documents. The necessity to highlight a zero-tolerance for bigotry, the uniqueness of each 
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student, and declare the personhood of each individual is imbued with dignity, worth, and respect 
point toward a volatile, yet transformative 50-year period. Ontotheologicially, the 1987 
document signals the increasing role of higher education to fulfill the original aims of higher 
education with an emphasis on “…help[ing] individuals cope with significant life transitions — 
from adolescence to adulthood, from dependence to personal autonomy, from one occupation to 
another” (NASPA, 1987, p. 7). Today, while original aims of higher education continue to 
vaporously undergird higher education, I argue, it is the final phrase—“from one occupation to 
another” (NASPA, 1987, p. 7)—that has taken primacy over ontology and the traditional 
epistemological function of knowledge production. We now abide in an ontohistorical era of 
economic epistemological primacy, which for all intents and purposes has exiled the ontological 
in favor of technocratic dominance. Heidegger’s enframing prediction is our current reality 
(Thomson, 2001).  
This brief ontohistorical analysis has demonstrated that higher education institutions are 
at once facsimiles of the society in which they are situated and vehicles of transformation for 
those same societies. If “our very ‘being-in-the-world’ is shaped by the knowledge we pursue, 
uncover, and embody” (Thomson, 2001, p. 250) and university’s have being (Barnett, 2011), 
then the reciprocal is also true—a transformation of the being of Beings can catalyze an 
institutional metamorphosis of being-becoming. If my logic holds true, the conceptualization of 
the Being-West catalyzes an institutional metamorphosis toward an onto-educational being-
becoming. In agreement with Thomson (2001), when the being-ness of beings change, then so to 
must colleges and universities—the institutional wombs of being-becoming, where we become 
what are— transform.  
 199 
To Transform As We Are Being Transformed: A Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued Onto-
Educational Philosophy of Higher Education 
In American higher education, we find ourselves both the perpetrators and the victims of 
an economic epistemological regime dominated by neo-liberal, technocratic principles and 
structurally by “nothing other than the optimal input/output ratio of a business” (Readings, 1999, 
p. 39), which leads us to a discourse of effectiveness and efficiency that deceptively circulates
what can only be interpreted as “a criterion of excellence as a performativity in an expanded 
market, because there is no cultural content” (Readings, 1999, p. 38) or ontological 
understanding of the being of Beings (Heidegger 1927/1962; Thomson, 2001). As I invited in 
Chapter 4, imagine the world we would live in if higher education were primarily concerned with 
being-becoming, becoming consciousness, becoming more-human, becoming just society, and 
becoming radical love. Imagine higher education as an environment where communalism, 
dialogue, respect, dignity, and learning over knowledge acquisition thrive (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987; Kincheloe, 2001, 2004, 2008; Freire, 1970; Eze, 2008, 2010, 2011; Hahn, 1999). I assert a 
Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued onto-educational philosophy of higher education offers such 
possibilities.  
It is important to insert a parenthetical remark, this (re)thinking of higher education 
through Buddhism and Ubuntu is designed to transform the being of Beings, and the being-ness 
of institutions of higher education. In agreement with Nakusera (2004),  
deep transformation should not only happen structurally, because the need for attitude 
changes underlies much of the required change in a organization today, and therefore, if 
one can change or enhance a person’s understanding or a situation and ensure that the 
environment supports that change, it is likely that attitude and behavior change will 
follow (Von Hirchfeld & Downs, 1992). (p. 129) 
An ontological transformation, I assert, will necessarily catalyze a structural transformation; 
therefore, this inquiry focuses solely on the human ontological transformation.  
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Again, the primary goal of this onto-educational philosophy of higher education, like the 
Heideggerian notion of Bildung (Heidegger 1927/1962), is the promotion of an education that 
attends to the molding of the being of Beings—onto-education. A Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued 
philosophy of higher education redistributes Eastern and southern African values into the 
Western context, while recognizing the issues of transferability and translatability, I contend 
there are a number of aspects in both onto-epistemological philosophies that once taken up at the 
site of the being-human could catalyze a new educational and societal becoming. Combined with 
the new being-ness of the Being-West, Buddhist mindfulness, The Four Noble Truths, and 
intertwined with the ubuntugogical aspects of dialogue and consensus building constitute this 
(re)thinking of higher education through a Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued onto-educational 
philosophy (Hanh, 1999; Bangura, 2005; Nafukho, 2006). (re)Thinking with and through 
Buddhism and Ubuntu, I now set about on a path of formulating an absent present-future onto-
educational philosophy of higher education toward the cultivation of educating for humanity and 
the manifestation of beings-more-human.   
A Community of (Un)Learners. First, the tenets of Buddhism and Ubuntu realign 
higher education institutions from multi- to uni-versity, that is, given the centrality of 
interconnectedness and interdependence (communalism) in both philosophical concepts, 
(re)thinking yields institutions of higher education as interconnected and interdependent 
communities of learners. The notions of community and learner are key to this first tenet. 
Community implies an interconnectedness and interdependence, which is integral to Buddhist 
and Ubuntu philoso-praxis (Hanh, 1999; Venter, 2004; Eze, 2008; Letseka, 2011). The notion of 
learner discards the traditional epistemological hierarchical designations of teacher and student; 
there are only learners in an onto-educational philosophy.  
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The community of learners inter-are (Hahn, 1999). In fact, the Ubuntist and Buddhist 
notions of community are conceptualized as beings-human entangled in a “vast, ever-expanding 
net of spiritual, psychosocial, biological and emotional relations” (Venter, 2004, p. 151). The 
conception of institutions of higher education as communal presumes interdependence, that is, 
the interdependence of beings-human and the various departments of the institution (sub-
communities). Communalism is an awareness of interdependence. Even more so, it is an 
awareness of the institution as caught up in the success of the beings-human who comprise the 
community of learners. Unable to totally discard West, onto-educational philosophy recognizes 
the Western need for individuality; therefore, individuality is not lost but becomes a matter of 
degree. Moreover, the African conception of individuality can be understood as a “being-with-
others” (Bangura, 2005, p. 33); an individual is only an individual in relationship with others 
(Bangura, 2005). The communalist foundations of an onto-educational philosophy within higher 
education assists in the development of harmonious human and non-human relationships, and 
enhances trust and dignity in human relations. In this perspective, the beings-human journeying 
deeper toward Beings-West who inhabit these institutions of higher education exhibit sensitivity 
and caring. In essence, they are beings-human with and for other beings-human in an 
environment that reciprocates and fosters care and concern for others. Institutions of higher 
education as communal—interconnected and interdependent—lead to social harmony and justice 
in educative relations (Venter, 2004; Waghid, 2014). This underlying understanding of the 
higher education ethos permeates the institutions’ and the learners’ very being-in-the-world. It is 
in community with other beings-human that one’s own being-humanness is made manifest and 
enhanced. As a Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued philosophy, onto-educational philosophy, has as it 
 202 
chief aim the formulation of educated persons, who are made more human in relationship with 
others and within the institutional womb of alma mater.  
What is an educated person? According to Waghid (2014) and Wiredu (2004), an 
educated person is not necessarily a person who has undergone the rigor of Western schooling or 
knowledge acquisition. Rather, just like the African sages mentioned in Chapter 2, an educated 
person in the African sense is one that possesses a knowledge of their culture, is tolerant and 
remains open to dialogical engagement, is moral, and has the ability to reason (Wiredu, 2004). 
Above, all an educated person is wise (Oruka, 1990, 2002; Wiredu, 2004; Waghid, 2014; Eze, 
2008). This understanding of an educated person runs counter to the Western understanding of 
what it means to be educated, yet opens a range of possibilities. In loosening up the Western 
conception of an educated person, we come to recognize all people as ontologically and 
epistemologically graced with the wisdom to know and be known. Additionally, the African 
conception allows for a certain supra-cognitive lucidity, which suggests, “being wise is a distinct 
achievement over above merely knowing many things, whatever the things are that are known” 
(Wiredu, 2004, p. 18). In short, this lucidity allows one to recognize the existence of educated 
fools. Given this conception of an educated person, epistemology too must be reconceptualized.  
Looking to Africa, Waghid (2014) and Wiredu (2004, 2005) assert an African 
epistemology is non-binary, that is, unlike a Eurocentric view of knowledge, an African 
epistemology and I would argue an Eastern epistemology are equally informed by cultural 
sagacity and Western ways of knowing; they are intertwined. For the Being-West, these 
knowledges inter-are (Hanh, 1999). In this view, knowledge is domesticated and like “education 
has to take into account the social context in which it unfolds; in other words, an Aristotelian 
view of education as simply a ‘social practice’ seems highly implausible” (Waghid, 2014, p. 39). 
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To put it another way, Waghid (2014) writes, “If there is an important truth in Buddha or Kant or 
Dewey or Heidegger or Quine, you can take it and add it to the truths that you have obtained in 
your own African tradition of thought” (p. 39). This understanding of epistemology is 
reminiscent of the entirety of this inquiry. Knowledge, like education and learning, is dependent 
upon the situatedness in which it unfolds.  
What is a learner? Indeed, we are all learners; simply living is a process of learning 
(Bangura, 2005). In the Platonic sense, learning is the continuous process by which we traverse 
the soul’s act of becoming to achieve being (Plato, 1968/360 BCE). While the Platonic 
conception is appealing, it does not do justice to what I consider an inseparable ontological and 
epistemological posture. Learning is an active engagement in Right Mindfulness and Right 
Thinking (Hanh, 1999). Right Mindfulness, avers Hanh (1999), “accepts everything without 
judging or reacting. It is inclusive and loving” (p. 64). While Right Mindfulness allows an 
openness of being, it is the tension between and the friction generated by the “initial thoughts 
(vitarka) and developing thoughts (vichara)” (Hahn, 1999, p. 60) of Right Thinking where the 
learning occurs and the being-becoming Being-West must attempt to reside. More importantly, 
learning is a communal unfolding. Looking West, Heidegger (1976) defines learning as making 
“everything we do answer to whatever essentials address us at a given time” (p. 14). Learning is 
an active ontological and epistemological engagement with the matter at hand, unfolding in 
relationship with the community of learners and in the situatedness of the larger community. In 
the West, the classroom constructs a sub-community of learners, who through relationship and 
dialogue onto-cognitively reside in the tension between the initial and developing thoughts of 
Right Thinking. Within this sub-community of learners, the teacher presides as Chief Learner. 
Declaring teaching more difficult than learning, Heidegger (1976) pronounces:  
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Why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger 
store of information, and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning 
because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing 
else be learned than learning. The teacher is ahead of his[/her] apprentices in this alone, 
that he has still far more to learn than they – he as to learn to let them learn. The teacher 
must be capable of being more teachable than his apprentices [emphasis added]. (p. 15) 
Learning and teaching are inseparable. Heidegger (1976) confirms the assertion that learning and 
teaching are two sides of the same coin, and the university as a community of learners among 
whom the teacher/professor is simply the Chief Learner among learners. Interestingly, he also 
defines teaching as “let learn” (Heidegger, 1976, p. 15), which connotes the Buddhist notion of 
Right Mindfulness. However, Buddhistic mindfulness is less concerned with learning and more 
focused on unlearning. To this point, Waghid (2014) writes:  
In essence, our deliberative actions in our teaching-learning encounters should also make 
us open to the unexpected, the uncertain and the unpredictable. In this way our teaching-
learning encounters cultivate a kind of deliberation without any preconceived end-point 
or finality in mind. (p. 13).  
Learning is a rhizomatic engagement producing lines of flight with stops and starts that end 
abruptly and begin unanticipatedly, it is the generation of onto-cognitive fissures and fusions that 
continue ad infinitum (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The community of learners simultaneously 
“let learn” (Heidegger, 1976, p. 15) and let be; they let learn-be acknowledging the 
inseparability of epistemology and ontology. Thinking with Buddhist mindfulness, the 
community of learners is actually a community of un-learners. Transgressing West in 
metamorphosis to Being-West, the community of (un)learners through active engagement with 
the matter at hand and in community seek to unlearn West toward conscious awareness and 
dissolution of self as individual, static, autonomous. The clarion call, it could be argued, for the 
community of (un)learners is not let learn, but let (un)learn-be. 
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Moral. Communalism, conceived through Buddhism and Ubuntu, is inherently imbued 
with a requisite moral or ethical understanding. Bolstering this claim, Menkiti (2004) argues 
African morality “demands a point of view best described as one of being-ness–with–others” (p. 
324). Ontologically (re)thinking higher education, reorients the understanding of institutions of 
higher education as not solely concerned with knowledge acquisition or transmission, but the 
moral development of all within the community of (un)learners. According to Wiredu (2004), 
education as a moral or ethical conception and the development of moral maturity are extremely 
important; it is a component of the embodiment of an educated person. Regarding the importance 
of moral maturity from a southern African perspective, he writes: 
In Akan thought its importance in the making of an educated person is more fundamental 
than might first appear. This quality is not just needed as a special qualification; it is 
needed for being a person at all in the first place. The very concept of a person [who is 
deemed human] in Akan has a normative component that stipulates that to be deemed a 
person (onipa) one must demonstrate a sense of responsibility towards one’s kith and kin 
as well as to the wider community. (Wiredu, 2004, p. 20) 
In agreement, Metz (2011) contends the highest moral obligation within the community of 
(un)learners is “to become more human” (p. 537). Again, moral maturity is a requirement for 
living in community, yet while it is a requirement for living in community it is within this very 
same community that moral maturity is developed. As I asserted earlier, the community of 
(un)learners is concerned with un-learning, which most assuredly occurs through trial and error, 
and mimesis. The trial and error of the (un)learning process requires another trait of an educated 
person – tolerance. Nevertheless, it is through the (un)learning process of trial and error that one 
achieves moral maturity and is then able to model the way for others in the community of 
(un)learners. No one reaches perfection, but is always engaged in a process of recalibration – 
trial and error.  
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Recognizing the moral maturity as a moving target, the Buddhist categorization of moral 
action within the Noble Eightfold Path contains: Right Action, Right Livelihood, and Right 
Speech43 (Hanh, 1999). Borrowing from statistical mathematics, one enters into a state of moral 
kurtosis, that is, one can get close to moral maturity, but never really reaches it because the 
situatedness is always in flux. However, Buddhism offers a philoso-praxis for the onto-
epistemological cultivation of morals through Right Action, Right Livelihood, and Right Speech. 
Right Action is “the practice of touching love and preventing harm, the practice of nonviolence 
toward ourselves and others” (Hanh, 1999, p. 94). Right Action is necessary for living and being 
in community, for being and keeping peace. Cultivated through mindfulness, Right Action points 
us toward an awareness that we are complicit in the physical and onto-epistemological violence 
of society, and encourages us to be generous, to practice responsibility, and to be mindful of 
consumption. Right Livelihood, in the community of (un)learners, reconceptualizes higher 
education as space/time in which the (un)learner discovers their soul’s purpose and is brought to 
the fullness of his/her humanity. This is the metaphysical dimension of the community of 
(un)learners influenced by Plato (1968/360 BCE) and Heidegger (1927/1962) coupled with the 
Ubuntu. The aim is to ensure that what the (un)learner does in life does not negatively affect who 
the (un)learner’s becomes. More succinctly, the (un)learner’s means of earning a living should 
not work against their ethical code or transgress their “ideals of love and compassion” (Hahn, 
1999, p. 98). Finally, Right speech is explained as: “(1) Speaking truthfully. […] (2) Not 
speaking with a forked tongue. […] (3) Not speaking cruelly. […] (4) Not exaggerating or 
embellishing” (Hanh, 1999, pp. 84-85). As I assert in Chapter 3, finding its basis in Right 
Thinking, Right Speech is the verbal expression of our thinking; however, deep listening 
occupies the core of Right Speech (Hanh, 1999). Deep listening is simply listening with 
43 See Chapter 3 
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compassion of which the fruit is healing (Hanh, 1999). Leading us to Right Action, Hanh (1999) 
declares, “to practice social justice and non-exploitation, we have to use Right Speech” (p. 93). 
In agreement with the central tenet of Ubuntu, Right Speech illuminates the importance of the 
dialogical to reduce suffering, increase understanding, and produce a harmonious environment 
within the community of (un)learners. Harmony is not the absence of conflict, but the presence 
of emotions, motives, and relationships oriented toward the edification of others and the good of 
the whole (Metz, 2011). Higher education, through this (re)thinking, is a community of mutual 
care—a formative space/time where Right Action, Right Livelihood, and Right Speech can be 
practiced and moral maturity cultivated through the (un)learning process of trial and error.  
An onto-educational philosophy of higher education seeks to enlarge the (un)learners 
moral imagination by “harness[ing] a culture of humanity and responsibility in schools and 
contribute toward nurturing a politics of harmony in…education” (Waghid, 2014, p. 70).  
Essentially, the cultivation of moral maturity and the calling forth of the (un)learner in the 
process of becoming Being-West engenders moral imagination, and crystallizes the 
responsibility that each being-human has for the whole community of (un)learners and all of 
humanity. Utilizing the Derrida’s (1991) notion of responsibility, Waghid (2014) contends, “a 
person’s individual responsibility and the collective responsibility of the group or community are 
constituted by the inter-relations between the individual and the community” (p. 37). The 
(un)learner and the community of (un)learners are responsible for one another as beings-human, 
and anyone who eschews this responsibility is deemed “unbecoming of what it means to be a 
human” (Waghid, 2014, p. 37). Enacting responsibility requires understanding the needs of both 
the (un)learner and the community of (un)learners; this understanding is only reached through 
dialogue.  
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Dialogical and Reflexive. The community of (un)learners engages in dialogue and 
subsequently, reflexivity. It is through dialogue that we come to know and be known, that we 
come to understand. Dialogical engagement is both intentional speaking and deep listening 
(Hanh, 1999). According to Freire (1970/2000), dialogue characterizes an epistemological 
relationship, which (positively or negatively) shapes ontology. Remember, “our very ‘being-in-
the-world’ is shaped by the knowledge we pursue, uncover, and embody” (Thomson, 2001, p. 
250). Consequently, language is of extreme importance in an onto-educational philosophy. The 
words one speaks and the manner in which one speaks them within the community of 
(un)learners becomes “a way of looking at ourselves, for language is a picture of the ways in 
which we interact with our environment and our kind” (Wiredu, 2004, p. 24). Within the 
community of (un)learners language is the means through which cognition is developed, 
knowledge is communicated, produced, and acquired. In the Buddhist perspective, Right Speech 
leads to Right Thinking, which spurs Right Action—literally the life or death is in the power of 
the tongue (Hanh, 1999; Nakusera, 2004).  
As I put forth in Chapter 1, an engagement in the dialogical, which Freire (1970/2000) 
classifies as an epistemological curiosity, leads to liberation from old regime thinking. Therefore, 
the introduction of an idea interrogated and problematized through dialogue, frees us from the 
prison of the known and transforms praxis, which Louw (2011) defines as an intentionality in 
thought, behavior, or action (Chopra, 1994; Freire, 1970/2000). This praxis constitutes a habitus, 
which gradually necessitates an ontological metamorphosis and catalyzes a new being-becoming 
(Louw, 2011). In a Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued onto-educational philosophical perspective, the 
importance of dialogical engagement within the higher education milieu cannot be underscored 
enough; it is one of the primary means through which the promotion of responsibility and 
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humanity are brought to fruition within the (un)learning community. Waghid (2014) avers, 
“dialogue should be presented as a practice that allows learners to open up to one another with 
the possibility that they [(un)learners] might even come to some kind of disagreement among 
themselves” (p. 76). Unlike the classrooms of the multi-versity, within the community of 
(un)learners (the uni-versity) dialogue is not policed by the Chief (un)Learner (teachers or 
professors). Instead, the community of (un)learners on their journey toward becoming Being-
West recognizes (un)learning as the willingness to be with and in the contradiction, which is 
situated within the tension of the initial and developing thoughts. (un)Learning, then is the ability 
to onto-epistemologically reside comfortably in the uncomfortableness of onto-cognitive 
contradiction.  
Intent on making strange the familiar, onto-educational philosophy focuses not on 
eloquent oration, but the ordinary colloquial and (in)articulate expression of all members of the 
community. An engagement in educated dialogue gives voice to those on the margins (Wiredu, 
2004; Waghid, 2014; Freire 1970/2000). Dialogue, in onto-educational philosophy, is simply 
conceived as a conversation where everyone has a willingness to attentively listen to and for the 
essence of the expression—the content and message, and not the eloquence of expression 
(Waghid, 2014; Hahn, 1999). In a word, an onto-educational philosophy is dialectical, and 
encourages one and all within the community of (un)learners to practice respect. Naturally 
conflicts will arise with the community of (un)learners undergirded by the dialectical; the 
resolution of conflict requires respect and what Waghid (2014) terms “conversational justice” 
(MacIntyre, 1999, 105 as cited in Waghid, 2014, p. 49). Respect in this sense is not a blind 
acceptance of everything that one has to say; however, respect demands that we “hold others to 
the intellectual and moral standards that we [strive to] apply to ourselves” (Waghid, 2014, p. 12) 
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and to do anything less would signal a devaluing of their voice and personhood. In an onto-
educational philosophical perspective, challenge is a form of honor; it shows that what 
(un)learners have to say is being taken seriously (Waghid, 2014).  
In practice, onto-educational philosophy informed by Ubuntu regards (un)learners as 
reasonable beings and recognizes their natural ability to make meaning of the various texts and 
concepts. The (un)learner is able to communicatively express their thoughts and ideas and the 
Chief (un)Learner (professor/teacher) is given to listening to the essence of those thoughts and 
ideas while developing the student’s communicative capabilities. The key aspect of this 
reasonableness is that both (un)learners and the Chief (un)Learners come to a place where 
finality and certainty are but myth, and the real joy is found in grappling as community with an 
idea or concept (Waghid, 2014). Highlighting the importance of reflexivity in the community of 
(un)learning, Waghid (2014) offers a practical suggestion for university professors teaching 
educational theory, he suggests “an understanding of critical pedagogy and reflexivity so that 
they, in turn, can critically and self-reflectively evaluate concepts” (Waghid, 2014, p. 11). This 
suggestion harkens to Pinar et al.’s (2008) notion of currere, whereby both Chief (un)Learners 
and (un)learners are encouraged to practice self-reflexivity to achieve Right Thinking and Right 
Action. In the onto-educational higher education milieu (re)thought through Buddhism and 
Ubuntu, reflection is not enough; (un)learners must make a choice to do something with the 
concepts they are learning and must attempt to put them into practice in their own way. In fact, 
the community of (un)learners is obligated to utilize all they have (un)learned to model the way–
to model the recognition of our shared humanity through their interactions with other beings-
human. Within an onto-educational philosophical perspective, active engagement in dialogue and 
the practice of reflexivity produces new imaginings and tensions from which springs the courage 
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to stretch beyond known boundaries—into the plane of immanence, which re-orients the 
(un)learner toward “the imaginative acquisition of knowledge” (Ramsden, 1992, p. 19) and a 
once unthinkable being of Beings (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  
Democratic. Institutions of higher education, (re)thought through Buddhism and Ubuntu, 
are democratic or focus on building consensus for the good of the whole. They are democratic 
both in the Deweyan sense and as democracy is conceived in southern Africa. Dewey (1916) 
contends “[a] democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily an associated mode 
of living, of conjoint communicated experience” (p. 101). In the African perspective, democracy 
or consensus building is also way of living and being together in community, and is achieved 
through dialogue. Reiterating from Chapter 2, Bangura (2005) asserts African democracy 
operates through discussion toward the pursuit of reconciliation and agreement. Born out of 
mutual respect, consensus building is an authentic recognition of the personhood of each 
individual, our shared humanity, and the maintenance of harmony. Democracy or consensus 
building, according to Broodryk (2006), is synonymous with gathering underneath the shade of a 
tree and engaging in conversation until an agreement is reached. While harmony and agreement 
are the ultimate aims of consensus building, the engagement is not a total dissolution of conflict 
or a resolution to the satisfaction of a single individual, but it is the attainment of a resolution for 
the good of the whole community. The achievement of resolution necessitates members of the 
community of (un)learners practice deep listening.  
Consensus building or democracy is synonymous with deep listening, which is the 
deepest expression of a culture of mutual care (Hanh, 1999). Living in a democratic community 
and practicing democracy is a continual exercise in compassion. Broodryk (2006) reminds 
treating others with respect and exercising compassion requires active and deep listening to the 
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words that others speak and the expression of the words they speak. Deep listening is not what 
commonly occurs in Western educational settings. In the West, subjects listen while formulating 
a rebuttal—this is not deep listening. Deep listening is done with the ears and the heart. Like the 
African system of democracy or consensus building, democratic living within the community of 
(un)learners is “about giving all a chance to express views and for all to listen and discuss 
standpoints, until everybody has reached agreement” (Broodryk, 2006, p. 14). In the community 
of (un)learners harmony or agreement is not always the end goal and cannot be a precondition 
for engaging in dialogue or debate; rather dialogue is a communal practice that opens up 
possibilities for the community as a whole and for oneself (Waghid, 2014). Practicing deep 
listening and Right Speech, the (un)learner begins to problematize the rigidity of their own 
beliefs and comes to understand the perspective of others. In the community of (un)learners, 
Right Speech necessitates the practice of conversational justice, which is the responsibility both 
the Chief (un)Learners and (un)learners to engage justly and respectfully in dialogue with one 
another (Waghid, 2014). More clearly defined,  
conversational justice requires among other things, first that each of us speaks with 
candour, not pretending or deceiving or striking attitudes, and second that each takes up 
no more time than is justified by the importance of the point that she or he has to make 
and the arguments necessary for making it. (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 111) 
This concept is the basis for human engagement and for moral dialogical engagement within 
community. Conversational justice allows the members of the community to share their voice, 
encounter both the similarities and differences within and between one another, and demands the 
practice of mutual respect. Bolstered by Buddhist mindfulness, the practice of conversational 
justice “engender[s] dignified humane action, evoke[s] the potentialities of people, and 
cultivate[s] a community of shared face” (Waghid, 2014, p. 70). Imagine a community, a society, 
and a political arena where conversational justice and deep listening were practiced; listening to 
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what is said not who is saying it. Imagine the synergies, the points of mutual understanding that 
could be reached in the community writ large if we justly conversed with one another. The 
possibilities for meaningful, authentic human engagement are limitless.  
Notwithstanding the benefits of practicing conversational justice, democratic education 
proffers Nussbaum (2002), “involves the cultivation of critical argumentation, reasoning and 
narrative imagination, that is to imagine what it would be like to be in the position of someone 
different from oneself” (p. 289). In other words, within a culture of conversation, the community 
of (un)learners practice “equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and social 
honour” ([SA] Department of Education, 2001, p. 3 as cited in Waghid, 2014, p. 72). Consensus 
building encourages an understanding of difference through dialogue and mandates the 
utilization of critical thinking in the engagement. Further, practical and ideological conflicts are 
bound to arise within community; living out democratic ideals within the community of 
(un)learners encourages reconciliation through dialogue (Wiredu, 2004). In this way, institutions 
of higher education serve as preparatory environments for living in community writ large. In a 
spirit of dialogue and through the practice of consensus building, the (un)learner comes to allow 
the existence of many ideas and perspectives without holding any one uncompromisingly in so 
far as the ideas meet the needs of the community, are moral, and recognizes the dignity of each 
being-human.  
Humanizing. Finally, an onto-educational philosophy of higher education hued by 
Buddhism and Ubuntu leads all (un)learners from themselves and back to themselves in the 
context of the space/time in which they are situated. As Broodryk (2006) asserts, “knowledge is 
the challenge of being human so as to discover the promise of being human” (p. 24). Onto-
educational philosophy holds education is one means through which (un)learners, and all humans 
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can come into the fullness of their humanity in relationship with one another and assist in 
developing the necessary tools through which we are able to fully express our soul’s purpose. 
Further, education allows us to realize: the global deficit of our shared humanity; and recognizes 
that as a nation, a people, and a culture we have privileged some over others; we have given a 
place of honor to the dominate race/group while erasing from hearts and minds the contributions 
of others who are equally deserving of the respect of remembrance. Within the (un)learning 
community, an onto-educational philosophy of higher education calls upon each of us broaden 
our view of the world and the people, who inhabit it—to recognize the contributions of all 
cultures and respect the personhood of each individual. Through the philoso-praxis of the Four 
Noble Truths, the Noble Eight Fold Path, and cultivation of the “Bodhichitta44” or “mind of 
love,” (Hahn, 1999, p. 62), an onto-educational higher education philosophy (re)thought through 
Buddhism and Ubuntu heightens the awareness that: 
‘A person is a person through other people’ [which] strikes an affirmation of one’s 
humanity through recognition of an ‘other’ in his or her uniqueness and difference. It is a 
demand for a creative intersubjective formation in which the ‘other’ becomes a mirror 
(but only a mirror) for my subjectivity. This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not 
embedded in my person solely as an individual; my humanity is co-substantively 
bestowed upon the other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other. We create 
each other and need to sustain this otherness creation. And if we belong to each other, we 
participate in our creations: we are because you are, and since you are, definitely I am. 
The ‘I am’ is not a rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this 
otherness creation of relation and distance. (Eze, 2010, p. 190-191) 
This is Ubuntu. This is Buddhism. This is the cultural philoso-praxis of the community of 
(un)learners. An onto-educational philosophy of higher education engenders “communal 
embeddedness and connectedness of a person to other persons” (Waghid, 2014, p. 10). In 
essence, it recognizes the humanity of the Other through a recognition of humanity in oneself. 
44 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Bodhichitta is cultivated when we seek to understand ourselves for the 
aim of showering others with happiness (Hanh, 1999). 
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At the heart of an onto-educational higher education milieu permeated with the 
philosophical concepts of Ubuntu and Buddhism is a strong communitarian and interdependent 
nature. As discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the conceptualization of the Being-West, subjectivity 
as we understand it, as a whole does not go by the wayside rather it is our responsibility—
ethically and morally—to act in a communitarian way. Moreover, to view our human relations 
with mindfulness through the lens of Ubuntu, according to Waghid (2014),  
is to do so with an intersubjective human identity that does not dismiss the self-
determined (autonomous) and responsible actions of individual persons. They act with 
their subjective selves in a self-determined and responsible manner towards others–that is 
they are in mutual action and interaction with others. I see myself reflected by and 
through the Other, which makes the Other a mirror that recasts my image to me; this 
suggests that there is some interconnectedness between the Other and me. (p. 29) 
This notion is powerful for all beings-human, but most especially for Chief (un)Learners 
(teachers and professors) who, I posit, are shaping first the hearts then the minds of 
(un)learners—molding their being-ness-in-the-world. An onto-educational philosophy of higher 
education holds that the aim of higher education is to educate the heart and the mind. To perceive 
oneself and the Other as one and same radically alters the way in which we let (un)learn-be and 
how as beings-human we come into relationship with one another. All within the community of 
(un)learners recognize their interconnectedness and interdependence as beings-human not only 
as mirror, but as one-same. To this point, Cavell (1979) offers “the other is like oneself, that 
whatever one can know about the other one first has to find in oneself and then read into the 
other…[that is] conceive the other from the others point of view” (p. 29). All within the 
community of (un)learners have a responsibility, a moral obligation to all beings-human, which 
makes them answerable for what happens to them (Waghid, 2014). Cavell (1979) unknowingly 
incorporates the communal, dialogical, and consensus building pillars of an onto-educational 
philosophy of higher education as a means of humanization.  
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The community of (un)learners seeks to impart an understanding of the complexity of 
this world and humanity by making strange the familiar and the familiar strange to lead 
(un)learners away and then back to themselves (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2007). What does this 
mean? It means that institutions of higher education have an obligation to expand the mind, to 
enhance moral growth, to problematize and make question—to promote ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological development. The seed of this developmental process must be 
firmly planted at the site of the being-human, first. For instance, entrance into the community of 
(un)learners most often causes the (un)learner to call into question the philosophies, ideologies, 
and practices of their communities of origin making what was once very familiar seem quite 
strange. Inversely, within the community of (un)learners, the (un)learner is familiarized with 
notions that were once thought strange; thereby making the strange familiar. This process 
purposefully generates a onto-cognitive dissonance—the tension between the initial and 
developing thought—which begins to make possible new modes of being and new 
understandings of what it means to be a being-human. Indeed, we are shaped by the knowledge 
we pursue, but also by our ability to abide, to be in the generous fissure of contradiction 
(Thomson, 2001). This is a necessity of deepening our understanding of self as being-human and 
the humanness of the other beings-human within the community of (un)learners. “Moreover, 
central to one’s connection with the Other is the notion that one has to acknowledge humanity in 
the Other–and the basis for such action lies in oneself: ‘I have to acknowledge humanity in the 
other, and the basis seems to lie in me’” (Cavell, 1979, p. 433). So, through a Buddhist and 
Ubuntu-hued onto-educational philosophy of higher education, the community of (un)learners 
arrives at the understanding that we are human begins through and with other human beings, but 
the realization of that humanity is at the same time both personal and communal. In this sense, 
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the (un)learner has departed as ‘self’ and returned to its personhood as Being-West. The 
(un)learner comes into the fullness of his/her humanity within the community of (un)learners 
through the philoso-praxis of onto-education.  
I recognize to simply say that (un)learners will come into the fullness of their humanity 
by partaking in the community of (un)learners is vague. Here is what I mean in asserting an onto-
educational philosophy is humanizing. First, the (un)learners conceptualization of humanity or 
humanness is developed in praxis, in active engagement in the life of the community, which 
requires the recognition of the dignity of each being-human within the community. Dignity, 
human dignity can only be developed in community and through a deep recognition of one’s 
own and the other’s humanness (Metz, 2011). Understanding the dignity and personhood of each 
being-human is a moral obligation and a practice in love. Love, I assert, is the key to blossoming 
beings-humans into the fullness of their humanity. The love of which I speak is not eros, 
sentimentality or mush, but agape—unconditional love, the liberating force that binds all beings-
human in common humanity. Love humanizes; it accepts the other in their otherness, but also 
mandates equal dignity, equal respect, mutual care, challenge and support, tolerance, and 
openness be extended to all beings-humans in the process of their being-becoming. As Hanh 
(1999) reminds, love is simply understanding called by another name.  
Conclusion 
The onto-educational institution of higher education is communal, normative, dialogical 
and reflexive, democratic, and humanizing. Ontologically (re)thinking institutions of higher 
education with Buddhism and Ubuntu reorients the aim from knowledge production and 
acquisition to the fulfillment of their deepest moral obligation: providing an environment where 
(un)learners can become more fully human by entering more deeply into community (Shutte, 
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2001). Mandated by the conceptualization of the Being-West (Chapter 4) as inextricably bound 
to other Beings-West, ontologically (re)thinking institutions of higher education through 
Buddhism and Ubuntu manifest what I term an onto-educational philosophy. An onto-
educational philosophy of higher education re-ontologizes education, that is, shifts the higher 
education milieu from its current status of polytechnic institution characterized by an economic 
epistemological fear toward an un-fragmented or uni-onto-educational institution, where the 
shaping of the being of Beings holds equality with the production and acquisition of knowledge 
(Thomson, 2001). Thinking with Buddhist mindfulness, the university is reconceptualized as the 
community of (un)learners, where (un)learners not students come together to gain an 
understanding of the complexity of the world from not professors but Chief (un)Learners. The 
entirety of the community of (un)learners from the Administration to the faculty, staff, and 
members of facility services personnel are perceived as both (un)learners and Chief 
(un)Learners—each person is considered an educated person enshrouded in the wisdom of their 
various communal and cultural embodiments and (un)knowings. As members of the community 
of (un)learning, each being-human presents the opportunity for new ontological and 
epistemological possibilities that can benefit the whole of humanity. In essence, (re)thinking 
institutions of higher education through Buddhism and Ubuntu initiates a contemporaneous 
‘individual’ and institutional metamorphosis. The community of (un)learners (university)—alma 
mater—in its being-ness is transformed into the institutional womb of being-becoming more 
human, which comes to birth the Being-West in the fullness of its being-humanness.  
The Western onto-praxis of onto-educational philosophy within higher education 
provides a counterbalance to today’s enterprising multi-versity and returns to the notion of 
higher education as a space/time of holistic development of the being-human; a time when higher 
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education was concerned with both the being of Beings and the production of knowledge for the 
betterment of humanity. This re-ontologizing of education, through the generative onto-
epistemologies of Buddhism and Ubuntu, in a sense re-ensouls the educative endeavor and re-
joins all of the components of today’s mutli-versity toward one goal—Bildung: the molding and 
shaping of life-long (un)learners who understand the nature of our shared humanity and the 
fragility and strength of our being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1927/1962). As I asserted elsewhere, 
the attitudinal (onto-epistemological) transformation and the structural transformation must 
necessarily occur in tandem to yield a new mode of being for all within the community of 
(un)learners. The institution of higher education permeated by the philosophy of onto-education 
does not view its self as multi-, but uni-. In the onto-educational university, all departments, 
divisions, faculty, staff and students work together with common purpose—they understand the 
wholeness of the being-ness of the institution and the inseparability of the structural components 
to its being-ness. The university, as community of (un)learners, is always oriented toward 
sharing, equality, respect, and compassion. This orientation transcends the siloed, territorial and, 
at times, predatory nature of the multi-versity. In effect, the onto-educational university is unified 
by its shared commitment to the creation of a community of (un)learners who pursue excellence 
with a conscience and an understanding that all within the community are committed to the 
responsibility of improving the world and beings-in-the-world for the sake of all humanity.  
In thinking about the current state of American higher education, I am frightened and 
enraged that we are all being conditioned to think, behave, process or not process in certain ways 
based on the dominate ideologies and discourse. Giroux (as cited in Pinar et. al, 2008) asserts 
that curriculum, and ideology in particular, structures the unconscious of students. Even more 
frightening is Apple’s (2013) assertion that we are the result of ideology and even now we are 
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under its spell. Institutions of higher education in the economic epistemological regime of fear 
presumes that being-humans are not capable of becoming or rather controls their “becoming” in 
order to fashion an ontology more congruent with the dominant political and economic 
ideologies. This hidden curriculum, which is not so hidden anymore, serves as a mechanism of 
the dominant culture to silence and to marginalize the ideas and voices of those who are not 
willing to conform to the rules of the status quo (Pinar et. al, 2008).  
An onto-educational philosophy of higher education focuses on the depth of our 
humanity, looks critically at the systems and power structures of this world, seeks to always 
disrupt hegemonic relationships, practices self-reflection and introspection, and that actively 
works on behalf of justice which is critical to our time. Within the hallowed halls of institutions 
of higher education, onto-educational philosophy attempts to recalibrate higher education to once 
again concern itself with being-becoming, becoming consciousness, becoming just society, 
becoming radical love, and becoming more-human. For too long we have allowed big business 
and elites to rule the world, control our understanding, and perpetuate human oppression. It is 
time for a new philosophical understanding, a new onto-epistemological perspective that 
privileges justice, equity, community, and liberation of the bodies and minds of all beings- 
human. Onto-educational philosophy, a Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued philosophy of education, is 
one of the many possibilities of philoso-praxical transformation of the being-ness of institutions 
of higher education and has the potential to catalyze a universal metamorphosis of humanity. 
With our feet firmly rooted in the now, we must begin to imagine a better tomorrow, a new 
tomorrow, and an education that recognizes on a deeply spiritual/humanistic level our collective 
humanity. How can this be? How can we re-fashion ontology in higher education? We must act; 
courageous praxis is the key that will unlock the door to our better tomorrow.  
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The cultivation of communalism, morality (ethics), dialogue and reflexivity, and a deeper 
understanding of our shared humanity in the conception of an onto-educational philosophy of 
higher education moves us collectively toward justice, mutual respect (love), the limitless 
imagining (hope) of what we are not yet but might become (faith). This ontological (re)thinking 
of higher education through Buddhism and Ubuntu reminds all within the community of 
(un)learners that we are always in the process of our being-coming. Waghid (2014) writes:   
All of us – in our incompletion of culture and in our incompletion of being –because for 
as long was we converse – and for as long as we absorb all that is around us, we are never 
complete. Every other that we encounter has the potential to bring new a new perspective 
and a changed perception…an enlargement of perspectives. (p. 67) 
We must begin to model this way of being within higher education classrooms, the hallowed 
halls of the academy, within our places of worship, within our respective communities. Leading 
by example, we must practice in the mundane and (extra)ordinary curriculum of our everyday 
lives the tenets of Ubuntu and Buddhism encapsulated in an onto-educational philosophy. 
Ontology within higher education will transform as the understanding of the very being of the 
beings-human who inhabit the hallowed halls of institutions of higher education are transformed. 
As we open ourselves to the possibilities of being-in-the-world differently, we begin to pursue 
new knowledges and view old knowledges differently, which will undoubtedly catalyze an 
ontological metamorphosis. In short, as we are transformed, we transform.  
 222 
CHAPTER 7: 
EDUCATING FOR A DEEPER HUMANITY: A NEW PLATEAU 
“Education for humanity is awareness of both the problems and possibilities that we face 
and the proactive tools and courage to act together. It is the provision of educational tools and 
processes that make the world a better place for humanity through serving human needs and 
those of the community. It is an education dedicated to awakening and empowering our spiritual 
sensitivities, our relation to the human community, our connection to nature, and our values as 
human beings dedicated to a healthy society, present and future.” 
- Henry M. Levin - 
Beginning with the litany of horrors in Chapter 1 and ending with the news we consumed 
this morning, it would appear humanity is at war with itself. This is a troubling assertion, yet all 
evidence points to its affirmation. As I aver throughout this inquiry, education and higher 
education, in particular, is the chief culprit in the commencement and promulgation of this war. 
Education is complicit in the creation of the mess we now find ourselves. However, education is 
also the means through which we can come to peace, but not the same education. Hell, not even 
a better education, but a different education. The mind that got us into this mess cannot be the 
mind that gets us out of it (Seymour, 2011). Unless we begin to educate differently, to shift our 
onto-cognitive (being-thinking) positionalities about the purpose and aims of educating beings-
human and recalibrate our understanding of what it means to be a being-human, then I am afraid 
the present war will rage on into an absent present-future. Even more, if we remain stuck in the 
onto-cognitive Western imperialist framework in which we currently reside, we will not be able 
to address the complexity or meet the realities of our very present-present nor our absent present-
future. As LeGrange (2011) contends, Western hegemony is a result of the scientific and military 
violence it has inflicted on the peoples of the world. Western power obtained through physical 
violence has been sustained by epistemological violence, which has undoubtedly murdered the 
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indigenous ontology of its non-Western subjects. This violence begets violence, which begets 
violence of all varieties ad infinitum—this is the mess that we now find ourselves.   
Mapping Harvey’s (2011)45 indictment of higher education institutions’ complicity in the 
current societal milieu and his assertion of their moral obligation and responsibility create a 
positive future society, I locate the site of this ontological (re)thinking at institutions of higher 
education and the beings-human that are impacted by them. More specifically, the hallowed halls 
of higher education institutions not only produce and disseminate knowledge to the world, but is 
where the very being of Beings is molded. It is from institutions of higher education that beings-
human will go out into the world as teachers, doctors, lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, 
policy makers, mayors, governors, and even as presidents of countries. It is within these 
hallowed halls that being is shaped and the world is (re/de)formed; the impact is unpredictable, 
but its effects last well into an absent present-future. Harvey’s (2011) contention coupled with 
Barnett’s (2011) declaration that a university “has being [emphasis in original]” (p. 13) and 
infinite possibilities, spurs an exploration of the other-than-ness of higher education institutions 
in our current space/time and within the reality of a very present-present. As I put forth in 
Chapter 1, education contains the possibility to be differently; however, we must (re)think 
Western taken for granted notions, values, and ideas about what education is and who human 
beings are to realize a new way of being-doing. More to the point, the assertion begs to question 
what higher education might become when ontologically (re)thought through Buddhism and 
Ubuntu—two non-Western onto-epistemological indigenous philosophies—toward an 
ontological revolution.  
Currently, the Western higher education milieu can only be described as an economic 
epistemological regime of fear, where neo-liberal ideology and market-driven educational 
45 See Chapter 1 
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discourse shapes and restricts thinking, and institutions of higher education are suppliers of 
consumer-driven demand—not institutions of higher learning, but supermarkets of economical 
knowledge acquisition (Barnett, 2011; Bacchi, 2000). Buddhism and Ubuntu provide a lens 
through which we can (re)think the possibilities of other-than-ness in the current higher 
education milieu. I theorize, in Chapter 1, the necessity of a contemporaneous 
reconceptualization of the Western subject and an institutional being-becoming—an ontological 
turn within higher education, which has the potential to “turn our current reality on its head” 
(Waldron, 2003, p. 146) or catalyze a new societal being-becoming. Again, I argue, the 
generative onto-epistemologies of Buddhism (East) and Ubuntu (South African) provide the 
rhizomatic node from which new ontological, epistemological, and axiological lines of flight 
may emerge in (re)thinking Western subjectivity and higher education to catalyze an educational 
and societal metamorphosis. This (re)thinking is an act of courage in a regime of fear. 
Chapter 2 explores Ubuntu or humanness, the southern African philosophy of life 
(Ramose, 2002; Waghid, 2004; Eze, 2008, 2010). Counter West, Ubuntu cannot be achieved in 
isolation, but one only becomes a person through relationship with other people (Eze, 2010). 
According to Eze (2010), Ubuntu can best be explained as: 
'A person is a person through other people' [which] strikes an affirmation of one’s 
humanity through recognition of an ‘other’ in his or her uniqueness and difference. It is a 
demand for a creative intersubjective formation in which the ‘other’ becomes a mirror 
(but only a mirror) for my subjectivity. This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not 
embedded in my person solely as an individual; my humanity is co-substantively 
bestowed upon the other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other. We create 
each other and need to sustain this otherness creation. And if we belong to each other, we 
participate in our creations: we are because you are, and since you are, definitely I am. 
The ‘I am’ is not a rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this 
otherness creation of relation and distance. (p. 190-191) 
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Ramose (2002) asserts an African’s life is anchored in Ubuntu, which mandates communalism, 
positive recognition of difference, and responsibility toward one another. Eze’s (2010)46 
definition coupled with Waghid’s (2004) assertion that Ubuntu contains the possibility to 
“…engender dignified and humane action, evoke the potentialities of people, and cultivate a 
community of shared face” (p. 70) provide the philosophical matter necessary to both 
reconceptualize Western notions of subjectivity and (re)think higher education.  
Ubuntu intensifies an understanding of the interconnectedness and interdependence of all 
living beings, and their indispensability in our collective being-becoming more human. This 
deepened understanding compels beings-humans toward a code of ethic that reinforces 
communal harmony, compassion, empathy, tolerance, kindness, and love. In a Western 
educational ethos that persistently dehumanizes, Ubuntu as philosophy and ethic, is re-
humanizing and realigns the aims and purposes of education toward educating for humanity. 
Through an Ubuntu-hued understanding of subjectivity, we are made aware that we belong to 
one another, are responsible for another, and are co-creators of human being-becoming. Further, 
I explore the potential of Bangura (2005) and Nafukho’s (2006) notion of ubuntugogy in the 
(re)thinking of higher education. Ubuntugogy transcends Western pedagogical notions and 
reshapes the learning environment to center dialogue and consensus building, and radically alters 
the Western being-doing of beings-human in the sub-community of the classroom (Bangura, 
2005; Nafukho, 2006). Biko’s (1978) proclamation of Ubuntu as the great gift of Africa to the 
world rings true in this inquiry’s aim of (re)thinking higher education to educate for humanity 
and in reconceptualizing the Western subject. Ubuntu, in Tutu’s (2004) appreciation, reorients 
Western thinking: “Ubuntu does not say, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human 
because I belong. I participate. I share’” (p. 27). Reiterated from Chapter 2, imagine a world 
46 See Chapter 2 
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where education and learning were approached from an ubuntugogical perspective. Even more, 
imagine a society in the West not focused on self-interests, but communal interests. How 
different might our present-present and absent present-future be—our world, human 
relationships, and planet be differently?  
Buddhism, I offer in Chapter 3, provides a unique vehicle for transformation. Not only 
does it promote mindfulness and awakens consciousness, but also allows for the practice of one’s 
root faith tradition alongside the teachings of the Buddha (Hanh, 1999). As a philoso-praxis, 
Buddhism is concerned with the present-present and holds nirvana can be attained in the here 
and now. Present transformation through the formulation of consciousness provides a 
complementary foil to the multi-directional nature of an Ubuntu philosophy. The teachings of the 
Four Noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path, and the Four Immeasurable Minds constitute a 
transformational praxis that alone is powerful, but when East meets southern Africa the 
transformative potential intensifies. Finding similarities between Buddhist notions and Ubuntu, 
one comes to discover the interdependence, interconnectedness, and inseparability of all things 
including ontology and epistemology (Hanh, 1999; Ramose, 2002; Asakura, 2011; O’Sullivan, 
2014). Conversely, unlike Ubuntu, Buddhism does not necessitate resolution or 
commensurability of contradictions, but allows one to sit comfortably in the uncomfortableness 
of the in-between. Following an exploration of Buddhist ontology, Chapter 3 concludes with a 
discussion on Hanh’s (2008) notion of Engaged Buddhism, which is integral to an understanding 
of its presence in every moment of life. Understanding that suffering in the world exists, 
Engaged Buddhism directs us not to run away from the suffering of the world, but promotes the 
courage to walk into the suffering of the world to transform it. In Hanh’s (2008) Engaged 
Buddhist’s renewal of the Four Noble Truths, he teaches transformation begins with self first and 
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then spreads outward to society (Sivaraksa, 2002). Buddhism provides an epistemology and 
methodology to transform collective ontology; in fact, there is no separation–they inter-are 
(Hahn, 1999). Interweaving Buddhist philoso-praxis and Ubuntu, catalyzes a reconceptualization 
of Western subjectivity and an educational metamorphosis.  
The Western notion of subjectivity does not do justice to who we are as beings-in-the-
world. Chapter 5 reconceptualizes the Western subject through Buddhism and Ubuntu, and 
metamorphs the subject from autonomous, separate, and individual to liberated, fluid, dynamic, 
and blissfully becoming in relationship with all things. (re)Thinking with generous ontologies of 
Buddhism and Ubuntu, the autonomous Western subject gives way to the Being-West, who is 
always already in communion with all things seen and unseen. Combining the Buddhist notion of 
interbeing with the intersubjective alchemy of personhood in an Ubuntist philosophy, the Being-
West is made manifest. The Being-West is conceptualized as a bundle of intensities, a sacred 
interweaving, a body without organs mutually becoming through a linkage of assemblages 
always already caught up in a process of folding and unfolding, creation and dissolution 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Waldron, 2003; Hanh, 1999; Forster, 2010). For the Being-West, 
beings-human are made more so in relationship and participation. Moreover, I argue, the Being-
West disintegrates Descartes ego cogito, and answers the call of being—the call of being 
differently in the world. The Being-West is an ontological response to the unabashed 
epistemological discipline and violence of a world post-Enlightenment.  
Named in recognition of its geographical, historical, and counter-ideological situatedness, 
the Being-West seeks to decolonize itself from the onto-cognitive imperialism of the West, yet 
continues to live, move, and have its being in a world-West. Therefore, while attempting to 
transgress West it must persist in the process of metamorphosis while maintaining its place of 
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belonging in the space/time West. Clarifying the nature of the Being-West, I argue, it is the 
double consciousness, an interdependent co-arising, a flow of energy, bundle of intensities, the 
knot of physicality, consciousness, and spirit swept up and transfigured in the rhizomatic ballet 
of being-becoming that we understand as life. Attempting to define the Being-West, I (re)think 
its characteristics sifted through the philosophical matter of Buddhism and Ubuntu. This 
(re)thinking yields the Being-West as: communal, an inbetween-ness interwoven with the 
infinite, non-anthropocentric, the embracer of certain uncertainty, consciousness made manifest, 
dwelling in love, and an onto-triadic rheomode. In short, our being-ness–in–the–world is 
conceived as a holonic intersectionality of an absent present-past, a very present-present, and an 
absent present-future. The being-becoming of the Being-West is multi-directional, multiplicitous, 
rhizomatic, and always already caught up in the chaotic rhythm of the cosmic drum in 
communion with all. In each beat we become, with each movement made anew—never same, 
yet one-same. 
Much like Buddhism, the Being-West is also a philoso-praxis. Given our current 
subjugation to West, the metamorphosis toward Being-West requires the active engagement in 
ontological and epistemological recalibration of each being-human. The Noble Eightfold Path—
Right View, Right Thinking, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood, Right Diligence, 
Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration—fused together with the Ngzu Tani (five 
principles)—kujichagulia, ujimaa, nia, kuumba, and imani—comprise a philoso-praxis for the 
cultivation of a being-ness oriented toward wholeness and harmony (Hahn, 1999; Ramose, 2002; 
Broodryk, 2006; Nafukho, 2006, Eze, 2008; Forster, 2010). Through this philoso-praxis, the 
Being-West manifests as the embodiment and concrete realization of the perpetual striving of 
being-becoming more human and begins to dance in sync with the rhythm of the cosmos.  
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Chapter 6 explores the aims of education from Plato to Heidegger, and utilizes seminal 
student affairs documents to conduct an ontohistorical analysis of the American philosophy of 
higher education. Ontologically (re)thinking higher education, through Buddhism and Ubuntu, 
institutions of higher education are (re)formed into onto-epistemological wombs of being-
becoming Being-West. Suggesting that much like the Western fragmentation of ontology and 
epistemology, institutions of higher education are no longer uni-, but multi-versities that have 
lost sight of their original goals of ontological formation inseparable from epistemological 
cultivation. As Thomson (2001) avers, the multi-versity is “an internally fragmented Uni-versity-
in-name-only, where the sole communal unity stems from a common grievance about parking 
spaces” (p. 251). (re)Thinking higher education with the onto-epistemologies of Buddhism and 
Ubuntu, I open up the possibilities for institutions of higher education to be differently in the 
world. The ontological (re)thinking of higher education yields an onto-educational philosophy 
that re-ontologizes higher education and re-essentializes the pursuit of higher learning as a means 
through which beings-human deepen their humanity. (re)Thinking an absent present-future onto-
educational metamorphosis of higher education institutions, four primary philosophical pillars 
emerged. More specifically, institutions of higher education are: reconceptualized as a 
community of (un)learners; they are moral; they are dialogical and reflexive; they are democratic 
(in the African sense of the notion); and finally, they are humanizing.  
In essence, a Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued philosophy of higher education (onto-
educational philosophy) reorients the educative milieu to a space/time where learners can 
become more fully human by entering more deeply into communion with one another, which re-
ontologizes the educative pursuit. Even more, an onto-educational philosophy shifts the higher 
education milieu from its current status of polytechnic institution characterized by economic 
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epistemological fear toward an un-fragmented or uni-onto-educational institution, where the 
molding of the being of Beings holds equality with the production and acquisition of knowledge 
(Thomson, 2001).  
Finally, at the close of Chapter 6, I contend the cultivation of communalism, morality 
(ethics), dialogue and reflexivity, and a deeper understanding of our shared humanity in the 
conception of an onto-educational philosophy of higher education moves us collectively toward 
justice, mutual respect (love), the limitless imagining (hope) of what we are not yet but might 
become (faith). This ontological (re)thinking of higher education through Buddhism and Ubuntu 
reminds all within the community of (un)learners that we are always in the process of our being-
becoming. I assert the (re)shaping of ontology within institutions of higher education is 
conducted through the circulation of discourse and an authentic modeling of humanity at the site 
of each being-human.  
Implications on Policy and Practice 
Given the nature of the inquiry, my belief that being-knowing-doing are inseparable, and 
theoretical underpinnings of the (non)methodology discussed in Chapter 4, I seek to avoid the 
reductionist tendencies of traditional research by cataloging intended or unintended policy 
implications. The aim of this study is to disrupt and (re)imagine the current discourse regarding 
the nature and purpose of higher education by introducing new imaginings and encouraging 
dialogue. An idea, I argue, precedes every action. To reiterate, the goal of this inquiry is not to 
produce a list of best practices or a prescription for metamorphosis; however, the goal is 
provocation of thought, meaningful dialogue, and the illumination of possibilities. According to 
Freire (1970/2000), dialogue characterizes an epistemological relationship that affects our being-
in-the-world. Thus in a sense, dialogue is a way of knowing and should never be viewed as a 
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mere tactic…” (p. 17). An engagement in the dialogical, which Freire (1970/2000) classifies as 
an epistemological curiosity, leads to liberation from old regime thinking. Therefore, the 
introduction of an idea interrogated and problematized through dialogue, frees us from the prison 
of the known and transforms praxis, which Louw (2011) defines as an intentionality in thought, 
behavior, or action (Chopra, 1994; Freire, 1970/2000). This praxis constitutes a habitus, which 
gradually necessitates an ontological metamorphosis and catalyzes a new becoming (Louw, 
2011). In that vein, we engage in a discussion of policy as discourse (Bacchi, 2000). 
Critical to the analysis of this study is hermeneutics, which situates the importance of 
language; narrative is how human beings share and make sense of the world (Savin-Baden & 
Major, 2012; Hendry, 2010). The primacy of language is recognized by ‘policy as discourse’ 
theorist (Bacchi, 2000; Jones, 2009) and the ability of discourse to shape both what we know and 
what we can know now that was unknown before (Bacchi, 2000). Regarding discourse, Foucault 
(1972) reminds, 
…[discourses] are not as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and word: an 
obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, coloured chain of words; I would like to 
show that discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality 
and a language (langue), the intrication of a lexicon and an experience; I would like to 
show with precise examples that in analyzing discourses themselves, one sees the 
loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of 
a group of rules proper to discursive practice. These rules define not the dumb existence 
of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of things. “Words and 
things” is the entirely serious title of a problem; it is the ironic title of a work that 
modifies its own form, displaces its own data, and reveals, at the end of the day, a quite 
different task. A task that consists of not–of no longer–treating discourses as groups of 
signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed 
of signs; but what they do is more than just use these signs to designate things. It is this 
more than that must reveal and describe. (Foucault, 1971/1972, pp. 48-49) 
In this way, discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, shapes “what the subject is able and what the 
subject is permitted to say” (Bacchi, 2000, p. 51). However, the undercurrents of critical theory 
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inherent in policy as discourse, acknowledges the ability of an agentic subject to transgress, in so 
much as possible, the powers that dominate to create change (Bacchi, 2000). In short, policy as 
discourse, seeks to open the discursive field in the policy realm for the purposes of social change 
(Bacchi, 2000). Its importance cannot be underestimated in (re)creating the world in which we 
live and are allowed to imagine.  
To illustrate policy as discourse at work, Jones (2009) provides the following example: 
…in the South, for example, Chinouya (2007) examines the role played by the traditional
African concept of Ubuntu, which sees knowledge and ways of life as intimately bound 
up with people’s interdependence and relationships with each other in response to 
HIV/AIDs in Zimbabwe. (pp. 15-16) 
The author argues the deeply embedded cultural idea of the onto-epistemological notion of 
Ubuntu served as a means for successful policy implementation (Jones, 2009; Ramose, 2002).  
Pinar et al. (2008) contends the aim of “research is to stimulate self-reflection, self-
understanding, and social change. Simply put…theoretical research is intended to provoke 
questions as much as it is to answer questions” (pp. 56-57). In addition to the provocation of 
questions, Stovall (2013) asserts theory should lead to a “commitment to on the ground work” (p. 
295); social justice should be viewed as “experienced phenomenon” (p. 294), whereby scholars 
have an obligation to understand the context of the spaces within which they work; scholars must 
utilize an interdisciplinary approach and train others to do the same. To put it another way, 
theoretical discussions without action are dead. Hahn (1999) eloquently reminds,  
But at some point, all of our concepts and ideas must yield to our actual experience. 
Words and ideas are only useful if they are put into practice. When do we stop discussing 
things and begin to realize the teachings of our life, a moment comes when we realize 
that our life is the path, and we no longer rely merely on the forms of practice. Our action 
becomes “non-action,” and our practice becomes “non-practice” The boundary has been 
crossed, and our practice cannot be set back. We do not have to transcend the ‘world of 
dust” (saha) in order to go to some dust-free world called nirvana. (p. 122).  
In this way, the most lasting implication is for those whose consciousness has been (re)awakened 
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to begin to model the way–to model the recognition of our shared humanity through their 
interactions with other beings-human.  
Implications for the Community of (un)Learners. Again, in keeping with the 
assertions and assumptions of (re)thinking as (non)method, I will not offer a listing of 
recommendations; however, I will posit a range of possibilities. The implication of a Buddhist 
and Ubuntu-hued onto-educational philosophy is an engagement in a philoso-praxis that alters all 
aspects of the life of the beings-human. For example, the Being-West displays: an understanding 
of shared humanity and interconnectedness, an ethic of mutual care for the all in the community 
of (un)learners, compassion, sharing, sympathy, empathy, mindfulness, recognition, 
encouragement, ability to communicate, respect and dignity of the personhood of each 
individual, responsibility for self and all within the community of (un)learners, understanding, 
tolerance, and equality. Additionally, the Being-West is the embodiment of the Brahmavirharas 
or the Four Immeasurable Minds and is imbued with compassion, joy, equanimity, and love 
(Hanh, 1999). Taking up Hanh’s (1999) assertion that all transformation begins first at the site of 
the ‘individual’ being-human and infiltrates the community-at-large, imagine society writ large 
inhabited by those educated in onto-educational institutions or educated by those who have 
attended onto-educational institutions of higher education.  
First, imagine a higher education institution president who is instilled with an 
understanding of onto-educational philosophy. His/her decisions are not based on self-interest, 
but for the good of entire community of (un)learners. Even more so, he/she does not make the 
decision alone, but receives feedback and input from the community to ensure agreement and 
lessen strife. He/she ensures that the decision does not dehumanize members of the community 
of (un)learners, but seeks to uphold the dignity and respect of all persons in the community.  
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While the higher education institution president is important to the micro-community, 
imagine the being-ness of the macro-community—the politicians, judges, teachers, professors, 
law enforcement officers, clergy and those who have been criminalized in the West—if they 
were educated for humanity in an environment that valued their humanity and modeled 
differently how to be-in-the-world with others. These members of the community, educated 
differently in an environment undergirded with an onto-educational philosophy would see no 
separation between themselves and the beings-human they come in contact with everyday. Not 
only would these beings-humans be epistemologically well equipped for their respective 
professions, but also they would be ontologically or spiritually equipped to deal with the being-
ness of others. For example, a Buddhist and Ubuntu-hued onto-education would engender the 
following in beings-human: self-awareness, the courage to face suffering and pain, a recognition 
of difference as generative, a holistic view of the world, a strong social justice orientation, 
dialogue toward reconciliation, and compassion (Lantieri, 2004).  
For the onto-educated politician, the practice of conversational justice (MacIntyre, 1999) 
and the compassion of deep listening would radically alter the game politic. Politicians from 
each side would be given to reconciliatory dialogue toward harmony and for the betterment of all 
in society. The narrow self-interested, presentistic, atomistic nature of Western politics would 
transform into an endeavor for communal good. I am not advocating for an era of communist 
politics; however, I am imagining the benefits of the current capitalist-dominated political party 
system, reconstituted as moderate democratic socialism. The vitriolic discourse and the verbal 
violence may lessen considerably.  
For the onto-educated judge, the restoration of communal harmony through 
reconciliatory dialogue is more important than punishment. Gade (2012) writes: 
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Instead of pursuing punishment, you are more interested in restoring relationships. That is 
fundamental to ubuntu because ubuntu does not focus on what has been done to you, 
ubuntu focuses on how we can be restored together as a community, so that we can heal 
together. Ubuntu does not only concentrate on the pain that has been caused to me, but 
also recognizes the damage that has been done to you. In the course of what you are 
doing to me, you are also hurting yourself (interview on 26 November 2008). (p. 493) 
The power to punish remains, but the necessity of punishing diminishes among those educated in 
onto-educational institutions of higher education (Foucault, 1977). Again, the aim becomes 
restorative justice, communal harmony, recognition of the suffering of the perpetrator and the 
suffering inflicted upon the victim. Further, Ubuntu holds that we are not only responsible for 
one another, but we are mirrors of the Other. This onto-educational understanding of punishment 
and an understanding of their being-ness as Being-West would alter the very being-doing of law 
enforcement and the judiciary alike. It would radically alter the way they communicate and deal 
with all those they come into contact with. 
Possibly, it is the teacher/professor who has the most responsibility in the world. It is 
their very being-ness within all levels of education that shapes the hearts and minds of the 
beings-human, whose being-ness will come to shape our world. The onto-educated 
teacher/professor (Chief (un)Learner) recognizes they are forming not only the minds, but the 
hearts of beings-humans. Unlike our current reality, the ontological and epistemological are 
equally privileged. Even more, the Chief (un)Learner recognizes each being-human as their 
responsibility—their brother/sister/child/mirror—and truest reflection of themselves. The sub-
community of (un)learners are treated equally and difference is treated as generative, which 
should lessen the instances of discrimination or prejudice. The chief (un)learner also practices 
the courage to let (un)learn-be and assists his/her (un)learners in traversing the sometime harsh 
terrain of life (Heidegger, 1976). For instance, I often ask teachers: Do you love your students? 
Do you see yourself in your students? The response of the answer to this question is devastating 
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for the society as a whole and negatively shapes the hearts of (un)learners. Love and mutual care 
are the products of the (un)learner and Chief (un)Learner relationship informed by an onto-
educational philosophy.  
The following example illustrates the necessity of an onto-educational philosophy of 
education. For example, a recorded interview of K-12 educator Suzanne Lepeintre is circulating 
the internet (Liberty & Justice for All, 2015), where she speaks candidly about the treatment of 
Black male elementary school students at the hands of white female teachers. Lepeintre, who is 
white, states:  
…culture informs everything that we do and most white people, because we live in a
country where we see ourselves everywhere and everyway; our culture is validated 
everywhere and in everyway. We don’t understand how our cultural values are brought 
into the classroom. When a white boy walks into the room, we understand him. We have 
similar cultural values. We understand how to behave, how to talk, how to respond to one 
another. If I am a white woman and he is a white boy, he can see me as his mother and I 
can see him as my child that positions him to know not only that he is right in the world, 
but that he deserves to feel comfortable and that he is really claiming his rightful place in 
the world to be a leader. A white boy who walks in the room and is animated and moving 
around and maybe even a little cheeky—is smart. Isn’t he smart, isn’t he cheeky. He is 
almost looked at as boys will be boys. A boy of color, especially an African-American 
boy who walks in the room exhibiting the same behavior walks in and you say, 
“Uhmmm…I might need to keep an eye on him. And that I really believe is our 
internalized racism that we are afraid of these young boys. And I’m talking young boys—
4 years old and above. Instead of the teacher looking at him/herself and saying, “What is 
going on with me that this same behavior that this same behavior creates fear in me 
instead of admiration?” We pathologized the boy’s color.” (Liberty & Justice for All, 
2015) 
Clearly, we need new cultural values; however, this is the reality of our very present-present. The 
teacher corps which is largely white and female in a country whose demographics are majority 
Black and Brown must be transformed. This typical white supremacist, Western behavior is a by-
product and continuation of the West’s ontological murder through epistemological violence. 
The ontology of little Black boys in American classrooms are being negatively molded and their 
being-becoming stifled at the hands of teachers who do not recognize difference as generative, 
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who have not done the work of critical reflexivity, and most assuredly do not practice 
compassion. These teachers have no love for students who are perceived as different. Love and 
understanding are the core of an onto-educational philosophy.  
In practice, the implications of the new insights gleaned from the study are potentially 
transformative and far-reaching within the fields of higher education, student affairs, and 
education, in general. Darling-Hammond (2010) and United Nations University (2009) provide 
illustrations of the global impact of engaging similar ideas in practice. The effect on theory, 
policy and practice of student development and the field of Student Affairs has transformative 
potential. For example, over the last year in the field of student affairs, I embarked on the 
creation of a program titled, “Dinner and Discussion” at a Research I university located in the 
southern United States. Putting into practice the philosophies, tenets, and values of Ubuntu and 
Buddhism, I designed the grant-funded program to engage student organizations on disparate 
ends of the stereotypical identity spectrum. The program was designed for students of each of the 
organizations to come together over a meal to discuss themselves, campus life, and societal 
issues. These discussions were to yield more than trivial dialogue on current events, but 
demonstrate in a very subtle way that this person, these people that you have been avoiding due 
to conformist campus discourse are no different from you. The goal was to illuminate and 
catalyze an understanding of a shared humanity. This programmatic example illustrates an 
enactment of idea-in-praxis.  
Additionally, in a blog post titled, “The Issue We See is Not the Problem We Have: The 
Great NASPA–Yik Yak Debacle of 2015,” (Robinson-Morris, 2015) I attempted to utilize 
discourse in critique of and to advocate for changes in both student affairs policy and the 
philosophical foundations of the field. More specifically, I argued for a true modeling of 
 238 
humanity for our students. However, recognizing the risks associated with the modeling of our 
humanness approach to policy advocacy, I offered the following words of encouragement: 
I’m certain that you are reading this and asking two questions: How–within the confines 
of university rules, human resource protocols, and restrictive societal norms–am I to 
model the fullness of my humanity? Is this not a huge risk? First, just live. Live fully, 
presently, and awake. Second, of course it is a risk; Gert Biesta (2014) asserts “that 
education always involves a risk” (p. 1). (Robinson-Morris, 2015, para. 10) 
The risk is worth it. The risk of leaning into the turn, that is, adopting the onto-epistemological 
position theorized in this study is counterbalanced by the harmonizing reward of the dignity and 
respect of the personhood of each individual and a recognition of our interconnectedness. Dewey 
(1902) argues each student “…represent[s] the dawning of a flickering light that will shine 
steadily only in the far future” (p. 14). How many students have their "flickering lights" 
extinguished before they have the opportunity to enkindle within themselves the fire of 
education, of success, and before believing that they too can step courageously and triumphantly 
into the joy of their own purpose? Even more important, how many students have received the 
light of destructive ideologies and will pass on the dimming light of destructive thinking to the 
impressionable minds of their students and children? Finally, with a deep and abiding 
understanding that each of us already are all that we want to become, the goal in education and 
human relationships is a new being-becoming catalyzed by a “critical ontology of ourselves” 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 50) and humanity.  
Thoughts on the Plateau 
In keeping with the (non)methodology (Chapter 4), this inquiry provides no conclusions. 
In fact, there is no beginning and no end, we arrive on a new plateau, we arrive at middle to 
(re)think, and to let (un)learn-be in a multi-directional manner. Onto-educational philosophy, 
undergirded with the onto-epistemological matter of Buddhism and Ubuntu, is a philoso-praxis 
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in love. Love liberates beings-human in the present-present and is an act of creation of the 
beings-human who are to be made manifest in the absent present-future. Onto-education calls us 
out of the depths of ourselves in love and sends us back to ourselves to love more deeply with 
the recognition that we are one-same. Love in the face of fear is courage.  
This inquiry encompasses a “critical ontology ourselves” (Foucault, 1984, p. 50), a 
history of the present-present, taking in account an absent present-past, and looking critically 
with hope toward an absent present-future of higher education to make good on its moral 
obligation and responsibility to set humanity on a new course through education. Abiding in the 
present-present and always affected by an absent present-past, I encounter a generative fissure of 
nascency between the two, which realizes the being-human as a site of onto-courage in the midst 
of epistemological fear. This generative fissure introduces not agency per se, but the courage to 
be differently—onto-courage—in an environment where fear of difference is its own stronghold. 
Hanh (2008) declares that we fight not against men, but ideologies. As I have contended 
elsewhere, our present-present higher educational milieu can be characterized as an 
epistemological regime of fear—fear is simply an idea made manifest in behavior. Love does not 
and cannot exist in a regime of fear, but love must be introduced to transform fear. Courage—
from the heart; it is from the heart, first, that we must educate to the heart of our brother/sister 
living in fear. If you are reading this, I call on you to practice onto-courage right where you are. I 
call on you to utilize the generous, generative, and humanizing onto-epistemologies of Buddhism 
and Ubuntu to be differently-in-the-world, in your homes, in your classrooms, in your 
educational institutions.  
As you begin the process of metamorphosis toward the Being-West, remember the 
Being-West dwells in love. This means the heart-mind is always inclined toward love. Again, not 
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eros, not inauthentic sentimentality or mush, but agape—the unobstructed, unconditional, open 
force that binds us all in community. The depth of me calls to the depth of you to practice onto-
courage, to practice radical love toward a revolutionary being-becoming. One act of courage 
provokes another. 
“Radical love demands that we utilize dialogue as a means of subverting dominant 
positionalities, since [love] ‘cannot exist in a relation of domination’” (Freire, 1993, p. 89 as 
cited in Douglas & Nganga, 2013, p. 64). Love–metta and radical–in the educational domain 
compels us to disrupt hierarchy, to move beyond domination, and shatters narrow self-interest 
(Hinsdale, 2012; Oliver, 2000; hooks, 2000; Hanh, 1999). When a system tightens its reigns, 
fails to hear the cry of its subjects or denies freedom to those struggling against its oppressive 
force(s), then love compels us toward revolution!  
Kristeva (2000) suggests love is a requisite of social revolution and hooks (1994) 
reminds, “The moment we choose to love we begin to move towards freedom, to act in ways that 
liberate ourselves and others” (p. 250). Not the ‘right to bear arms,’ Boston Tea Party revolution, 
but an educational revolution that utilizes “problem-posing education...[as] revolutionary 
futurity” (Freire, 2000, p. 84). Freire (2002) asserts problem-posing education recognizes human 
beings “in the process of becoming” (p. 84) with the prophetic hope to “transcend themselves” 
(P. 84). Deleuze (1990) argues: 
They say revolutions turn out badly. But they’re constantly confusing two different 
things, the way revolutions turn out historically and people’s revolutionary becoming. 
These relate to two different sets of people. Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary 
becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable. 
(para. 4)  
In the face of the intolerable circumstances we now find ourselves in, the dialogical and 
prophetic possibilities (Freire, 2000) offered by Ubuntu (Eze, 2010; Waghid, 2013; Ramose, 
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2002) and Buddhism (Hahn, 1999), and the relational attitudes and practices mediated through 
the Brahmaviharas offers a means of cultivating radical love to bring about an ontological 
revolutionary becoming to “disentangle the threads of complicated [educational and] social 
relations” (Hinsdale, 2012, p. 36). De-centering West and awakened to an interconnected, 
intimately interwoven world where we are but mirrors of one another and love reigns supreme, 
there is no choice but to be-do differently–to align our epistemology, methodology, and axiology 
with our transformed ontology–this is our revolutionary being-becoming, our personal and 
institutional ontological metamorphosis. Transfigured, metamorphosed by (re)thinking, we arrive 
again differently just as we started on a new plateau burgeoning with new lines of flight, new 
rhizomatic becomings toward an ever-present absent present-future.  
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